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This dissertat ion examines the influence of international 
insti tutions on religious NGO claims making.   An analysis of rel igious 
participation in Human Rights addresses three general  questions.   
First ,  how has the rationalization of the human rights f ield influenced 
levels of rel igious mobilization in human rights?  Second, how, and 
through what mechanisms, do religious NGO frames transform as a 
result  of part icipation in secular international inst i tutions?  Third,  
how, and through what mechanisms, is  access to human rights 
insti tutions associated with rel igious and regional characterist ics of 
NGO?  These questions are addressed through analyses of 24 key- 
informant interviews, United Nations documents and press releases 
pertaining to the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, and 
an original  dataset  comprised of 591 rel igious human rights 
organizations.    
First ,  rel igious NGO foundings over the past  century show that  
religious movement into the public sphere increased while Human 
Rights  was becoming a highly bureaucratized regime with 
international insti tutions at  i ts  core.   Interviews with religious NGO 
members confirm that the increase in rel igious NGO foundings over 
the past  f i f ty years does not indicate cooptation of religious NGOs for  
the pursuit  of secular agendas.   Rather,  rel igion st i l l  serves as the 
primary motivating force behind human rights activism among 
religious NGOs.  
Second, analyses of interviews and United Nations documents 
reveal two strategies – discursive secularization and procedural  
rat ionalism – that  rel igious groups use to assert  claims, to create 
al l iances with other NGOs, and to minimize conflict  in si tuations 
where religious and secular human rights norms conflict .   Religious 
NGOs use these strategies to capital ize on advantages and mitigate 
disadvantages associated with religious affi l iat ion in terms of al l iance 
formation and competit ion for  funding within Human Rights.   
 Third,  binomial logist ic regression reveals that  NGO 
consultat ive status with international insti tutions systematically varies 
by religious affi l iat ion and location of secretariat .   This variat ion is  
explained by the intersection of two types of variables:  those 
indicating conformity to hegemonic principles and those indicating 
organizational resource capaci ty.   In spi te of insti tutional 
differentiation,  rel igion not only remains relevant in the public 
sphere,  but also continues to be influenced by relationships with states 
at  the transnational level  of analysis.       
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CHAPTER ONE 
 THE SACRED AND SECULAR IN  
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS  
 
So let  us today,  from this great centre of  global community,  reaff irm 
every man and woman's fundamental  right to freedom of religion….  
Where governments and authorit ies fail  to protect  these freedoms, i t  is  
at  once an affront  and a menace.   Where religions and their adherents 
are persecuted,  defamed, assaulted or  denied due process,  we are all  
diminished, our societies undermined.  There must be no room in the 
twenty-f irst  century for religious bigotry and intolerance… 
 
As the world's  religious and spiri tual leaders,  you embody humanity 's  
deepest  yearnings.   You have traveled many paths to this t ime and 
place.   Some of you have been imprisoned for your beliefs .   Some have 
survived the Holocaust,  or seen your people targeted for genocide.   
St i l l  others have l ived through other tribulations and indignit ies.   
Whatever your past ,  whatever your call ing,  and whatever the 
dif ferences among you, your presence here at  the United Nations 
signif ies your commitment to our global  mission of  tolerance,  
development and peace.   
 
UN Secretary-General  Kofi  Annan  
August 29,  2000, UN General  Assembly Hall ,  New York 
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Quoted above is  an excerpt from Kofi  Annan’s address to the 
Millennium World Peace Summit of Religious and Spiri tual  Leaders,  
which took place at  the United Nations (UN) in August 2000.  The 
purpose of the Summit was to bring together rel igious leaders from 
around the world to discuss how their  diverse tradit ions might 
collectively contribute to a framework for  building global peace.   To 
that  end, the part icipants hoped to create a religious advisory 
committee to the United Nations.   
The discourse of the Summit communicated a spiri t  of hope – a 
hope that  within the world’s religions lay a basis  for peaceful 
transnational cooperation.   In this event ,  we get  a sense of religion as 
an insti tution that ,  despite i ts  own internal  problems with war and 
conflict ,  nonetheless operates according to a logic that  somehow 
transcends,  and is  to a certain degree detached from, that  of the 
secular poli t ical  world.   In Kofi  Annan’s address,  we get  a glimpse of 
diverse religions being discursively constructed as equally worthy of a 
sacred insti tutional space,  one that  is  protected from the potentially 
destructive imposit ions of pol i t ical  interests and conflicts .   This was 
the spiri t  conveyed in the official  discourse of the Summit,  and 
presumably in the hearts and minds of the part icipants.  
Practice,  however,  was another matter ,  and posed a conspicuous 
challenge to the integri ty of the Summit’s discourse.   Although over 
1,000 religious and spiri tual  leaders from around the world,  and from 
all  major fai ths,  were invited to the summit,  one very important f igure 
was left  off the guest  l is t  – the Dalai  Lama.  In spite of the fact  that  
he represents over 15 mill ion Buddhists  globally and is  a Nobel Peace 
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Prize recipient,  the Dalai  Lama was excluded from the Summit as a 
result  of protests  from the Chinese government and Chinese religious 
leaders.   In reference to the spiri tual  leader’s opposit ion to the 
Chinese occupation of Tibet ,  his detractors described him as a 
“turmoil-maker instead of a peace-maker” and therefore inappropriate 
for  inclusion in a peace summit.   Since northern governments were 
concerned not to offend China during a period that  coincided with 
sensit ive economic negotiations,  the Dalai  Lama’s invitat ion was 
withheld.    
Once news broke of this renowned spiri tual  leader’s exclusion 
from the Summit,  t ransnational protest  poured out from religious and 
secular circles al ike,  mainly in the forms of peti t ions,  withdrawal 
from participation in the Summit,  and public statements condemning 
the UN’s failure to issue “His Holiness” an invitation.   One of the 
more publicized cri t icisms came from Archbishop Desmund Tutu,  who 
wrote to Kofi  Annan stat ing that ,  had he init ial ly planned to at tend the 
Summit,  he would have “withdrawn as a small  protest  against  a very 
sad aberration.”1  Tutu further commented that  the exclusion of the 
Dalai  Lama “… totally undermines the integri ty of the UN and the 
credibil i ty of the summit.”2  
Subsequent to the outpouring of  public protest ,  the summit’s 
organizers  extended a late invi tation to the Dali  Lama, asking him to 
give a speech to the Summit part icipants at  a nearby hotel .   The 
international celebrity gracefully declined the invitation,  however,  
                                                          
1 Scoop News Agent, Friday, August 25, 2000. 
2 BBC News, Friday, August 2, 2000. 
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cit ing a prior commitment.   In l ieu of his at tendance,  he sent a writ ten 
address in support  of the general  goals of the Summit.   When the 
Buddhist  delegation read his address,  members of the Chinese 
government walked out in protest .    
At f irst  glance,  this story might str ike the observer as a clear-
cut,  realist  account of the epiphenomenal posit ion of culture in 
international relat ions.   The actions of each of the relevant  part ies  – 
the conference organizers,  the Dalai  Lama, the Chinese government – 
can easily be explained as pol i t ically or  economically motivated.   
Whether examined from the standpoint of Communists,  Buddhists or  
Neoliberals in the story,  the underlying issues at  stake,  ( terr i torial  
sovereignty,  trade relations),  were interest-based.   And regardless of 
the “rightness” or “wrongness” of the Chinese occupation,  the Dalai  
Lama’s presence at  the UN would indeed have raised questions about 
the Chinese government’s  act ions in Tibet,3 thus violating UN rules 
requiring nongovernmental  part icipation to be str ict ly apoli t ical .   
Indeed, on the surface,  the entire spectacle can be understood in terms 
of matters of state,  poli t ics and economics.   Rel igion,  from this 
perspective,  is  incidental ,  a  mere “tool” for expressing what are 
ult imately economic interests .   
But i f  we dig a bit  deeper,  the event raises addit ional quest ions 
that  are not so easily answered through straightforward appeals to 
realism and economic rat ionalism.  First ,  there is  the fact ,  in and of 
i tself ,  of  an event called the Millennium World Peace Summit of 
Religious and Spiri tual  Leaders being held at  the United Nations,  a 
                                                          
3 In The News, September 2, 2000. 
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primary purpose of which was to create a global  religious advisory 
group to the UN.4 And, in this regard,  the Millennium Summit is  
hardly an isolated case.   Religious groups have been adopting 
increasingly assert ive stances at  the UN on a broad array of issues 
since the early 1990s,  in many instances further advancing “cultural  
r ights” claims that  were prominently debated during the UN World 
Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.  In recent years,  
rel igious groups have wielded considerable influence in the draft ing 
of UN declarations on cri t ical  issues such as human rights for women, 
HIV/AIDS, and population and development (Buss and Herman 2003; 
Sunder 2002).   Meanwhile,  the legit imacy of religious authority in the 
transnational public sphere is  strengthened through highly publicized 
events l ike the Millennium Summit.  
 Religious involvement is  also increasing in other major 
international insti tutions.   For instance,  since the mid-1990s,  the 
World Bank has sponsored a series of conferences aimed at  bringing 
religious leadership into closer dialogue with the Bank and the 
international development community.   Meanwhile,  in spite of 
depressed levels of church attendance in “secularizing Europe” (Bruce 
1996),  the European Commission has been the si te of concerted efforts  
to improve dialogue with religious communities and leaders in 
increasingly formal and structured ways.   One explici t ly stated goal of 
this  effort  has been to al low religious leaders and communities to 
influence “the meaning, spiri tual  direction,  and ethical  dimension of 
                                                          
4 Christian Century, September 13, 2000. 
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European unification and the policies developed in this context” 
(Jansen 2000, p.  104).   
Second, the higher profi le that  rel igion is  adopting in 
international insti tutions is  not only relevant in terms of religion.   I t  
also tel ls  us something about the impact  of civil  society more 
generally.   In the case of the Millennium Summit,  protests  against  the 
exclusion of “His Holiness” not only occurred,  but they also had an 
impact,  culminating in the issuance of an invitat ion for the Dalai  
Lama to speak to the Summit,  despite the wishes of the Chinese 
government.   Normative claims issuing from global civil  society 
mattered.    
Granted,  one might st i l l  maintain a str ict ly material ist  stance 
and dismiss the UN’s recognition of rel igious and nonstate actors as 
mere “window dressing” – symbolic nods in the direction of civil  
society in order to garner public support  for an insti tution that  
ult imately exists  to promote the economic and poli t ical  interests of i ts  
member states.   But  even if  this were the case,  we must  concede that ,  
for  some reason, this window dressing is  perceived to be effective – 
even necessary.   At  one level or another ,  the archi tects of 
international insti tutions recognize that  rel igion and spiri tuali ty are 
powerful  sources of meaning through which many publics  interpret  
their  membership in local ,  national and even global communities.   
That the Dalai  Lama’s status as a religious leader  should outweigh 
concerns about his status as the leader  of a poli t ical ,  anti-government  
movement  is  no small  matter,  especially in an insti tution such as the 
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UN, in which national sovereignty has t radit ional ly stood as a sacred 
principle.    
This entire spectacle should give us pause to consider not only 
the influence of non-state actors in international relations,  but the 
addit ional  leverage that  accrues to non-state actors when they claim 
the authority of a religious tradit ion.   On the one hand, perhaps the 
support  for the Dalai  Lama at  the Millennium Summit was an 
aberration,  an exception to an otherwise secularizing trend in global 
poli t ics.   But,  on the other,  perhaps this event is  part  of a larger 
pattern of increasing religious legit imacy and influence on the world 
stage,  in spite of the rat ionalization of global poli t ics through 
integration of markets and construction of international  inst i tutions.   
The possibil i ty of the lat ter  scenario raises important  questions for 
scholars of both secularization and globalization about  the 
relationship between religious and secular authority as we move to the 
transnational level  of analysis.   That  is ,  i t  provides us with a new 
angle from which to examine the relationship between rationalism and 
public religion ,  which will  be the general  topic of this dissertation.     
In using the term “rationalism” I  am referring to the following 
characterist ics of organizational f ields:  insti tutional differentiat ion,  
bureaucratization,  professionalization,  s tandardization,  quantif ication,  
and the application of legal and scientific principles to social  
problems.  Each of these characterist ics will  be i l lustrated in greater 
detail  in the next section.   I  am particularly interested in rat ionalism 
as i t  manifests  i tself in formal insti tutions,  part icularly the 
international insti tutions that  provide the core of the global human 
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rights regime. Although insti tutionalization does consti tute  a 
departure from strict ly economic,  i .e .  market ,  rat ionalism, many of the 
features of formal inst i tut ions are themselves rat ional,  regardless of 
whether or not they produce rational,  or even intended, outcomes.  
Furthermore,  I  am not interested in rat ionalism as a characterist ic of 
individual  actors,  but  as a characterist ic of social  structures such as 
organizations,  insti tutions,  and social  movement f ields.5  
Borrowing from Casanova, I  define “public religion” as rel igion 
that  is  oriented toward “the public arena of moral  and poli t ical  
contestation” (Casanova 1994, p.3).   Casanova identifies  three forms 
of secularization and points out that  they can occur in tandem, in 
opposit ion,  or  independent of one another,  and therefore must  be 
assessed separately if  we wish to move the secularization debate 
forward (Casanova 1994, p.211).   He identifies "secularization 1) as 
differentiat ion of the secular spheres from religious inst i tut ions and 
norms, 2) as the decline of rel igious bel iefs and practices,  and 3)  as 
the marginalization of rel igion to a  privatized sphere" (Casanova,  
1994, p.  211).   This  study measures the third form by observing i ts  
opposite:  public religion.   “Public religion” stands in contrast  to 
“privatized” religion (religion oriented toward regulation of the 
private sphere),  and indicates a “refusal  to accept  the marginal and 
privatized role which theories of modernity as well  as theories of 
secularization had reserved for them” (Casanova 1994, p.  5).   For the 
                                                          
5 Following DiMaggio and Powell  (1991b: 64 – 65), by organizational field I mean those organizations 
that, in aggregate, constitute a recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product 
consumers, regulatory agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products.  In 
term of social movements, a field would include activist organizations, NGOs, international institutions, 
legal establishments, universities, regulatory agencies, and the like, i.e. organizations and institutions 
that engage in practices and provide resources relevant to the social movement in question.  
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purposes of this project ,  the founding or operation of a rel igious 
human rights NGO would indicate an assert ion of public religious 
authority.  
In this dissertation,  I  will  focus on one aspect of the 
relationship between rationalism and public rel igion by examining the 
role of international inst i tutions in ei ther suppressing or facil i tat ing 
religious influence in national  and transnational civil  societies.   
Specifically,  I  will  address the following question: How do secular 
international insti tutions influence patterns and forms of  religious 
claims-making in international poli t ics?   Turning our attention away 
from the disruptive forms of contentious poli t ics associated with 
religious activism, and toward religious conflict  within the formal 
arenas of international insti tutions,  will  shed l ight on an important but 
neglected dimension of rel igious conflict .   This dimension includes 
power among states,  and the highly ri tualized world of diplomacy 
wherein that  power is  symbolically negotiated.   As the chapters that  
follow will  demonstrate,  the secular culture to which I  will  refer,  and 
which consti tutes international insti tutions,  exerts  an important 
influence on religious expression,  and in patterned and predictable 
ways.     
I  wil l  explore the influence of international insti tutions on 
religious claims-making through an analysis of religious participation 
in the transnational organizational f ield of human rights (from here on 
to be referred to simply as “Human Rights”).   Three substantive 
chapters of this project  will  report  the findings of my empirical  
analyses aimed at  answering the following questions:    
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How has the rationalization of the human rights  f ield influenced 
overall  levels of rel igious mobilization in human rights (Chapter 
Three)? 
•  
•  
•  
How, and through what mechanisms, are rel igious mobilizing 
strategies and discourses influenced by part icipation in secular 
international insti tutions (Chapter Four)? 
How, and through what mechanisms, does access to internat ional 
human rights insti tutions vary across rel igious tradit ions (Chapter 
Five)? 
 
Why Human Rights? 
Several  characterist ics of the human rights field make i t  ideal  for a 
study of the relationship between rationalism and public religious 
authority.   To begin,  the “origin myth” of Human Rights  is  that  the 
field emerged as an outcome of enlightenment rationalism and the 
embrace of secular individualism as the cornerstone of r ights 
protections.   Though Enlightenment principles certainly did play a 
role in the field’s development ,  this popular account of Human Rights 
origins conceals the field’s historical  roots in the aboli t ionist  
movement  of the 19t h  century – a movement that  was comprised of 
predominantly Quaker,  Baptis t  and Methodist  act ivists  (Miller  1996;  
Keck and Sikkink 1998).   This transnational movement was organized 
in networks that  spanned continents but nonetheless lacked a 
centralized,  insti tut ional base (Keck and Sikkink 1998, p.  75).  
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However,  beginning with the establishment of the United 
Nations in 1948, and the explici t  codification of human rights norms 
into the Universal  Declaration of Human Rights,  human rights 
activism increasingly cohered around the centralized structures of the 
UN and other international insti tutions,  which have since served as the 
field’s insti tutional core and have been the targets most frequently 
called upon to address human rights grievances (Risse and Sikkink 
1999).   The structuring of the human rights regime6 around 
international insti tutions has been accompanied by an underlying 
rationalism that  is  evident in the marked bureaucratization,  
standardization,  and professionalization that  has occurred within i t  
over the past  half-century.  
For example,  in terms of the first  feature of rat ionalization,  
bureaucratization,  international insti tut ions themselves tend to be very 
large bureaucratic st ructures,  comprised of complex systems of 
classificat ion,  documentation,  formal procedures,  and chains of 
command.  Far  from being poli t ically neutral ,  these bureaucratic 
features were developed with an eye toward the selective management 
of the various types of NGOs (e.g.  northern,  southern,  scientif ic,  
activist)  seeking a “seat  at  the table” (Pei-heng 1981,  p.26) .   As Pei-
heng points out,  since the UN’s establishment,  “great  str ides have 
been made in bureaucratic sophistication and awareness of the proper 
and appropriate place of each actor in the international  scheme of 
things” (Pei-heng 1981, p.26) .   Human rights advocates who wish to 
                                                          
6 Following Jepperson (1991, p.150), by “regime” I mean “Institutionalization in some central authority 
system – that is, in explicitly codified rules and sanctions – without primary embodiment in a formal 
organizational apparatus… With regimes, expectations focus upon monitoring and sanctioning by some 
form of a differentiated, collective, “center.”  
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have their  grievances heard at  the UN must organize in ways that  
enable them to navigate these bureaucracies.   At the most basic level,  
international insti tutional part icipation requires the adoption of an 
organizational form, such as the “NGO,” which is  recognized as 
legit imate within the human r ights f ield.  
One way that  NGOs achieve legit imacy in Human Rights  is  
through compliance with a second form of rationalization – 
standardization.   Although over t ime Human Rights has become 
increasingly diverse in terms of the cultural  and national identi t ies of 
part icipating NGOs, by and large,  human rights  NGOs exhibit  common 
characterist ics and behaviors that  al low for the effective coordination 
of their  operations and signal  their  legit imacy within the field.   These 
characterist ics typically include public statements of support  for 
United Nations programs and principles,  the use of ei ther English or 
French as a working language,  facil i ty with western technology and 
models of bureaucratic management ,  and the use of standard sets of 
procedures for reporting human rights  violations.   
Related to standardization is  a  third feature:  professionalization.   
In contrast  to their  predominantly Quaker,  Baptis t  and Methodist  
predecessors (Miller  1996),  by and large,  today's  human rights 
advocates are members of professional  NGOs and are often,  
themselves,  professional advocates.   Human Rights Internet  reports 
worldwide 96 professional associations,  389 academic or universi ty-
based programs, 283 educational and training insti tutions,  and 620 
legally-oriented organizations (e.g.  bar associations,  law firms, legal 
resource centers)  that  focus on human r ights.   In other words,  the 
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human rights regime not only has international insti tutions at  i ts  core,  
but i t  is  also embedded in array of l inked insti tutional structures that  
provide i t  with legit imacy, material  support  and coherence.   That is ,  
Human Rights exhibits  the formal properties of an organizat ional 
f ield.  
 The substantial  presence of universi t ies and legal  
establishments is  associated with an important cultural  transformation 
in the field -  the transformation of human rights  discourse away from 
it  roots in natural  law and religious tradit ions,  to a f irm anchoring in 
the languages of posit ive law and science.   Hence,  rel igious NGOs 
operating at  the beginning of the 21s t  century are not only confronted 
with a  more pluralis t  organizational f ield than their  predecessors 
were,  but a more thoroughly secular discursive environment as well .   I  
will  refer to this transformation from religious to secular  language as 
discursive secularization .   
Due to their  centrali ty in the field,  international insti tutions 
play a large role in defining the terms for part icipation in Human 
Rights  -  terms that  are clearly rooted in Enlightenment rationalism, 
and “world cultural  principles” that  I  will  describe in Chapter Two. 
For example,  one need only read the preamble to the Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights for explicit  endorsement of principles 
such as universalism, individualism and world cit izenship.   Likewise,  
the language used in volumes of human rights covenants,  conventions,  
and declarations since the Universal  Declaration have been consistent 
enough with the lat ter  to warrant to the description “routine.” 
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According to the modernization paradigm that  the social  
sciences have assumed throughout much of their  development (which 
will  be discussed in greater detail  in the next chapter) ,  the extensive 
rationalization entailed in the consolidation of the human r ights 
regime should be associated with a  decline in public religious 
authority.   Yet,  i t  is  far  from clear that  any such decline has occurred.   
Religion,  as I  will  demonstrate in later  chapters,  continues to be an 
important factor  in both human rights activism and conflict ,  and i ts  
influence does not appear to be waning (Chapter  Three).    
The persistence of rel igion in Human Rights presents us with 
the opportunity to examine the relat ionship between rationalism and 
religiosity,  and to ask questions about the ways that  rel igious actors 
engage with the principles and rules embedded in a predominantly 
secular movement f ield (Chapter Four) .   For example,  does rationalism 
in Human Rights  create an environment that  requires religious groups 
to suppress religious expression as a condit ion of their  part icipation?  
Or do religious and secular forms of human rights advocacy coexist  
quite comfortably?  In either  case,  how do religious groups respond 
when conditions for Human Rights  participation require affirmations 
of l ifeways or practices that  conflict  with the religious beliefs of their  
members or consti tuencies?  The fact that  Human Rights is  organized 
around an insti tutional core is  especial ly useful  for examining these 
types of questions,  since formal insti tutions provide bounded spaces 
wherein we can observe the interaction between rel igious and secular 
authority,  and religious and secular norms.  
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But the questions just  posed assume two opposing and 
homogenous categories:  sacred and secular.   The organizat ion of the 
field around formal insti tutions also makes i t  well  suited for 
addressing a second set  of questions,  questions that  pertain to 
religious heterogeneity.   In terms of religion,  the NGOs (and states)  
interacting within Human Rights are quite heterogeneous,  including 
such diverse groups as secular  humanists,  evangelical  Christ ians and 
Scientologists .   In many ways,  as will  be discussed in Chapter Four,  
these groups compete with each other  for resources and recognition 
within the human rights field.   Among the resources and recognit ion 
that  they compete for are formal t ies to international  inst i tutions,  
usually in the form of consultative status.  
Theoretically,  this scenario allows us to examine how cultural  
and ideological  competit ion play out  in an insti tutional environment 
dominated by an overarching,  homogenizing cultural  framework.  But 
issues of heterogeneity and competit ion are of more than only 
theoretical  importance; they have practical  significance for  advocates 
and activists  as well .   Relations with IGOs are an important form of 
social  capital  in Human Rights -  just  how important becomes clear 
when we consider the reasons that rel igious NGOs pursue IGO ties in 
the first  place.    
First ,  most  rel igious human rights organizations focus in part  on 
“secular” human rights issues such as torture,  slavery,  or  economic 
rights.   Formal t ies  to IGOs allow NGOs to contribute formal  input at  
IGO meetings and obtain access to information about ongoing 
developments with regard to these types of issues.  
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Second, consultat ive status with an international insti tution 
confers the legit imacy required to build all iances and seek financial  
support  from other organizations within the field.   Religious 
organizations that  have been denied consultative status experience 
much difficulty obtaining support  from other actors,  including larger 
human rights NGOs, foundations and states.7  This  explains why even 
groups l ike “Watchtower,” whose theological  doctrines declare the 
United Nations to be an instrument of Satan,  or the World Sikh 
Organizat ion,  many of whose members opposes affi l iat ion with the UN 
for  poli t ical  reasons,  have nonetheless held or aggressively sought  
consultative status with the UN. 
Third,  when religious organizations are offered seats at  the 
tables of international insti tutions,  opportunit ies emerge for them to 
pursue interests of their  own that  may or may not be compatible with 
the dominant interpretations of human rights.   Among those interests  
are the saving of souls and the transformation of societies in ways that  
are compatible with their  rel igious beliefs and practices (Buss and 
Herman 2003).   According to the data that  I  collected for Chapter Five 
of this dissertation,  19 percent  of religious human rights NGOs focus 
on the issue of religious freedom, and 25 percent  report  the promotion 
of their  own religious tradit ions as amongst their  goals.8 International  
insti tutions are important to these groups since they are the forums in 
which international laws pertaining to evangelism and religious 
                                                          
7 Interviews with representatives of two religious human rights organizations.  One organization had 
been consistently denied consultative status (Ottowa, Septemeber 2000) and one organization had 
recently seen its consultative status revoked (Zurich, October 2000).   
8 This figure is derived from the dataset that I constructed for this project, the details of which are 
discussed in the methods section of this chapter. 
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minority r ights are negotiated and formalized,  and where the broader 
debates about individualist  vs.  collectivist  interpretations of human 
rights are played out .   The tension between religious freedom as an 
issue of individual choice and conscience vs.  rel igious freedom as the 
right of vulnerable groups to protect  their  tradit ions from perceived 
threats is  far  from resolved, and proponents of both sides seek voice 
within international insti tutions (Thomas 2001).    
Fourth,  in addit ion to serving as forums for debate over the 
legal  aspects of rel igious freedom, international insti tutions are arenas 
where rel igious identi t ies are legit imated,  challenged, or otherwise 
negotiated.   Consider,  for example,  the NGO “Catholics for a Free 
Choice” and the associated See Change Movement,  whose objective is  
to have the Vatican’s UN Permanent Observer status revoked.  At stake 
for  this NGO are not only women’s reproductive rights,  but  more 
fundamental  conflicts over  what i t  means to be Catholic,  who gets to 
speak for Catholics ,  and how to define Catholic perspectives on human 
rights issues.   Catholic identi ty is  continually negotiated through this 
NGO’s and the Holy See’s competing claims within the United 
Nations.   These negotiations over ident i ty have the potential  to 
influence relationships of power within as well  as among religious 
groups.   As a result ,  their  outcomes are especially important  to 
marginal groups,  such as Scientology, whose status as a legit imate 
religion is  often challenged in regions where they are attempting to 
expand, especially in Western Europe.  
The religious NGOs that  have formal t ies with international 
insti tutions have input into these types of negotiat ions.   Those that  
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lack such access do not.   For  al l  of these reasons,  t ies to and influence 
within international insti tutions are important indicators of 
strat ification among religious NGOs in the world poli ty.   
Given the characterist ics of Human Rights that  I  have just  
described,  the study of rel igious part icipation in Human rights can tel l  
us much about the relationship between rationalism and religion,  and 
hopefully shed some light on religion’s persistence and resurgence in 
transnational public spheres.  
 
Organizat ion of  the Dissertation 
Chapter Two will  outl ine converging trends in theories of 
secularization and globalization,  and will  show how a stronger 
dialogue between sociologists of rel igion and scholars studying 
transnational social  movements can be useful  for developing a 
framework for understanding religious resurgence in global poli t ics.   I  
wil l  then argue in favor of an insti tutionalist  approach to 
understanding the relationship between religion and transnational 
advocacy, one that  highlights  the role of international insti tutions in 
selecting among social  movement  organizational  forms.  
Chapter  Three makes a methodologically focused argument 
about the analytical  boundary between the sacred and secular that  is  
often assumed in social  science research.   Using data and methods that  
relax assumptions about sacred-secular boundaries,  I  will  show that ,  
contrary to the conclusions to which theories of modernization would 
lead us,  the human r ights f ield has not secularized alongside the 
rationalization of global civil  society over the past  century.   Through 
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an analysis of religious NGO foundings over the past  century,  I  will  
show that  religious movement into the public sphere actually 
increased while Human Rights was becoming a highly bureaucratized 
and professionalized regime with international inst i tutions at  i ts  core.    
I  wil l  draw upon interviews with religious NGO members to 
interpret  what these organizational foundings actually mean.  In spite 
of the fact  that  the discourses and principles that  currently buttress 
Human Rights at  the field level are dist inctly secular,  I  will  show that  
the dramatic increase in religious NGO foundings does not  indicate 
the systematic cooptation of rel igious means for  the pursuit  of secular 
ends.   Rather,  rel igion st i l l  serves as a motivating force for human 
rights activism within religious NGOs.  
 Chapter  Four turns to cultural  heterogeneity as a  source of both 
cooperation and conflict  in Human Rights.   First ,  I  draw upon 
interviews with religious NGO members to discuss that  ways that  
rel igious affi l iat ion creates both advantages and disadvantages in 
terms of al l iance formation and competit ion for funding within the 
human rights f ield.    
Second, Chapter Four examines the discursive strategies that  
rel igious groups use when rel igious and secular human rights norms 
coll ide.   Specifically,  I  analyze the highly conflictual  negotiat ions 
surrounding in the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.  
Through an analysis  of the transcripts and press reports from the 
United Nations General  Assembly Special  Session on HIV/AIDS, I  
examine how religious and secular discourses are treated within the 
UN and by the press.   I  show two things:  first ,  argumentation based on 
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“fact” is  valued over  argumentation based on “ideology.”  Second, and 
most important,  the dist inction between “fact” and “ideology” is  based 
less on the content of the argument and more on the status of the 
speaker and the group she or  he represents,  with religious groups more 
l ikely than secular  groups to be discredited as arguing from nonfactual  
bases.   I  then i l lustrate how religious NGOs use a combination of 
rat ionalizing tactics to navigate si tuations where their  claims may be 
discredited on the basis of the speaker’s rel igious affi l iat ion.     
 Chapter Five takes a quanti tat ive approach to the assessment of 
stratif icat ion among religious groups in the human rights f ield.   Using 
a dataset  that  I  constructed of 546 religious human rights  NGOs, I  
analyze patterns of NGO consultat ive status with international 
insti tutions,  looking not only at  variation by religion,  but at  global  
north-south differences as well .  After  analyzing the relative influence 
of two types of variables (structural  and cultural)  on authorization by 
international insti tutions,  I  argue that ,  in order  to understand religious 
and national variat ion in consultat ive status,  we need to take into 
account  how hegemonic principles intersect  with forms of “hard 
power,” including relationships with dominant states and 
organizational resource capaci ty.   The theoretical  implication of the 
analysis is  that  the relat ionship between religious and secular 
authority remains important in spite of insti tutional differentiat ion,  
especially when we consider rel igion and poli t ics at  the transnational 
level  of analysis.       
 
 
 
    
CHAPTER TWO 
 TOWARD AN INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACH TO  
GLOBAL RELIGIOUS TRANSFORMATION  
 
The research that  I  present in the following chapters empirically 
addresses two assumptions.   The first  assumption is  that  the 
rationalization of the public sphere is  associated with a decline in the 
relevance of rel igion as a public insti tution.   The second, and related,  
assumption is  that ,  in the absence of rel igious establishment,  rel igious 
and secular authority function essential ly and necessari ly in conflict ,  
or at  least  concern themselves with dist inctly separate spheres of 
society,  with only minimum influence flowing between them.   
I t  has been argued by some globalization scholars that  
globalizat ion has entailed a rationalization of the public sphere at  the 
transnational level  of analysis (Featherstone 1990, p.  3) .   Likewise,  
one could argue that  the globally normative model  of the nat ion-state 
as the structure around which social  relations are organized contains 
within i t  an implicit  understanding that  the nation-state is ,  among 
other things,  ideally secular .   If  such assumptions about  rationalism, 
insti tutional differentiat ion and globalization were accurate,  and 
rationalism was indeed associated with the decline of public rel igion,  
globalizat ion would mean a loss of public authority for religion at  the 
global level of analysis.   
Recent  history,  however,  does not entirely support  such a 
conclusion.   At least  in the field of contentious poli t ics,  there has 
been too much evidence of religious mobilization in recent decades  
 21  
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to uncrit ically support  the classical  secularization paradigm.1 In 
addit ion to the dramatic episodes of poli t icized religious violence 
capturing headlines around the globe,  rel igious organizations are 
becoming increasingly visible in international inst i tutions,  as I  
discussed in the previous chapter.   These assert ions of religious 
authority in both the informal and formal public  spheres of 
international relations indicate anything but privatization.    
But thus far,  scholarly attempts to make sense out  of 
interactions between religion and secular poli t ics at  the global level  of 
analysis have been l imited in scope.   Although radical  rel igious 
mobilization,  especially in i ts  Islamic manifestations,  has received 
considerable attention,2 social  scientists  have been largely si lent  about  
rel igion in the more mainstream world of insti tutional global poli t ics.3 
As a result ,  a  picture emerges of poli t ically engaged transnational 
rel igion acting predominantly outside or against  governments,  and 
outside of non-violent,  insti tutional channels.   We are left  knowing 
very l i t t le  about  the formal insti tutional  spaces where religious 
                                                          
1 By “secularization theory,” or  “classical secularization paradigm,” I am referring to synthesis of 
modernization theories aptly articulated in Peter Berger’s The Sacred Canopy (Berger 1967).  In this 
text, around which a considerable portion of the secularization debate revolves, Berger borrows heavily 
from a variety of classical social theorists and philosophers such as Hegel, Feuerbach and Nietzsche.  
He borrows most heavily, however, from Durkheim’s writings on symbolism, ritual and social 
solidarity in The Elementary Forms of the Religious Life (1916) and The Division of Labor in Society 
(1902), Weber’s writings on the rationalization of the lifeworld in the Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of 
Capitalism (1958) and Marx’s writings on alienation and objectification (see especially, the Economic 
and Philosophic Manuscripts of 1846, and The German Ideology - Theses on Feuerbach  [1939]). 
2 Among the most popular books addressing religion and political violence have been Samuel 
Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order (1996), Mark Juergensmeyer’s 
Terror in the Mind of God (2003), and Benjamin Barber’s Jihad vs. McWorld.(1995). 
3 Scholars are increasingly studying the relationship between transnational religion and states, but their 
research has been largely state-focused in terms of methodology.  Examples include Byrnes (2001), 
Warner and Wenner (2002), Della Cava (2001) and many of the contributions in the edited volume by 
Rudolph and Piscatori (1997).  
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contention intersects with negotiat ions over power among states.4 How 
can this “blind eye” best  be explained?  
I t  is  my contention that  rel igion often remains “under the radar” 
in scholarship on insti tutionally focused transnational poli t ics because 
of an implicit  reification of the practical  boundary between religious 
and secular practices,  organizations and insti tutions.   Their  arenas of 
influence are researched as i f  they were mutually exclusive,  their  
interests as if  they were unrelated or mutually antagonistic .5  This is  
especially true for research that  rel ies on quanti tat ive data for 
evidence.   As I  will  discuss in Chapter Three,  the assumption of this 
str ict  boundary is  evident not  only in research designs and foci ,  but in 
the classification systems of data sets commonly used to study 
organizational behavior in global civil  society.    
One implication of this methodological  separation between 
religious and secular spheres is  that  i t  keeps us from understanding 
the influence of rel igion in sectors of civil  society that  we usually do 
not immediately associate with religion.   This is  especially the case in 
social  movement sectors such as human rights,  environmental  
protection and labor r ights.   By bringing religion into sharper relief  
within these movement sectors,  we can better  understand the various 
                                                          
4 Two notable exceptions include Voye (1999) and Buss and Herman (2003).  In addition, legal scholars 
and philosophers of law have written in detail about the technicalities of human rights law as it pertains 
to religion.  However, from what I have read, legal research on the topic is largely divorced from theory 
about religious transformation as it is argued in the social sciences.   
5 Unless, of course, the research under consideration is oriented toward public regulation of what we 
typically regard as the “private sphere” in secular democracies, e.g. issues of sexuality and 
reproduction.  But in these cases, it is politics, not religion, that is seen as violating the boundary 
between sacred and secular by not confining its activities to its culturally assigned, public, domain.  In 
contrast, this dissertation will be examining the converse scenario, wherein religion violates the sacred-
secular boundary through political participation in the public sphere, i.e. through claims-making in the 
field of human rights. 
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sources of ideas,  networks,  and material  support  that  comprise the 
associational l ife required for social  movement maintenance and 
survival.  
A second implication of assuming a practical  boundary between 
religious and secular spheres is  that i t  deters us from asking questions 
about the mutually consti tutive relationship between religion and the 
state in international poli t ics -  a relat ionship that  is  grossly 
undertheorized.   In part icular,  the emphasis on insti tutional  
differentiat ion as “separation” distracts  us from studying mutually 
influential ,  and at  t imes beneficial ,  relationships that  exist  between 
the two types of insti tutions beyond their  agreements to stay out of 
each other’s affairs.   In the context of transnational poli t ics,  such an 
impoverished understanding of the relat ionship between religious and 
secular authority might well  obscure important advantages and 
disadvantages that  flow between those religious insti tutions and 
secular governments that  share common developmental  histories.   In 
l ight of the fact  that  the poli t ically dominant states in the 
international system share a more or less common religious heri tage 
(Judeo-Christ ian religion),  i t  makes sense to consider how structural  
and ideological  affinit ies created through centuries of interdependent 
insti tutional development might currently influence the outcomes of 
interfai th conflicts  in transnational poli t ics.  
Neglect  of these types of questions makes i t  al l  too easy to fal l  
into the trap of thinking in terms of simplist ic,  value-laden 
dichotomies that  analytically treat  “good secular  democracies,” 
differently from “bad theocracies.”  We need to account for  the fact  
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that  i t  is  not only through theocracies that  rel igious and secular power 
interact ,  potentially producing mutually beneficial  outcomes; the same 
can be true of rel igion and poli t ics across secular states.   The nature 
of the l ink between religious and secular authority in secular societies 
may differ  in important ways from the l ink that  exists  within 
theocracies,  but  the l ink persists  nonetheless,  and is  worthy of 
analytical  at tention.   This relat ionship becomes especially important 
at  the transnational level  of analysis,  as religious issues seem to be 
capturing an increasingly prominent place in international conflicts.    
In the burgeoning field of globalization studies,  scholars 
focusing on international insti tutions and non-state  actors have come 
largely from subfields (e.g.  economic sociology, development 
sociology, international poli t ical  economy, economics) that  have 
analytical ly ignored religion unti l  quite  recently.6  As a result ,  
research on the cultural  aspects of globalization has been conducted 
largely without the benefit  of theoretical  and conceptual tools that  
sociologists  of rel igion have been using for  decades to study the ever-
transforming relationship between religious and secular authority.   At 
the same t ime, sociologists  of rel igion have yet  to make substantial  
empirical  forays into the analysis of religious transformation as a 
dist inctly transnational (as opposed to comparative) phenomenon.  I t  
will  be instructive then to bring sociological  scholarship on 
intergovernmental  organizations (IGOs) and nongovernmental  
organizations (NGOs) into dialogue with relevant  work in the 
sociology of religion.   The next segment of this  chapter entails  my 
                                                          
6 An important exception is Roland Robertson’s work on religion and globalization (Robertson 1992).     
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at tempt to facil i tate such a dialogue.   My aim is to convince the reader 
that  research on the cultural  and normative aspects of globalization 
can be vastly improved through a reassessment of the relationship 
between religion and secular insti tutions,  especially in the current 
global context where secular democracies are the norm. 
 
The Legacy of  Secularization Theory 
Secularization has been of central  importance to sociologists  since the 
discipline’s founding.  Our most commonly recognized classical  
theorists  al l  addressed religious transformation as a key component  of 
the sweeping world historical  changes that  they observed and 
predicted.   For Durkheim, religion would give way to science,  while 
the plausibil i ty structures of the former would progressively weaken 
as a result  of not only of the development of the lat ter ,  but as a result  
of urbanization and the division of labor in society.   Weber foresaw 
the disenchantment of the world,  as religion would come to be 
eclipsed by instrumental  and economic rationalism.  For Marx, the 
“opiate of the masses” would inevitably be discarded along with a  
shedding of false consciousness that would occur as an outcome of the 
contradict ions of capital ism.  Indeed, the sweeping processes of 
industrial ization,  urbanization,  and the Enlightenment  left  their  
imprint  on Sociology’s founders and their  ideas about the fate of 
religion.  
 Equally important to 19t h  century theorists ,  however,  were 
undoubtedly their  not-so-distant memories of more concrete historical  
events – not only the Protestant Reformation,  but more recently,  the 
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American and French Revolutions.   Consistent  with the centrali ty of 
issues of church and state to these events,  classical  secularization 
theory developed not only according to the progressive and l inear 
logic reflective of the spiri t  of  the Modern Age; i t  also came to place 
considerable emphasis on inst i tutional differentiat ion,  especially 
religious disestablishment.   Accordingly,  the secularization paradigm 
came to emphasize the separation of rel igion and state,  along with 
other forms of societal  fragmentation,  as creating the condit ions for 
subsequent forms of rel igious decline,  especially pluralism, 
privatization,  and the associated de-legi t imation of plausibil i ty 
structures essential  to rel igion’s status as “sacred canopy” (Berger 
1967).   That is ,  in the absence of state support  for  a part icular 
religious insti tution,  and through the introduction of competing forms 
of rel igion in a pluralist  market ,  rel igion loses i ts  authority as the  
inst i tution through which individuals collectively define their  social  
world.   Describing states (and other inst i tutions) as being 
“emancipated” from religious control ,  secularization theorists  
identified insti tutional differentiat ion as a precursor to the erosion of 
rel igion’s capacity to function as a public insti tution,  as secular 
insti tutions would gradually usurp religious functions.   Seen through 
this lens,  rel igious and secular insti tutions are caught in a near zero-
sum batt le  for influence and control .   Throughout  much of Sociology’s 
development,  this  model was seldom questioned. 
 During the last  quarter of the 20t h  century,  however,  
sociologists of religion began to challenge the secularist  model of 
insti tutional differentiat ion and religious decline.   Although 
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challenges emerged from a variety of sources,  one of the most 
controversial  and influential  challenges was launched from the 
exchange theoretic perspective.   Research from this perspective served 
as a foundation for a “New Paradigm in the Sociology of Religion,” 
(Warner  1993),  and subsequently,  a continually evolving 
“secularization debate.”   
 Consistent with the markets-based approach that  informs 
exchange theory more general ly,7 exchange theorists  argue that  
rel igious pluralism, which they translate into the language of 
“religious economies,” improves the quanti ty and quali ty of rel igious 
consumer choices.   Since greater consumer choice is  theoretically 
associated with greater overall  consumption,  pluralism, by extension,  
should be associated with increases in religious involvement.   
Rational  choice scholars support  this argument with evidence of 
increased levels of rel igious mobilization8 in environments 
characterized by high levels of rel igious pluralism and competit ion,  
especially in urban areas and in the United States (Finke and 
Stark1988; Finke and Stark 1992).  
 At f irst  glance,  the religious economies model is  appealing.   
Changing the direction of the relationship between disestablishment 
and religious decline from posit ive to negative is  no small  theoretical  
accomplishment.   I t  challenges the fundamental  assumption that  the 
flourishing of religion and the rationalization of societal  subsystems 
                                                          
7 See, especially, Gary Becker, 1976. 
8 Finke and Stark (1988) operationalize religious mobilization as the number of adherents to religious 
traditions.  They do not make any distinctions regarding religious adherence as a set of private vs. 
public practices.  In other words, the word “mobilization” does not, for Finke and Stark, have anything 
to do with participation in institutional or contentious politics, and should not be confused with the 
term’s usage in studies of social movements.    
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are necessari ly incompatible.   This  assumption,  which l ies at  the heart  
of modernization theory,  is  hardly a tr ivial  matter  for the social  
sciences.    
 Yet,  upon closer inspection,  exchange theoretic research st i l l  
leaves important aspects of secularization theory intact .   For one,  
sociologists who measure religious growth and decline usually rely 
upon indicators of religious mobilization that  assume from the outset  
that  religion occupies a dist inct  sphere of activity,  separate from other 
sectors of civil  society.   The most  common indicators include 
frequency of church attendance,  frequency of prayer,  f inancial  
contributions to churches,  and the l ike.9 As a resul t ,  we are left  with 
scant knowledge of rel igious authority as publicly or poli t ically 
engaged.  Increased measures of the indicators that  they use are not 
incompatible with secularization defined as privatization,  or the 
retreat  of religion from the public sphere.  
 Second, exchange theoretic predictions about  the outcomes of 
insti tutional differentiat ion maintain the assumption,  though from a 
different angle,  that  religion and state exist  essential ly in conflict .   
For secularization theory,  that  conflict  took the form of the state and 
secular society progressively taking over the social  functions 
previously performed by religious inst i tutions.   For exchange 
theorists ,  that  conflict  takes the form of state regulation repressing the 
capacity for rel igious entrepreneurs to freely innovate,  thus 
                                                          
9 For a discussion of the secularization debate that aptly describes in greater detail the arguments on 
each side of the secularization debate and the types of indicators that are most commonly used and 
argued over as evidence, see Warner (1993).  
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diminishing their  abil i ty to meet the demands of rel igious consumers 
(Stark and Iannaccone 1994; Stark and Finke 2000).    
 Related to this,  from the exchange theoretic perspective,  
separation of rel igion and state is  reified.   In the absence of religious 
establishment ,  the state plays no role in determining religious 
outcomes.   The market ( i .e .  variation in consumer preferences) for 
rel igious goods will  determine specific forms of religious 
transformation,  including religious variat ion in growth and decline.   
That is ,  rel igious competi t ion in secular states is  purely a function of 
supply and demand, and is  assumed to be a poli t ically neutral  process.    
 An alternative approach is  to search for ways that  power and 
poli t ical  processes might be associated with patterns of rel igious 
transformation and competit ion,  even in the absence of formal 
rel igious establishment.   As poli t ical  scientist  Anthony Gill  points 
out,  when examining religious competit ion,  i t  is  necessary to go 
beyond the issue of rel igion-state separation and “…pay careful  
at tention to the poli t ical  negotiations surrounding a broad array of 
regulatory laws affecting religion.   Zoning regulat ions,  levels of 
taxation,  media restrict ions,  and government  subsidies al l  impose 
differential  cost  on religious evangelization.   This calls ,  then,  for a 
poli t ical  economy of rel igion,  which incorporates the interests of 
poli t ical  actors into the study of rel igious markets” (Gill  2001).   De-
regulation may be associated with increases in overall  levels of 
rel igious part icipation,  but on i ts  own, i t  is  insufficient for explaining 
how power and poli t ics influence variat ion across rel igions in terms of 
growth,  decline,  and internal transformation.   Gil l’s  emphasis on 
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poli t ical  processes within secular states has potential  to move our 
arguments about  insti tutional differentiation and religious 
transformation forward considerably.   
Consider,  for  instance,  the work of Jose Casanova.  Arguing 
from a sl ightly different angle,  Casanova examines the l ink between 
poli t ical  structures and social  movements in order to explain why 
precisely those states where religious insti tutions historically enjoyed 
establishment  are the states that  have seen the most pronounced 
religious decline,  whether defined as privatization or decline in 
religious beliefs  and practices.   Providing an alternative to the 
markets-based explanation offered by rational choice scholars,  
Casanova i l lustrates that  the mechanisms l inking religious 
establishment  and religious decline are found not in state control  of 
rel igious markets,  but  in the anti-clerical  movements that  emerged in 
response to church establishment.   In places where such movements 
did not emerge,  the Catholic  Church has assumed a much more public 
role in recent decades (Casanova 1994, Ch. 2).  
Gill  and Keshavarian have made similar progress studying the 
relationship between poli t ical  processes and public religious authority 
by focusing on the conditions under which states ei ther form all iances 
with religious insti tutions or take more aggressive,  conflictual  stances 
toward them (Gill  2001).   For  example,  their  study of state  building in 
Iran and Mexico demonstrates how “church-state  cooperation is  l ikely 
in the init ial  stages of the state-building process when opponents to 
the exist ing state leaders are prevalent.   Yet,  as state officials succeed 
in eliminating secular r ivals,  the bargaining power of religious 
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authorit ies wanes,” result ing in an increase in church-state conflict  
and a subsequent loss of rel igious insti tutional influence (Gill  and 
Keshavarian 1999, p.457-458).   
Gil l’s  insti tutionalist  approach,  and especially his emphasis on 
state building,  can be usefully applied at  the global level of analysis.   
Historical ly,  transnational rel igious expansion and the quest  for  
converts have been anything but stories about unfettered competit ion 
among providers of religious goods in an open market.   Rather,  they 
have been deeply entrenched and implicated in colonial  and other 
forms of s tate-driven conquest .   Although the l ink may no longer be as 
explicit  as  in colonial  history,  I  propose that  rel igious and secular 
power are st i l l  l inked in reciprocally advantageous ways in their  
parallel  quests for global influence.  But new actors,  practices,  and 
insti tutions need to be taken into account.   This is  where the study of 
globalizat ion,  social  movements and international insti tutions enters 
the picture.  
 
Globalization,  Movements,  and Insti tut ions 
One dist inguishing characteris t ic of the current wave of globalization 
is  i ts  coordination through international insti tutions,  which have 
developed at  an astounding rate over the past  30 years.   According to 
the Yearbook of  International  Organizations ,  in 1909, there were only 
37 intergovernmental  organizations (IGOs) in existence.   In 1951, 
there were 123 and in 1972, there were 280 IGOs.  In contrast ,  by 
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2003, the number of IGOs had risen to 7,306.10 The most  obvious 
function of international insti tutions is  the creation of rules according 
to which international relat ions,  and now globalization and i ts  
associated processes and pract ices,  operate.   Contrary to popular 
discourses that  construct  globalization as the outcome of abstract  
autonomous forces (e.g.  “the market ,  “technological  development”) 
beyond the control  of individuals or states,  globalization is ,  in 
important ways,  authored and enabled by strategic actors,  including 
states (Panitch 1996; Sklair  2002).   International insti tutions are 
important  instruments through which these strategic actors exert  
authority over processes associated with globalization,  and over each 
other (McMichael 2002).   Examples of this authority include the 
development of patent law, the enforcement of international  trade 
rules and restrict ions,  regulations pertaining to environmental  
protection,  labor r ights and migration,  the development of standards in 
technology, and the expansion of a  body of human rights  law.  
As with the state-building processes explored by Gill  and 
Keshavarian,  the construction of international insti tutions may be 
opening opportunit ies for religious actors to exert  influence in the 
transnational public  sphere.   One reason for this  opening of 
opportunit ies is  that  international insti tutions,  l ike states,  need 
legit imacy in order  to operate unimpeded, especially in the early 
phases of their  formation.11  Religious organizations,  insofar as their  
                                                          
10 These statistics, and others on IGOs and INGOs, are readily accessible from the Union of 
International Association’s website: www.uia.org. 
11 Consider, for example, the protests that “shut down” the World Trade Organization ministerial 
meeting in Seattle.  One common grievance among the protest’s diverse participants was that the WTO 
lacked transparency and accountability.  That is, the WTO was not and is not perceived as legitimate in 
the eyes of many left-leaning progressive groups in global civil society. 
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missionary and humanitarian endeavors have embedded them in local  
contexts around the global for  decades,  even centuries,  are often well  
posit ioned to confer such legit imacy (Johnston and Figa 1988).12  
A second reason that  international insti tution-building opens 
opportunit ies for rel igious groups is  that  the lat ter  are often capable 
of providing much needed material  support  and infrastructure.   Just  as 
states rely upon domestic civil  society organizations to deliver certain 
public goods to their  ci t izens,  international insti tutions are in part  
dependent  upon the cooperation of nongovernmental  organizations 
(NGOs) and international nongovernmental  organizations (INGOs) to 
support  their  international programs (Wapner 1995; Lipshutz 1999).   
Religious NGOs and INGOs can be part icularly useful  in this regard,  
as I  will  describe in greater detail  in Chapter Four.   In fact ,  one 
respondent from my fieldwork described the early 1990s as marking a 
“new wave of mobilization” of transnational rel igious networks’ 
resources in support  of United Nation’s programs.13  
If  Gil l’s  state-focused model of rel igion-state cooperation is  
generalizable to the global level  of analysis,  rel igious groups’ 
potential  to provide much needed resources and confer  legit imacy 
should afford them greater leverage vis-à-vis international 
insti tutions,  and probably explains their  higher profi le in these 
contexts in recent years.   To the extent that  international insti tutions 
are in the early stages of construction,  and therefore in need of 
material  resources,  as well  external  verification of their  legit imacy,  
                                                          
12 Unless, of course, local groups associate them with unpopular past or present governments (Haynes 
1996). 
13Interview with member of interfaith NGO, September 2000, New York City. 
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opportunit ies will  open for  organizations that  can provide such 
resources to exert  claims of a public nature.   Because religious groups 
are common among the organizations that  exhibit  these characterist ics,  
the construction of secular insti tutions should actually be associated 
with an increase  in transnational religious claims making – a 
hypothesis that  will  be specified and tested in the next chapter.  
However,  the possibil i ty of rel igion and state reciprocally 
interacting at  the transnational level  of analysis raises questions about 
the cultural  autonomy of transnational religion from states whose 
ideological  underpinnings are hegemonic in international insti tutions.   
For instance,  we know from sociological  research on organizations 
and insti tutions that  “… for  organizations to have a legit imate claim 
on scarce resources,  the goals they pursue should be congruent with 
wider societal  values” (Scott  1995:  45; Ruef and Scott  1998).   States 
and other regulatory and standards-sett ing organizations play an 
important  role in facil i tat ing this cultural  al ignment between 
organizations and their  wider insti tutional environments (Ruef and 
Scott :  877).   Within transnational regimes,  international insti tutions 
perform this standard-sett ing function (Strang and Chang 1993; 
Tarrow 2001).  
If  issues of religious freedom and identi ty are to be increasingly 
negotiated beyond states,  and subject to the cultural  models of 
“appropriate” religious expression and practice that  are assumed in 
international insti tutions,  we need to consider the possibil i ty that  
incentives are created for rel igious groups to conform, or even 
transform, according to these dominant models.   This is  turn,  raises 
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questions about how such incentives might variably affect  the diverse 
religious groups competing for voice within the transnational public 
sphere.  
  Consider,  for example,  the relat ionship of poli t ical  Islam to 
the United Nations.   I t  is  an explici t  requirement for NGOs with 
consultative status at  the UN that  they be able to demonstrate 
“poli t ical  neutrali ty.”  Although on the surface this seems l ike a 
culturally neutral  requirement ,  i t  actually assumes a historically 
specific,  western model of rel igion and state differentiat ion -  one that  
many forms of Islam do not acknowledge.  For them, religion is  
enacted through part icipation in the world,  including poli t ics.   By 
allowing only apoli t ical  forms of Islam accreditation,  and therefore 
representation,  in the world poli ty,  other forms are marginalized.    
I l lustrating another example,  Chapter Four will  focus on the 
issue of HIV/AIDS and a debate that  ensued at  the UN over the 
explici t  mention of homosexuali ty in a UN Declaration.   The explici t  
mention of homosexuals was controversial  because i t  implied the tacit  
recognit ion of homosexuali ty as a legit imate l ife choice,  and of 
homosexuals as a  category of persons whose human rights  require 
explicit ,  public art iculation.   The recognit ion of homosexuali ty in 
these terms creates far  less of a problem for l iberal  religious NGOs 
than i t  would for conservative rel igious NGOs that  interpret  
homosexuali ty as contrary to their  theology.  Scholars have yet  to 
systematically explore how such variation in religious NGO resonance 
with the dominant principles operating in international human rights 
regimes and insti tutions is  related to the level  of influence they can 
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assert  within the field,  or,  by extension,  with the tendency to modify 
their  public discourses and platforms.  
These questions about legit imacy bring us to what is  perhaps a 
more latent  function of international insti tutions,  and draws out 
developments in social  movement  theory that  have parallels  with 
research on insti tutions and legit imacy in organizational analysis.   
Just  as state-building in large part  determined the forms of organizing 
that  we associate with modern-day social  movements (Til ly 1986),  
international insti tutions influence the forms through which non-state 
actors make claims in global civil  society (Tarrow 2001;  Imig and 
Tarrow 2001; Tarrow 2005, Ch. 2) .   Transnational  social  movements 
and advocacy networks do not  appear  inevitably or automatically as 
result  of globalization.   Rather,  internat ional insti tutions play a 
substantial  role in their  emergence and formation (Tarrow 2001;  Imig 
and Tarrow 2001;  Tarrow 2005, Ch. 2).   Tarrow advances the claim 
that  international insti tutions function as centralized forums through 
which diverse actors from around the globe can “find one another,  
gain legit imacy, form collective identi t ies,  and go back to their  
countries empowered with all iances,  common programs, and new 
repertoires of collective action” (Tarrow 2001, p.15) .   He further goes 
on to specify mechanisms – modulari ty,  brokerage,  mobilization,  and 
cert ification -  through which international  inst i tutions facil i tate these 
processes and subsequently shape forms of contentious poli t ics 
(Tarrow 2001, p.14-15).    
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In Chapter Five,  I  explore how one of these mechanisms – 
cert if ication14 -  shapes the forms through which religious claims are 
asserted in the international public sphere.   I  accomplish this through 
an examination of organizational characterist ics that  are associated 
with having consultat ive status with international  inst i tutions.   Going 
beyond Tarrow, this analysis demonstrates how the cert ification 
process contributes to stratif ication among NGOs – in this case 
rel igious strat ification within the human rights  f ield.   I  wil l  show how 
cert ification is  not a culturally or poli t ically neutral  process,  but one 
that  systematically opens opportunit ies for some forms of actors,  
while excluding others.   In the case of religious NGOs, differences in 
power among states intersect  with normative interpretations of human 
rights and religious freedom to influence variation in access to 
international insti tutions.    
 Of relevance to secularization scholars,  I  argue that  the 
movement of a secular model of rel igion and state relat ions to the 
transnational level  of analysis does not  necessari ly consti tute a further 
separation between religious and secular public authority in the global 
public sphere.   Rather,  i t  is  equally possible that  rel igious and secular 
power interact  in a continual  process of co-development,  thus giving 
advantages to religious groups that  have been historically t ied to more 
powerful states.   In order to investigate how religion-state l inkages 
operate in transnational poli t ics,  i t  is  instructive to examine the 
                                                          
14 Following Tarrow, I define certification as “the validation of actors, their performances, and their 
claims by authorities.”  Tarrow goes on to explain that “certification operates as a powerful selective 
mechanism in contentious politics, because a certifying site always recognizes a limited range of 
identities, performances and claims” (Tarrow 2004, p. 22). 
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inst i tutions where transnational rel igious and secular power meet.   
International insti tutions are one such arena.  
 But to examine how secular insti tutions influence religious 
claims making in the global  public sphere requires a theoretical  
framework that  explici t ly problematizes the issue of culture in and on 
organizations and insti tutions.   That is ,  we need a theoretical  account 
of insti tutions as not only regulating the technical  aspects of the 
global pol i t ical  economy, but  as playing an important part  in the 
production of norms, the definit ion of actors,  and the legit imation of 
practices in global civil  society.   As emphasized by Barnett  and 
Finnemore:  
 
Global organizations do more than just  facil i tate 
cooperation by helping states to overcome market failures,  
collective action dilemmas, and problems associated with 
interdependent social  choice.   They also create actors,  
specify responsibil i t ies and authority among them, and 
define the work these actors do,  giving i t  meaning and 
normative value.   Even when they lack material  resources,  
IOs [international organizations] exercise power as they 
construct  the social  world (Barnett  and Finnemore 2001, 
p.404).  
 
In sociology, the theoretical  perspective that  gives greatest  priori ty to 
role of culture in insti tutions is  sociological  insti tutionalism.  
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Insti tutionalism and World Poli t ics 
In the social  sciences,  there are multiple “insti tutionalisms” that  differ  
from one another in important  ways and can be classified along 
multiple dimensions.   The insti tutionalisms that  I  discuss below do not 
consti tute a complete survey, but highlight contrasts  among 
insti tutionalisms that  I  hope will  make clear my decision to engage 
primarily with the “new insti tutionalism,” and more specifically 
“world poli ty insti tutionalism” as a framework for understanding the 
influence of secular insti tutions on transnational rel igious claims-
making in the public sphere.    
 To begin by way of contrast ,  the strand of insti tutionalism that  
is  furthest  removed from the study of culture in insti tutional  analysis 
is  the rational choice framework, which was elaborated by Brinton and 
Nee in The New Insti tutionalism in Sociology (1998).   Also referred to 
as “economic insti tutionalism,” this exchange theoretic approach to 
insti tutions is  most compatible with the “religious economies” model 
of secularization described earl ier  in this chapter .   From this  
perspective,  both markets and insti tutions are conceptualized as the 
aggregate of their  parts ,  those parts being the transactions among 
individual  and organizational  actors that  rat ional ly pursue their  
economic interests,  with an eye to minimizing costs and maximizing 
benefits  to themselves.   Insti tutions,  from this perspective,  serve a 
uti l i tarian function by decreasing uncertainty and lending a certain 
level  of predictabil i ty to markets, thereby lowering the transaction 
costs involved in exchange relations (North 1984).   Applied to the 
world of international relat ions,  this model theorizes states as the 
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rat ional actors that  engage in transactions,  with regimes and 
international insti tutions serving the function of decreasing 
uncertainty in inter-state poli t ical  and economic exchange.  Their  
primary function,  then,  is  to lower the transaction costs of engaging in 
international relat ions (Young 1986).   For economic insti tutionalists ,  
the exercises of power entailed in the creation of insti tutions and 
markets  are often treated as given – that  is ,  they are not 
problematized.   Likewise,  the sources of and processes through which 
actors come to define the interests that  they pursue are usually beyond 
the scope of economic insti tutionalist  research.  
 In contrast ,  historical  insti tutionalism, also known by the 
misnomer “old insti tutionalism,” emphasizes the exercise of power in 
the creation of markets and the formal insti tutions that  structure them.  
This perspective is  represented in the works of scholars such as 
Selznick (1949),  Keohane (1988),  Fligstein (1990) and Roy (1997).   
Rather than taking markets or insti tutions for granted,  historical  
insti tutionalists  closely examine the processes through which they are 
created.   They do so with an eye toward the various actors,  interests,  
and values that  combine to produce organizations and insti tutions 
whose rules systematically favor some types of actors and practices 
over others.   From this perspective,  states and international  
insti tutions are of considerable importance,  not only in their  capacity 
to exert  influence over the “rules of the game” but also as instruments 
that  competing actors at tempt to wield on behalf or their  
consti tuencies.   This is  not to say,  however,  that  the features of 
insti tutions are wholly consistent with the designs of their  authors.   
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Instead,  historical  insti tutionalists  emphasize the emergent propert ies 
of insti tutions,  and their  propensity to develop in unintended and 
unpredictable ways.   
 Implici t  in this concern with the tension between emergence and 
design is  a claim that  insti tutions,  once constructed,  have the capacity 
to shape the practices of actors that  engage with them.  As we move in 
the direction of new insti tutionalism, we find an increased emphasis 
on insti tutional power as not only the power to make technical  rules,  
but as the power to create meaning.  As described by Keohane, 
“insti tutions do not merely reflect  the preferences and power of the 
units  consti tuting them; the insti tutions themselves shape those 
preferences and that  power” (Keohane 1988, p.388, ci ted in DiMaggio 
and Powell  1991, p.7).   This emphasis on consti tutive power adds a 
new dimension to the notion of autonomous insti tutional effects  
(Barnett  and Finnemore 2001).  
 The new insti tutionalism’s most influential  art iculation to date 
appeared in the edited volume by Powell  and DiMaggio,  t i t led the New 
Insti tutionalism in Organizat ional Analysis (1991) .   As i l lustrated by 
the contributors to that  volume, in response to economic 
insti tutionalists’  emphasis on rationalism as an essential  characterist ic 
of organizational actors,  new insti tutionalists  emphasize the variety of 
ways that  culture influences organizational behavior.   They describe 
culture,  and the insti tutions in which cultural  assumptions are 
embedded, as the source of actors’  identi t ies,  interests,  and the 
appropriate means for pursuing them - even when those identi t ies,  
interests and means give the impression of being “rational” (Fligstein 
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1990;  Friedland and Alford 1991, p.240;  Meyer and Rowan 1991;  
Clemens 1997),   
 There are a variety of ways that  insti tut ionalists  study the 
relationship between culture and organizations.   While some new 
insti tutionalist  scholars focus on the need for organizations and 
insti tutions to resonate with external  environments,  others emphasize 
the routine,  cognitive,  and taken-for-granted aspects of organizational 
and insti tutional behavior that  account for  such processes as 
insti tutional durabil i ty.   But these differences aside,  in contrast  to 
economic insti tutionalists ,  new insti tutionalists  al l  challenge the claim 
that  organizations operate primarily according to cri teria of efficiency 
and profi tabil i ty,  pointing out that  inst i tutions persist  despite fai lures 
to produce efficient ,  rat ional or otherwise intended outcomes.   Rather ,  
they i l lustrate how non-rational processes and concerns such as habit ,  
fashion,  or legit imacy drive much of organizational behavior (Meyer 
and Rowan, 1991;  Powell  and DiMaggio 1991; Strang and Soule 1998; 
Strang and Macy 2001).   
 Though there is  considerable overlap,  new and old 
insti tutionalists  differ in important ways in terms of their  emphases.   
In comparison to old insti tutionalists ,  new insti tutionalists  place a 
greater premium on the cognit ive,  taken-for-granted aspects  of social  
organization than on vested interests and power.   Whereas old 
insti tutionalists  emphasize how interests  negotiated in informal 
relations subvert  the intended functions of formal structures (Selznick 
1949),  new insti tutionalists  emphasize how attachment to r i tual  and 
symbol can preclude rational outcomes (Meyer and Rowan 1991).   
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While old inst i tut ionalists  examine embeddedness in terms of t ies to 
local  communities,  new insti tutionalists  give priori ty to embeddedness 
in field-level  symbolic and culture systems and shared notions of 
legit imacy.  Old insti tutional ists  provide accounts of action and 
change; new insti tutionalists  describe enactment and social  
reproduction.15 As I  will  demonstrate in the following chapters,  to 
understand the influence of secular insti tutions on religious advocacy 
will  require the incorporation of concepts emphasized within both the 
new and the old insti tutionalisms.   
 
World Poli ty Insti tutionalism 
In the chapters that  follow, I  will  engage with a specific branch of the 
new insti tutionalism called “world poli ty insti tutionalism,” which 
art iculates a framework for understanding how culture influences 
organizational behavior at  the global  level of analysis.   Rather than 
assuming economic rationalism to be an essential  feature of action in 
world poli t ics,  global insti tutionalists  conceptualize rat ionalism as a 
social  construct  that  is  enacted through various agents in the world 
poli ty,  especially INGOs.   
 Insti tutionalists  locate the origins of rat ionalist  constructs in 
what they refer to as “world culture” (Meyer et  al  1987; Meyer 1991; 
Meyer et  al .  1997; Frank et  al .  1999; Boli  and Thomas 1999a; Thomas 
2001).   They define "culture," and by extension "world culture," as "a 
set  of fundamental  principles and models,  mainly ontological  and 
                                                          
15For a detailed comparison and discussion of the old and new institutionalisms, see DiMaggio and 
Powell (1991) or Hirsch and Lounsbury (1997). 
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cognit ive,  defining the nature and purposes of social  action" (Boli  and 
Thomas 1999).   Rat ionalist  world culture and i ts  associated principles 
are theorized as having an independent,  homogenizing influence over 
organizational forms and behavior in global civil  society.   They 
support  this claim by examining the structures and processes of 
international nongovernmental  organizations (INGOs),  ci t ing research 
that  identif ies structural  isomorphism across geographical  contexts 
(for example,  Thomas and Lauderdale 1987; Strang 1990; Meyer et  al .  
1992).    
Insti tutionalists  identify five general  world cultural  principles 
that  are enacted through INGOs.  Since these principles are indeed 
defining features of Human Rights,  I  will  briefly review them here.   
The first  is  the principle of rational voluntarist ic authority ,  which 
holds that ,  “responsible individuals acting collect ively through 
rational procedures can determine cultural  rules that  are just ,  
equitable and efficient,  and that  no external authority [such as 
rel igion] is  required for their  legit imation… It  is  the agency presumed 
to inhere in rational individuals organizing for  purposive act ion” (Boli  
and Thomas 1999, p.37).   Second, the world cultural  principle of 
universalism is  i l lustrated in the rhetorical  application of human 
rights conventions to all  persons across all  t imes and places.   
Likewise ,  individualism, the third principle,  is  i l lustrated in the belief 
that  individuals are the natural ,  sovereign enti t ies to which human 
rights apply.   For example,  the right to vote and rights to freedom of 
association and freedom of conscience are al l  r ights that  are assumed 
to inhere in individuals,  not  groups such as families or communities.   
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Fourth,  the principle of world cit izenship  implies a shared belief in a 
common human destiny that  transcends terri torial  boundaries.   And, 
f inally,  the principle of rationalizing progress  denotes the belief  that  
these other principles can best  be enacted through the calculated 
application of science,  expert ise,  technology and reason to social  
problems and issues (Boli  and Thomas 1999, p.34-41).    
 By identifying a coherent cultural  system exerting a 
homogenizing influence at  the global level  of analysis,  world poli ty 
insti tutionalism potential ly provides a useful  conceptual  framework 
for  examining how a hegemonic cultural  form influences world poli ty 
part icipation among culturally heterogeneous actors.   In i ts  current 
elaboration,  however,  i t  fal ls  short  of being adequately sui ted to this  
task.   The main weakness of the perspective is  that  i ts  claims about  
the homogenizing force of world culture are over-determined, leaving 
l i t t le  room for the incorporation of the empirical  heterogeneity of 
cultural  forms into i ts  sweeping research agenda.   Although there are 
occasional references to the fact  that diversity and conflict  exist  in the 
world poli ty (Boli  and Thomas 1999, p.18; Thomas 2001),  we find 
l i t t le  at tempt to examine interaction among competing cultural  forms, 
or the factors that  determine the resolution of cul tural  conflicts.   We 
are not given any explanation for why rationalist  world cul ture defeats 
al l  challengers or the mechanisms through which competing 
ideological  systems, including religions,  remain subordinate to this 
pervasive,  homogenizing force.   Neither is  there any discussion of 
competit ion among “lesser” cultural  forms vying for dominance 
beneath the umbrella of this overarching world cultural  framework.   
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 Without a  clearly defined framework for addressing 
heterogeneity and conflict ,  world poli ty insti tutionalism falls  short  of 
being able to account for  the inconsistency between the secularism of 
world culture on the one hand and the evidence of widespread 
religious resurgence in the world poli ty on the other.   However,  by 
taking into account developments in the sociology of religion,  and 
explici t ly incorporating some neglected aspects of both the new and 
old insti tutionalisms, we could develop a global inst i tut ionalist  
framework that  is  amenable to the study of religion and world culture.   
This dissertat ion will  at tempt to achieve three modifications intended 
to move global insti tutionalism in such a direction.    
 First ,  inst i tutionalist  accounts of world culture’s homogenizing 
force underestimate the capacity of religion to thrive in highly 
rationalized environments (Chapter Three).   In describing the origins 
of world culture,  and i ts  global integrat ion and coherence,  
insti tutionalists  adhere to a model of societal  transformation that  
closely resembles Weber’s account of Western secularization.   On the 
one hand, insti tutionalists  identify world culture as historically rooted 
in Christendom.  For instance,  Meyer describes the “unique structures 
of Christendom” as “the source of the West’s capacity to develop and 
sustain orderly long-distance l inkages beyond i ts  poli t ical  control  
system, and to penetrate society with collective meanings,  r ights,  and 
powers without collapsing in chaotic and segmented power systems” 
(Meyer 1991, p.  400).    
 On the other hand, insti tutionalists  ult imately subscribe to a 
model of a rat ionalized,  secular world poli ty -  one that  has been 
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emancipated from the religious foundations to which Meyer refers.   As 
I  will  describe in greater detail  in the next chapter,  insti tutionalism 
confronts  us with a world culture whose authority not only exists  
independent of the religious system from which i t  evolved, but 
functions as an antagonistic force,  steadily usurping religion’s 
influence.   This account of the relationship between religion and 
rationalism stands in contrast  to theoretical  developments in the 
sociology of rel igion (discussed earl ier) ,  that  challenge the 
secularization paradigm.  The empirical  evaluation of these competing 
claims about the influence of rel igion in global civil  society will  
require that  we relax assumptions about  insti tutional differentiation,  
and reassess the Weberian model of secularization that  world poli ty 
insti tutionalism takes for granted.   Chapter Three will  accomplish this 
task by showing that ,  even in a highly rationalized field l ike human 
rights,  the influence of public rel igion is  growing.   
Second, an insti tutionalist  account of world culture must clearly 
dist inguish between rationalism as a goal or objective,  and rationalism 
as an instrumental  means for  achieving objectives that may or may not 
themselves be rat ional .   In an earl ier  formulation of world poli ty 
insti tutionalism, Meyer and his colleagues claimed to be examining 
only instrumental  rat ionali ty (Meyer et  al  1987, p.  20),  thereby 
leaving open the possibil i ty that  organizations may adopt 
instrumentally rational means to achieve religiously-inspired ends.   
Boli  (1999),  however,  in a later  account  of world poli ty 
insti tutionalism, does not maintain a clear conceptual  dist inction 
between means and ends,  nor  for the matter ,  does he offer clear 
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definit ions to dist inguish between rational  and non-rational  modes of 
organizing.    
 For example,  in his  discussion of the pervasiveness of rat ional 
voluntarism, he states that ,  “global organizations whose goals or 
means include something l ike compassion (world peace,  harmony, 
fellowship,  mutual understanding, tolerance) are not at  al l  rare but 
few of these [INGOs] al low compassion to play a major role in their  
internal  st ructures or operations.   Most are much too rationalized for 
that” (Boli  1999, p.276-277).   Since i t  is  not clear from Boli’s 
argument what a “compassionate organizational st ructure,” or 
“compassionate means,” would look l ike, we are left  to infer that  any 
attempt to organize instrumentally – that  is ,  any attempt to organize – 
is ,  by default ,  evidence of conformity to the rationalist  values of the 
world poli ty.   In effect ,  we are left  with an untestable hypothesis.   
 Equally problematic is  the claim that  organizations that  
explici t ly state that  their  goals are inspired by the desire for 
compassion,  are really just  “[incorporating] compassion mainly as a 
source of motivation for the commitment to rat ional purposes” (Boli  
1999, p.176).   In other words,  compassionate ends are actually just  
means for  achieving the “real” end,  which is  organizing according to 
rational means.   In this dissertation,  I  consider the alternative,  and 
less convoluted,  scenario – that  rational ism may in fact  be an 
instrumental  strategy for the commitment to rel igious or spiri tual  
purposes.  
 Chapters Three and Four in part icular will  add some clari ty to 
the relationship between rationalism and religion,  and to the 
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dist inction between means and ends rat ionalism.  First ,  Chapter Three 
will  examine the prevalence of rel igious organizing by looking str ict ly 
at  organizational goals and motivations,  and thereby establ ish 
rel igion’s primary relevance as a basis for mobilization among 
religious advocates in Human Rights.  Chapter Four will  then explore 
in greater detail  the rational,  instrumental ,  means that  are used to 
achieve religiously motivated ends,  by not only NGOs, but also states 
assert ing claims in Human Rights.   Taken in combination,  Chapters 
Three and Four clar ify the dist inction between instrumental  and values 
rationalism, and show how “rational” means are part  and parcel  of 
rel igious organizing.   Though NGOs at  t imes employ tactical  
maneuvers that  may give the appearance of secularization,  these 
maneuvers do not considerably compromise the religious sensibil i t ies 
or motivations of the strategists  that  employ them.  In fact ,  rat ional 
means and religious motivations co-exist  quite comfortably.  
 Third,  and finally,  more explici t  at tention to the insti tutionalist  
concept  of decoupling (Meyer and Rowan 1991, p.57-58),  will  be 
useful for  exploring stratif ication in transnational  organizat ional 
fields,  and will  al low for an incorporation of old insti tutionalist  
concerns into the study of organizations and world culture.   By 
decoupling,  I  am referring to the process whereby the formally and 
officially art iculated goals of an organization exist  independently of 
the practices that  actually comprise an organization’s operations.   As 
explained by Meyer and Rowan (1991,  p.58),  when decoupling occurs:  
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The assumption that  formal structures are really working 
is  buffered from the inconsistencies and anomalies 
involved in technical  activit ies… Decoupling enables 
organizations to maintain standardized,  legit imating 
formal structures while their  activit ies vary in response to 
practical  considerat ions.   The organizat ions in an industry 
tend to be similar in formal structure – reflecting their  
common insti tutional origins – but may show much 
diversity in actual  practice.  
  
 
In the case of Human Rights,  a disjuncture,  or  decoupling,  
exists  between the egali tarian myth of world culture on the one hand 
and strati f ication within the organizational f ield on the other.   The 
principles of world culture that  f ind rhetorical  expression in Human 
Rights  are principles of equal i ty,  universalism, democracy, and a 
depoli t icizing rationali ty.   However,  beneath this realm of ostensibly 
apoli t ical  discourse l ies a practical organizational  context that  is  
profoundly marked by poli t ics,  competi t ion and relationships of 
dependence among various actors,  whether they are states,  
corporations,  or  NGOs (Bob 2002; Mendelsohn and Glenn 2002;  
O’Brien 2000; Uvin 2000).   Furthermore,  issues of representation and 
accountabil i ty among differential ly si tuated actors are only beginning 
to be empirically explored (Obrien 2000; Reuben 2002; Tarrow 2001;  
Uvin 2000).   To theorize a direct  l ink between “world culture” and 
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“organizat ional forms” without  examining the empirical  relationships 
among different  types of organizations is  to leave unchallenged the 
assumption that  world cultural  discourse is  coterminous with the 
organizing principles of global civil  society as they are played out in 
practice.    
In terms of religion,  we cannot assume that  voice in the world 
poli ty is  enjoyed equally among religious NGOs, especially in l ight  of 
the unique historical  relationship of Christendom to world culture.   
Through centuries of co-development with Western states,  
Christendom developed transnational inst i tutional  structures that  not 
only comprise some of the oldest  and most expansive organizational 
networks in the world,  but “were central  factors helping to determine 
the great  dist inctive Western,  and now world,  outcomes” (Meyer 1991, 
p.  401).   The organizations that  operate beneath the umbrella of the 
Christendom not only span a larger transnational terri tory than do 
those of other religious tradit ions,  but in the case of Catholicism, are 
more often embedded in centralized hierarchical  structures that  al low 
them to operate more efficiently in both their  transnational  programs 
and in their  affi l iat ions with international insti tutions.   Within 
Catholicism, as Della Cava (2001, p.  2) points out ,  NGOs can draw 
from a variety of resources,  including Catholic universi t ies,  
seminaries and research centers,  highly mobile,  well- trained 
manpower reserves in the form of missionaries,  clerical  and lay,  as 
well  as  funding that  is  channeled through a wide variety of related 
international rel ief and charitable agencies.   “Additionally,  
Catholicism is  in the unique posit ion among all  contemporary world 
  
                                                                                                                                                                     
                                                                                                                                                                  53
               
rel igions of also having a centralized administration,  the Stato della 
Citta del  Vaticano, that  is  universally recognized as part  of a current  
state-system.  As a result ,  i t  may at  t imes derive benefits  for i ts  
ecclesiastical  interests by invoking i ts  role as a state” (Della Cava 
2001, p.  2).      
This stands in contrast ,  for example,  to Islam.  Although Islam, 
l ike Christ ianity,  has also spread in part  through missionary activity,  
the historical  details  of i ts  development have culminated in 
organizational structures characterized by terri tor ial  and ideological  
boundaries.   Whereas Christ ian missions were supported by state-led 
processes of terri tor ial  expansion, much of Islamic identi ty and 
interorganizational s tructure developed alongside the various 
nationalisms that  developed in response to Western colonial ism 
(Lapidus 2001, p.46-48).   Ira  Lapidus points out ,  in his discussion of 
universalist ic Islam, that  “… while there are numerous [universal]  
associations that  operate for rel igious purposes,  most  Islamic poli t ical  
groups are in fact  localized in national s tate contexts … National 
states define the boundaries of Muslim identi t ies” (Lapidus 2000, p.  
38).   As a result ,  Islam lacks a centralized,  international 
organizational structure comparable to that  of the Catholic  Church.  
Furthermore,  i t  lacks a more or less common model of rel igion-state 
relations and an international ly centralized authority that  is  
recognized as a  legi t imate representative of universalist ic Islam.  Just  
as these characterist ics of transnational Islam present barriers to 
collective action within western states,  (Warner  and Wenner 2002, 
p.5),  can hypothesize them to leave Islam at  a disadvantage in 
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competing for resources and insti tutional access on the formal 
poli t ical  terrain of the world poli ty as well .  
This dissertation,  especially in Chapters Four and Five,  will  
bring this heterogeneity and conflict  to the forefront of inst i tutionalist  
research on world culture.   In the process,  i t  wil l  aim to achieve a 
conceptual  synthesis that  str ikes a balance between new 
insti tutionalism’s emphasis on culture and old insti tutionalism’s focus 
on power,  states,  and conflict  within insti tutions and organizational 
f ields.   I  will  accomplish this through an empirical  analysis how 
international inst i tutions shape forms of rel igious claims-making in 
Human Rights.    
 
  
   
CHAPTER THREE 
 MEASURING RELIGION IN GLOBAL CIVIL SOCIETY 
 
 In this chapter,  I  will  suggest  methodological  innovations that  
will  improve our abil i ty to accurately identify and measure macro-
level patterns of religious resurgence and decline.   I  will  begin by 
showing how, in past  and current research,  operationalizations of 
religiosity,  even those used in studies that  refute the dominant 
secularization paradigm, usually assume differentiated fields of 
action,  rendering them inadequate for assessing religious involvement 
in the public sphere.   To correct  this problem, instead of treating 
religion as a dist inct ,  differentiated sphere of social  l ife,  I  examine 
religion within one organizational f ield -  human rights.   By doing so,  
I  relax the assumption of a str ict  separation between sacred and 
secular f ields of action,  revealing the presence of organized religion 
in an arena that  is  often assumed to be the domain of secular poli t ical  
engagement.    
However,  rather than taking for granted that  religious 
participation in human rights indicates mobilization based on religious 
principles or for religious purposes,  I  will  consider the alternative 
possibil i ty that  i t  is  actually a form of secularization,  one whose 
mechanism is the co-optation of religious NGOs’ resources for secular 
purposes.   This chapter will  begin to assess these competing 
interpretations of public religious mobilization through the 
examination of interviews with individuals working for religious 
human rights NGOs, as they describe the principles and sources of  
 55 
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motivation behind their  advocacy.  In the process,  this chapter will  
establish the existence of a hierarchy of cultural  principles operating 
across different levels of engagement in human rights,  thus sett ing the 
stage for a more detailed discussion in Chapter Four about the 
strategic uses of heterogeneous discourses across contexts.   
 
Measurement and Insti tutional Differentiation 
As stated in Chapter Two, insti tutionalist’s accounts of world culture 
underestimate the capacity of religion to thrive in highly rationalized 
environments.   This over-determined secularism is reflected in their  
choice and interpretations of data used to support  claims about the 
content of world culture.   Specifically,  insti tutionalism’s proponents 
do not insure that  their  own methods for measuring the adoption of 
world cultural  principles are independent of the constructed world 
cultural  categories that  they describe.   This is  part icularly true of the 
boundary they assume between religious and secular f ields of action,  
describing the former as “out of step with world cultural  principles” 
(Boli  and Thomas 1999, p.  43).    
As evidence of religion’s incompatibil i ty with world cultural  
principles,  insti tutionalists  use the Yearbook of  International 
Organizations (YBIO)  to compare INGO foundings in different sectors 
of activity and observe a relative decline in foundings of organizations 
in the “religious” field over the past  century.   Figure 3.1 i l lustrates 
the decline in religious organizational foundings to which Boli  and 
Thomas refer.   
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Figure 3.1  Foundings of “Religious Organizations” (Organizations 
Classified as “R” in the YBIO) 
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Observing this apparent decline,  insti tutionalists  claim that  “the 
individualism of world culture works against  collectivist  forms 
[including religion] of transnational organizing” (Boli  and Thomas 
1999, p.43).   Their  interpretation of the YBIO data conforms to the 
l inear model of progressive insti tutional differentiation predicted by 
modernization theory,  which posits  secularization as a foregone 
conclusion,  with religion (and other “primordial  forms”) pit ted against  
world culture in a losing batt le for ideological  dominance.   Thomas 
(2001, p.  517) offers the most explicit  assert ion of this sacred-secular 
antagonism, arguing that  “world culture is  not neutral  vis-à-vis 
religions even as religions are practiced within i t  and must engage i t .   
Because i t  has a diffuse moral nature,  world culture competes with 
religions for providing the moral grounds to public and private l ife,  
and thus much conflict  takes religious forms.”   
Meanwhile,  research on the relationship between religion and 
modernization is  increasingly turning up evidence that  the two can 
actually co-exist  quite comfortably.   Much of the research on Islam, 
for example,  points to the need for a conceptually more fluid approach 
to the sacred and secular,  i l lustrating how “Islam and modernity are 
not in contradiction nor do they evolve in opposit ion but rather they 
mutually consti tute each other” (Yavuz 2001, p.  2).   Yavuz, for 
example,  explains how the increase in associational l ife that  occurs 
with democratization creates opportunit ies for religious resurgence 
(Yavuz 2001, p.  4).   Bamyeh argues that  many Islamic cri t iques of the 
West are not aimed at  the West’s promotion of modernization,  but at  
the West’s failure to l ive up to the goals of i ts  own modernization 
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agenda, with Islam held up as a superior model for achieving those 
goals (Bamyeh 2002).   Adelkhah (2000) describes the association 
between the theocratization of the Iranian state and the rationalization 
of the Shi’a Muslim clergy.  The posit ive association between Muslim 
commitment to Islam and higher education is  also well  documented 
(Rudolph 1997, p.30; Hefner 2001, p.494).   
And Islam is not simply an exception that  proves a rule about 
religion and modernization.   Riessebrodt (1993) demonstrates how the 
emergence of both American and Iranian fundamentalism were aided 
by and shaped modern developments in their  respective contexts.   
Rational choice scholars have demonstrated that  competit ion within 
religious markets is  associated with the flourishing of religious l ife in 
America and Western Europe (Finke and Stark 1988; Stark and 
Iannoconne 1994).   Research on poli t ics and the Catholic Church has 
shown that  religion-state differentiation actually posit ions the Church 
to more effectively take opposit ional stances on certain public issues 
(Smith 1991; Burns 1992; Casanova 2001).   And most important,  
Casanova advances the argument that  the coincidence of insti tutional 
differentiation and globalization will  not result  in privatization,  but on 
the contrary,  will  result  in a movement of religious authority to the 
public sphere of global civil  society (Casanova 2001).   If  these 
scholars are correct ,  rather than the marginalization of religion,  we 
should find increased  rel igious mobilization accompanying the 
rationalization of the world poli ty and the formal insti tutions around 
which i t  ral l ies.     
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Unfortunately,  however,  any such mixing of the sacred and 
secular or movement of religion to the global public sphere will  be 
difficult  to capture in studies that  measure religion as a dist inct  sector 
of social  l ife.   This brings us to the evidence presented by world 
poli ty insti tutionalists:  the main problem with their  measurement of 
religious organizing is  that  i t  assumes what the authors intend to 
demonstrate -  a secularized public sphere.   The problem, in large part ,  
l ies in the source of world poli ty scholars’ data – the Yearbook of 
International Organizations – and the inferences they draw from its  
system of classification.   
 
The Yearbook of  International Organizations 
The primary purpose of the Yearbook of  International Organizations  
(YBIO or  Yearbook) is  the collection of data on international 
organizations.   The Yearbook’s editors,  the Union of International 
Associations (UIA),  have been collecting this information since 1908.  
Not surprisingly,  i t  is  the most complete,  and almost the sole,  source 
of information used by scholars who conduct quantitat ive studies of 
INGOs.  However,  use of the YBIO as a source of data for supporting 
claims about the principles enacted through “world culture” is  
problematic.   I  say this for two reasons.  
First ,  there is  good reason to believe that  the UIA’s data 
collection methods are biased in favor of organizations that  embody 
the world cultural  principles identified by insti tutionalists .   After 
World War I ,  the Union of International Associations began working 
in collaboration with the League of Nations and, since the end of 
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World War II ,  has worked closely with the United Nations (UIA 2000, 
p.2419).   In fact ,  the UIA’s methodological  approach to the selection 
of organizations for inclusion in the YBIO  has been officially endorsed 
by the Economic and Social  Council  of the UN (UIA 1992, p.  1628).   
As a result  of this collaboration,  the UIA’s cri teria for inclusion in the 
YBIO  are at  t imes influenced by the UN’s informational needs.   For 
example,  in 1978, the YBIO revised i ts  classification scheme in order 
to more accurately reflect  the types of organizations that  have 
consultative status with the UN (Pei-heng 1981, p.64).    
The UIA’s efforts to define INGOs in ways that  are consistent 
with the needs of international insti tutions have not been motivated 
solely by the practical  advantages of doing so.   Norms have also 
played a role.   Consider this excerpt from a memorandum by the 
Secretary-General  of the League of Nations,  communicated to the 
League on September 5,  1921: 
 
The principles and ambitions of the Union of International 
Associations were consecrated by the formation of the 
League.  The very nature of the work carried out by the 
Union of International Associations before the war 
rendered i t  indirectly and within the means at  i ts  disposal,  
one of the promoters of the League of Nations.   I t  had 
already expressly declared at  one of the congresses that  
the principle of a League of Nations was the ult imate end 
of all  international movements (UIA 2000, p.  2419).  
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This close and principled collaboration between the UIA and 
international insti tutions suggests the need for caution when using the 
YBIO  as a source of evidence for making claims about the content and 
pervasiveness of world culture.   With the UN so thoroughly 
embodying the world cultural  principles described by insti tutionalists  
(Chapter Two),  any data collection system designed to identify 
organizations that  are legit imate vis-à-vis UN criteria is  l ikely to 
contain a collection bias in favor of the types of organizations 
structured according to those world cultural  principles.   For example,  
they are more l ikely to have large,  internationally diverse 
memberships,  have egali tarian voting and financial  structures,  and 
have universally stated goals that  are achieved through the use of 
technical ,  scientif ic,  or quasi-scientif ic methods.   In other words,  
using YBIO data to make claims about the proliferation of world 
cultural  principles is  akin to sampling on the dependent variable.     
My second reason for caution in using the Yearbook  is  more 
directly related to claims about religion in world culture;  i t  is  the 
classification system used by the UIA.  The organizations that  meet 
the insti tutionally recognized cri teria described above, and about 
which the most detailed information is  published, are classified in the 
YBIO  as “conventional international” organizations.   Insti tutionalists ,  
by and large,  only measure “conventional organizations” in their  
quantitat ive studies of INGOs and world culture (Smith 1997; Boli  and 
Thomas1999, p.20; Frank et  al .  1999, p.85; Berkovitch 1999, p.  117).   
The cri teria for inclusion in the YBIO  as a “conventional 
international” organization include: membership in three or more 
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s tates,  non-exclusive membership,  equal voting rights for members,  
and relatively equal f inancial  contributions from members from each 
state,  so that  no one state’s members dominate the others (Union of 
International Associations 2002/2003, p.2661-2663).    
Religious orders,  fraternit ies and secular insti tutes,  often having 
hierarchical  structures,  seldom meet all  of these cri teria.   Therefore,  
they are classified in a separate category,  “R,” presumably for 
“religion,” and their  Yearbook entries are abbreviated to include only 
the organizations’ names and contact  information.   Note that  this 
classification into a separate category is  based the structure and 
membership rules of  an organization  – not primarily on the presence 
or absence of  religious missions or activit ies .   This means that  a 
number of the human rights INGOs classified as “conventional” in the 
YBIO  may in fact  be religious,  but are not identifiable as such if  the 
determination is  made solely on the basis of their  YBIO  classification.  
The use by scholars of this separate category to measure the 
enactment of religious principles in world culture is  misleading in that  
i t  implies that  “religious” and “secular” fields of activity are mutually 
exclusive,  with religious activity confined to the realms of prayer,  
religious vocation,  and otherworldly concerns.   All  “non-R” or 
“conventional” activity is  assumed to be the exclusive domain of 
"secular" actors enacting "world cultural" principles.    
This sacred-secular dist inction is  similar to that  which is  
assumed in many of the quantitat ive studies engaging the 
secularization debate;  they also rely upon indicators of religiosity 
such as frequency of attendance at  worship services,  frequency of 
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prayer,  donations to churches,  or recruitment to the clergy, that  
assume a practical  and organizational boundary between religious and 
secular l ife.1  These indicators of religiosity are not sensit ive to the 
presence of organized religion in the public sphere of civil  society.   
We cannot know to what extent the poli t ical ,  educational,  or even 
scientif ic spheres,  for example,  are domains of religiously principled 
action if  they have been pre-defined as “non-religious,” in contrast  to 
their  “religious” counterparts which are classified separately.   
One way to obtain a more precise account of religious influence 
in civil  society is  to measure religious INGO foundings within  
organizational f ields,  rather than across them, therefore avoiding the a 
priori  assumption that  a differentiation between religious and secular 
spheres exists in practice.   To achieve this,  I  constructed a dataset  
comprised of human rights organizations founded over the past  
century,  analyzing their  mission statements and program descriptions 
for religious content.   In addit ion,  I  conducted interviews with the 
leaders of religion-based human rights organizations.  Rather than 
taking for granted that  religious human rights advocacy implies either 
a tacit  acceptance of the secular world cultural  principles elaborated 
in the global human rights regime, or a tacit  acceptance of religious 
principles,  I  spoke with individuals members of religious human rights 
NGOs in order to learn from them directly about the principles that  
inform their  activism.    
                                                 
1 Warner’s (1993) influential piece on competing paradigms in the sociology of religion provides a 
useful review of findings of studies engaging the secularization debate, most of which employ measures 
of religiosity that assumes a strict boundary between religious and secular spheres.   
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As I  described in Chapter Two, through the associated processes 
of rationalization and structuring of the field around a formal 
insti tutional core,  the dominant cultural  logic in Human Rights has 
shifted from one based in natural  law and religious tradit ions,  to one 
based in posit ive law and science.   What is  more,  as discussed in the 
Introduction,  the secular world cultural  principles described by 
insti tutionalists  came to be firmly embedded in human rights discourse 
in almost ideal-typical  form.  If  the classical  secularization paradigm 
is correct ,  this type of rationalization within an organizational f ield 
should be associated with an exclusion of religion from the global 
public sphere.   Therefore,  we should find a relative decline in 
foundings of religious human rights NGOs beginning just  after the 
mid-20t h  century,  with the structuring of the human rights f ield 
through the United Nations.   Alternatively,  if  secularization theory’s 
challengers are correct ,  we should find either no such decline or an 
increase in transnational religious mobilization around human rights,  
as transnational religious authority transfers to the realm of global 
civil  society.   
 
Data and Methods – Organizational Foundings .    
To avoid the confusion caused by the UIA’s system of INGO 
classification,  instead of the YBIO  I  used the online Human Rights 
Directory  compiled by Human Rights Internet (HRI) as my primary 
source of information.  HRI, which was founded in 1976, is  an 
internet-based organization whose main purpose is  the collection and 
continual updating of information on human rights organizations 
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worldwide.   HRI does not use organizational structure as a cri terion 
for inclusion in i ts  Directory .   Therefore,  even human rights 
organizations that  do not meet the structural  cri teria for inclusion as a 
conventional organization in the YBIO  are included in the HRI dataset .   
That is ,  the HRI database includes organizations with hierarchical  
structures,  less than three countries represented in their  memberships,  
or disproportionate voting rights or f inancial  contributions among 
members,  as well  as the human rights organizations that  are included 
in the Yearbook.   Therefore,  i t  is  inclusive of,  and presents more 
complete information on, a wider variety of organizational forms than 
those recognized within the UN system as legit imate NGOs.  
HRI also has a search engine that  al lows users to search for 
human rights organizations by religious affi l iat ion.   Although this 
feature made i t  considerably easier to identify religion-based NGOs, I  
nonetheless checked to insure each organization was indeed religion-
based and not,  for example,  a secular organization promoting religious 
freedom. For each religion-based organization’s entry that  I  identified,  
I  collected information on the organization’s t i t le,  mission,  
membership,  activit ies and leadership.   Where possible,  information 
from the database was supplemented with information from the 
individual organizations’ web sites.   I  included an NGO in the dataset  
only if  i t  met at  least  one of the following cri teria,  which I  view as 
equally important indicators of religiosity:  
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A.  A mission statement that explicit ly identi f ies a religious doctrine or 
tradit ion as the primary ideological framework for participation in 
human rights.   
 
For example,  The Africa Faith and Justice Network’s mission 
statement reads as follows: 
 
The Africa Faith and Justice Network (AFJN) strives to be 
a meaningful voice for Africa in U.S. public policy.  AFJN 
stresses issues of human rights and social  justice that  t ie 
directly into Catholic social  teaching. AFJN works closely 
with Catholic missionary congregations and numerous 
Africa-focused coali t ions of all  persuasions to advocate 
for U.S. economic and poli t ical  policies that  will  benefit  
Africa 's  poor majority,  facil i tate an end to armed conflict ,  
establish equitable trade and investment with Africa and 
promote ecologically sound development.  
 
AFJN's support  base is  primarily buil t  on the Catholic 
missionary community in the U.S. and in Africa.  AFJN is 
an extension of missionary witness in the difficult  yet  
important arena of U.S. poli t ical  decisions that  affect  
African people.2  
 
 
                                                 
2 Available at h t tp : / /a f jn .cua .edu/af jn .cfm.  
  
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                  68      
 
B.  An agenda that explicit ly includes the mobilization of  religious 
persons or groups on behalf  of  human rights .    
 
 
For example,  the Association of Christ ian Insti tutes for Social  
Concern in Asia l ists  among its  principal objectives the following: 
 
ACISCA is motivating the Church and Society to develop 
counterveil ing power in the midst  of gloom and despair .   
The task of building a global people 's  network such as 
common people 's  programme for the 21st  century should is  
(sic) one of the perspectives.   
 
ACISCA aims at  re-interpreting the meaning of people 's  
movements and struggles to the churches and seeks their  
full  support  and cooperation recognizing and reaffirming 
i ts  faith and commitment.   
 
ACISCA wants to build ecumenical relations with the 
Roman Catholics,  Orthodox and Charismatic Churches and 
prove that  even at  the grass root level i ts  ecumenical  
relationship is  deeper and self  sustaining.3  
 
 
 
                                                 
3 Available at h t tp : / /216 .92 .200 .162/AsiaHome.h tml#MEMBERS
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C.  Activit ies which include evangelism, proselytism, or the explicit  
promotion of  theocracy .  
   
For example,  the Baptist  World Alliance’s “Who Are We?” web page 
reads:   
The Baptist  World Alliance unites Baptists  worldwide,  
leads in evangelism, responds to people in need and 
defends human rights.4
 
Using these cri teria,  I  identified 591 religion-based human 
rights organizations.  
The other source of data that  I  used was the YBIO .   I  used the 
YBIO  for two purposes.   First ,  I  used i t  as a basis for creating a trend 
l ine to i l lustrate the decline in religious organizational foundings 
referred to by insti tutionalists ,  that  is ,  those organizations that  were 
classified as “R” in the Yearbook .   Although the YBIO  does not 
provide detailed entries for organizations classified as “R,” the 
appendices of the YBIO do contain data on numbers of such INGOs 
founded each year over the past  century.   
Second, I  used the YBIO  as a supplementary source of 
information on religious human rights NGOs.  Using the 1999-2000 
edit ion,  I  examined YBIO  entries classified under “Humanity,” 
searching for human rights NGOs whose entries contained evidence of 
religious affi l iat ion according to cri teria described above.5   
                                                 
4 available at h t tp : / /www.bwanet .org / fe l lowship / index.h tm
5 The YBIO’s classification system as the of the year 2000 did not include a category titled “Human 
Rights.”  Rather, human rights organizations were classified under the category “Humanity.” 
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Results   
Overall ,  my data collection through the use of HRI  yielded 591 
religion-based human rights organizations.   One hundred sixteen of 
those organizations were l isted in the YBIO  as well  as HRI .   In order 
to provide for a meaningful comparison with Boli  and Thomas’ 
findings on religious NGOs, which only include INGOs with or more 
countries represented within their  memberships,  not al l  of the NGOs 
listed in the HRI Directory are used in the analysis that  I  present in 
this chapter.   In particular,  I  only include international organizations 
with three or more countries represented among their  members and 
exclude human rights organizations that  are str ict ly national or 
bilateral  in structure.6  I  also exclude cases for which information on 
these variables was missing.  Only 196, or 33.2% of the religious 
human rights organizations in the dataset  are international.   Three 
hundred forty-one (57.7%) of the organizations in the dataset  are 
either national or bilateral .   Information on this variable was missing 
for 54 (9.1%) of the cases.  This dramatic difference between data 
sources in terms of the numbers of religious NGOs listed is  reflective 
of the YBIO  selection bias,  mentioned above, in favor of larger 
organizations with universal  goals and/or membership.   These figures 
alone give us some insight as to the amount of information that  is  
unaccounted for in research that  makes empirical  claims about global 
civil  society based solely on the YBIO  data.   Hence,  my decision to 
                                                 
6 For the results of an analysis that included national and bilateral as well as international  
NGOs, contact the author. 
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use the HRI data for my remaining quanti tat ive analyses.    
Figure 3.2 compares the foundings of “religious organizations” 
identified by the Boli  and Thomas (the descending grey l ine,  n =220) 
with the religion-based human rights organizations identified in this 
study (the ascending black l ine,  n=196).   The ascending black l ine 
represents currently active human rights organizations that  are,  in 
fact ,  rel igious according to the cri teria defined above. That is ,  they 
are religious INGOs whose primary focus is  on what world culture 
presumably defines as a secular social  issue,  i .e.  human rights.    
As the figure reveals,  al though foundings of YBIO-defined 
"religious organizations" have declined over the past  century,  
transnational religious participation in human rights has steadily 
increased over the same period.   The most dramatic increase begins 
around 1955 and continues during the two decades following the 
establishment of the United Nations – that  is ,  during a period of 
marked rationalization within the human rights f ield,  entail ing in part  
the insti tutionalization of secular “world cultural  principles.”  
Foundings dropped somewhat between 1975 and 1980, but appear to 
have held steady since then, with approximately 15-17 INGO 
foundings during every five-year period unti l  1990. Figure 3.2 
i l lustrates quite a profound shift  in religious INGO orientation,   
especially when we consider the fact  that  the ascending l ine only 
represents foundings in one sector of poli t ical  activity.  
If  secularization is  defined as a retreat  of religion from the 
public sphere,  and a differentiation between religious and secular 
f ields of action,  then the comparison reveals that  the apparent decline 
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in the number of “religious organizations” reported by Boli  and 
Thomas is not  evidence of secularization.   Rather,  the decline is  
associated with a population-level shift  away from differentiated 
modes of organization,  and toward organizational missions that  place 
religious NGOs squarely within the public sphere of global civil  
society.   
 This shift  raises the question,  however,  about whether the 
movement of religious groups into secular domains might i tself  be an 
indicator of secularization,  insofar as i t  might indicate that  religious 
organizations have abandoned their  spiri tual  missions and adopted  
agendas prescribed through the ideologies of enlightenment 
rationali ty,  perhaps through strategic choice,  co-optation,  or an  
unintentional drift  toward secularism (see,  for example,  Voye 2000).   
I t  would follow then, that  in function and form, religious 
organizations cease to be “religious.” 
Although this is  a reasonable argument,  in the field of human 
rights,  i t  is  difficult  to sustain.   To define human rights activism a 
priori  as a secular practice is  to impose an interpretation on i t  that  is  
not shared by the activists themselves.  Previous research shows that  
religious groups working with the United Nations do not for the most 
part  adopt the UN's ideological  premises.   On the contrary,  a study of 
international,  U.S. -  based,  religious organizations revealed that:  
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Figure 3.2  Foundings:  “Religious” Organizations vs.    
Religious Human rights Organizations,  1905-1990  
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Although most religious organizations view the United 
Nations as legit imate,  none thinks of i t  as the source of 
authority for human rights.   Each organization appeals 
rather to i ts  own highest  authority,  f inds human rights to 
be supported or required by that  authority,  and then 
concludes -  more or less systematically -  that  the 
international covenants adequately express i ts  human 
rights commitment and that  the United Nations is  the 
appropriate agency to monitor the fulfi l lment of those 
rights" (Livezey 1989, p.76-77).    
 
To determine whether or not Livezey’s findings pertain to U.S.-based 
religious organizations were generalizable among transnational NGOs, 
and to interpret  the meaning of the organizational foundings discussed 
above, we can refer to the interviews that  I  conducted with 
transnational religious INGO advocates.  
    
Data and Methods – Interviews.  
My fieldwork was exploratory,  and was conducted at  the very 
beginning of my project ,  prior to the construction of my quantitat ive 
dataset .   My questions were motivated toward acquiring a global view 
of the terrain of Human Rights and the place of religion in i t .   I  was 
not aiming to produce a “thick description” of the cultural  aspects of 
religious activism, but a general  understanding of how the insti tutions 
of the human rights f ield operate with reference to NGOs, and if  the 
“rules of the game” posed any special  opportunit ies or challenges for 
  
                                                                                                                                         
                                                                                                                                  75      
 
rel igious organizations.   With these aims, and my limited budget,  in 
mind, I  chose to conduct a small  number of in-depth,  key-informant 
interviews with general  secretaries,  treasurers,  founding members and 
other leaders of well-established transnational religious human rights 
organizations.   Since my budget and associated t ime constraints would 
not permit  me to travel the entire world,  I  had to make decisions about 
the regions upon which I  would focus.   I  chose the eastern United 
States,  including Washington DC and New York City,  Canada, and 
Western Europe.  I  chose these regions for two reasons.   First ,  my 
language competencies are in English and (just  barely) French.  
Second, these regions are homes to the United Nations and the 
European Commission.  As a result ,  they are also the locations where 
many of the major human rights organizations have established their  
secretariats.  
 Since I  planned my fieldwork at  the beginning of my research,  I  
was not yet  aware of the problems with the Yearbook of  International 
Organizations that  I  described above.  Therefore,  since use of the 
YBIO  is  somewhat of an established practice among global civil  
society scholars,  I  consulted i t  as my source of information on where 
to find religion-based human rights NGOs.7 This is  important to note 
in that  my use of the YBIO, along with my choice in regions,  biases 
my findings toward the information given by very large,  resource rich 
NGOs that  have affi l iat ion with international insti tutions and other 
                                                 
7 It was during the course of my fieldwork that I began to discover the limits of using the YBIO, as 
several of the religious NGOs that my respondents referred to were not listed in it.  While working with 
the YBIO at a later date, it became clear that the “missing” NGOs often did not meet the YBIO’s criteria 
of a “conventional” organization.  It was also through my preliminary fieldwork that I learned of 
Human Rights Internet. 
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major organizations in the human rights f ield.   In other words,  my 
respondents are very familiar and practiced in the “spiel ,” as well  as 
poli t ics and legali t ies,  of the field.   The voices of numerous smaller 
NGOs, in many cases struggling to survive,  are not here represented.    
At the t ime when I  was planning my fieldwork, the most recently 
published Yearbook  was the 1998 edit ion.   That edit ion did not have a 
category specifically t i t led “Human Rights.”  Instead,  human rights 
organizations were classified,  along with certain other types of 
organizations,  under a category t i t led “Humanity.”  After searching 
among the organizations classified under “Humanity”  I  was able to 
identify only 35 western INGOs that appeared, from their  YBIO  
entries,  to be religion based.8  I  sent let ters to all  of them, describing 
the purpose of my research and requesting an interview that I  
estimated to be one hour in duration (see appendix A).    
Five of the organizations to which I  sent let ters turned out to not 
be substantially focused on human rights.   Instead, they focused 
predominantly on such issues and peace and nuclear nonproliferation,  
abortion,  or on the delivery of humanitarian assistance.   Three of the 
organizations were located in inconvenient locations outside of my 
                                                 
8 Months later, when I had finished my fieldwork and was beginning to construct my dataset, I 
contacted the UIA, explained my project and asked how I might get additional information on 
organizations classified as “R.”  In response, one of their editors sent me a list of 80 religion-based 
human rights INGOs in their database.  Why had I not been able to identify these religion-based INGOs 
on my own?  First, at least 11 of them were located in either Asia, Latin America or Africa, so they 
were outside of my chosen research sites.  Second, 54 of them were not classified as “conventional” 
organizations, and therefore did not have complete entries.  Many of those without complete entries had 
names like “Coordinating Board of Jewish Organizations” or “St. Joan’s International Alliance” and, 
without more information, it was not apparent that they were human rights organizations.  Third, even 
among organizations classified as conventional, the organizations’ religious affiliations were not 
always obvious.  With names like “Youth for Exchange and Understanding” “Right Sharing of World 
Resources,” and “Pan European Union,” I had assumed many of them to be secular organizations.  This 
issue of “hidden religion” will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter Four. 
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research si tes,  including Cyprus and Lebanon.  There were five 
organizations from which I  received no response,  in spite of follow-up 
letters that  I  sent through Email  three weeks after  the init ial  let ters 
had been sent out.   From an addit ional three organizations,  I  received 
an init ial  response,  but could not arrive at  a commitment for 
interviews, as my requests were repeatedly reported to have been 
“passed on to other members of the organization” and the l ike.  
In the end, I  conducted a total  of 24 interviews with general  
secretaries,  treasurers,  program directors and individuals in other 
leadership posit ions across 18 human rights organizations.   Two 
Muslim, one Bahá'ái ,  one Sikh, three Jewish,  four Catholic,  three 
Protestant,  one Secular Humanist ,  and two interfaith organizations 
were included among those that  I  interviewed.  Although most of them 
had affi l iat ion with international insti tutions,  one organization had 
repeatedly been denied consultative status with the UN and another 
had recently had i ts  UN consultative status revoked.   
The interviews were conducted either in the INGOs’ offices or 
in nearby coffee shops and cafeterias.   After turning the tape recorder 
on,  I  briefly re-explained the purpose of the interview, recorded the 
name and t i t le of the respondent and asked her or his permission for 
the interview to be recorded.  The small ,  hand-held recorder was 
placed in the middle of the table.   
The interviews were open-ended and semi-structured.   They 
focused on three general  themes relevant to this and other chapters in 
the dissertation.   The questions that  were relevant to this chapter were 
largely contained in the first  set  of questions.   These questions were 
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about the advantages and disadvantages of religious affi l iat ion in 
terms of the abil i ty to attract  members and supporters,  perceived 
legit imacy vis-à-vis secular insti tutions,  legit imacy vis-à-vis general  
publics,  and all iance formation with other human rights organizations.   
This segment of the interview also included questions about the use of 
explicit ly religious language by organizations’ spokespersons across 
varying contexts (e.g.  local group meeting vs.  meeting at  UN or EU) 
and the extent to which inter-religious differences are topics of 
discussion in ecumenical  and interfaith meetings and organizations.  
In spite of the rather clinical  nature of my questions,  
respondents often gave clues as to how important religion was to them 
personally or for the organization’s members.   For example,  one of my 
respondents expressed disappointment upon discovering the types of 
questions I  wanted to ask,  saying he had really hoped he would have 
more t ime to talk about his personal story and the role that  religion 
played in bringing him to human rights activism.     
 
Findings 
My own research corroborates Livezey’s findings on U.S.-based 
human rights NGOs mentioned above (p.  63).   During the course of my 
fieldwork, advocates described their  human rights activism as mainly 
rooted within their  religious convictions.   In fact ,  activists  not only 
identified their  rel igious tradit ions as the primary ideological  
frameworks through which they interpret  their  human rights activism, 
but frequently legit imated this identification with assert ions that  the 
doctrines of their  religious tradit ions espoused human rights principles 
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long before the Universal  Declaration of Human Rights came into 
existence.   Consider the following conversation with a Muslim human 
rights activist :  
 
Interviewer:   Could you explain your organization’s 
definit ion of human rights or what you would consider to 
be within the realm of human of r ights issues? 
 
Respondent:   The basic concept of human rights -  I  don’t  
think there is  any difference in defining what the rights 
are – but our definit ion is  sl ightly different from the UN 
Universal  Declaration.   We actually have got a bit  of a 
problem call ing that  universal  because I  don’t  think 
universally everyone got together to come up with i t ,  so I  
don’t  see how it  becomes universal .   Basically,  we share 
most things,  except on some areas we actually feel  that  
there are certain rights which have not been established in 
the UN Charter.   
 
After this activist  described some of the issues that  he felt  the UN 
Charter fails  to address,  I  asked him the following: 
 
Interviewer:   You had mentioned that  the Universal  
Declaration of Human Rights isn’t  al l  that  Universal .    
Where would you say your organization’s definit ion 
originates? 
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Respondent:   Our sort  of basis goes back to Islamic basis.   
The human rights Universal  Declaration only chases 
history for f if ty odd years.   Ours actually goes much 
further than that .   I  mean the Islamic principles evolved 
while the West was st i l l  not al lowing women to have the 
rights of property.   And Islamically,  al l  those issues were 
already established.  Those rights were well  established 
within Islamic Law.  And, you know, the issues of you 
know even standing against  injustice is  extremely inherent 
in the Islamic teaching and jurisprudence.   There are many 
verses in the Koran that  actually deal with struggle for 
sake of those who are oppressed.   One particular verse -  
i t  says “How can you not f ight in the struggle for the sake 
of those oppressed men, women and children who are 
crying and who are saying, ‘God send us a Helper.   God, 
send us a protector.’?” And that  verse … calls upon the 
believer to rise up in the struggle for the sake of them 
because they are oppressed.9  
 
Likewise,  Sikh activists were eager to describe their  basis for human 
rights in their  own religious tradit ion.   For example,  when I  opened 
one interview by asking for a “crash course on Sikhism,” explaining 
that  I  knew very l i t t le about the religion,  the first  thing one activist  
told me was the following: 
                                                 
9 Telephone interview with Chairperson of Islamic human rights NGO, December 2001. 
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Essentially,  i t’s  a 500 year old religion which is  relatively 
young on the international scale.   However,  the scripture 
i tself  reads l ike the UN Declaration on Human Rights.   So, 
i t’s  way ahead of i ts  t ime – i t  enshrined the rights of 
women in scripture long before the rights of women were 
considered,  i t’s  against  caste hierarchies,  which is  the 
predominant Hindu practice….  The whole religion is  
essentially based on social  justice,  okay? 
…we look at  human rights across the board,  for 
everybody.  I t’s  part  of our faith to do that .   To defend the 
rights of the downtrodden.10
 
But activists  did not only make references to religious doctrine.   Some 
activists also emphasized a human rights orientation as an inherent 
component of the general  practices that  are part  of their  commitment 
to a faith tradit ion.   
 
Respondent:  We’re not really an NGO like,  I  don’t  know, 
Amnesty,  al though we work very well  together.    
 
Interviewer:   What are the differences?  Are there 
differences in function? 
 
Respondent:   No, I  don’t  think there are differences in 
                                                 
10 Interview with spokesperson for Sikh NGO.  September 2000, Ottawa. 
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function,  but there is  a difference,  because Amnesty is  not 
a faith.   I  mean people who are members of the Bahá'í  
fai th in a way automatically are a member of the NGO. 
 
Interviewer:   Even if  they don’t  formally contribute to i t?  
 
Respondent:   Absolutely.   Because they do, because they 
contribute in a way because they contribute anyway.  
Because the goals are the same, so they might not really 
realize i t .  You see?  So i t’s  not a membership thing.   
Clearly,  the Bahá'í  fai th and therefore [our organization] 
had decided to contribute to the work of the UN because 
i t’s  very much in l ine with our  principles,  so we feel  we 
can contribute to the work of the UN.11
 
Membership in an NGO’s religious group was also revealed to 
be an important signal of legit imacy for some of the minority religious 
NGOs, as was reflected in prohibit ions against  f inancial  support  from 
non-adherents.  Consider,  for example,  this Bahá'í  activist’s 
description of the difference between her organization and Amnesty  
International upon my asking how this particular NGO funded i tself  in 
the absence of a dues-paying membership:  
 
Respondent:   Through the international funds of the Bahá'í  
faith.  You see,  that’s the difference.   That’s where we 
                                                 
11 Interview with minority religious NGO activist, October 6, 2000, Geneva.   
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work,  for example,  as a faith.   We abide by the principles 
of our faith which is  that  a contribution cannot be 
received by anybody who is not a Bahá'í .  
 
Interviewer:   So,  al l  of your contributions do come from 
Bahá'í  s? . . .     
 
Respondent:   Yes,  that  is  a principle of our faith.12   
 
I t  also became clear from my interviews that ,  in terms of 
expressive styles,  rel igion does not take a back seat  to secularism 
when i t  comes to human rights activism within religious NGOs.  
Consider,  for example,  this Christ ian activist’s comparison of his own 
expressive style and orientation toward human rights to that  of other 
Christ ian activists in his NGO:   
 
Respondent:   … So, I  see the [NGO’s] movement as being 
very “faith fi l led” in the sense that  there are lots of 
people who use a lot  of God language and they’re kind of 
Christocentric and they understand that  the ministry and 
the resurrection of Jesus is  kind of normative for their  
l ives and drives a lot  of their  human rights issues…. 
 But when we have l ike sort  of organization-wide 
meetings,  we have lots of – people pray and … they’re not 
ashamed of their  kind of faith background.  And someone 
                                                 
12 Ibid. 
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l ike [anonymous],  who is the president in [anonymous],  he 
is  very faith-fi l led in a somewhat tradit ional sense.   He 
uses Christ  language, he prays…  I  f ind i t  very moving, 
but i t’s  not entirely my language.  But I  love the fact  that  
people can express their  faith as the core of their  human 
rights condition.   I  think that’s a really good thing.  
 
When I  asked how his own orientation toward human rights was 
different from the “Christocentric” approach that  he described, the 
activist  made a dist inction between official  rel igion and religion as 
informing his day to day practice.   But the centrali ty of religion to his 
activism was nonetheless maintained. He stated: 
 
Respondent:  Well ,  for me, I  mean I’m a church heavy guy, 
but I’m not necessarily in church to worship the 
conventional Catholic l i turgy every day.  I’m there to 
meet the neighbors,  to talk to kids,  to work in the pantry,  
to explore options for AIDS ministry,  to si t  with 
neighbors.   I  have to touch i t  in order to feel  whole in my 
day.……most of what goes on the world I  don’t  
particularly l ike,  and the only way that  I  can function 
intentionally,  and happily and freely is  to take all  of my  
values and put them into play… I couldn’t  do that  work 
without my neighbors in my church. 
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The respondent later went on to describe more about how belief in God 
motivates his human rights activism, again through a contrast  to more 
“Christocentric” approaches:  
 
R: I  think that  there are a few people – there are many 
people in the [NGO] – would make the case that  … 
freedom from abuse and torture and degrading treatment is  
part  of their  ministry as Christ ians who have been called 
to fulfi l l  that  ministry.   That’s not how I feel  personally.   
I’m not uncomfortable with that  language, but for me, i t’s  
much more that  …..  if  there is  a God, a lot  of this is  
intolerable to me.  I t’s  just  intolerable.   I t  calls  to me that  
– i t’s  intolerable to me that  my friend died in his early 
40s,  and i t’s  intolerable to me that  the stress and toll  of 
this work has been taking on people that  I  love.  I t’s  
intolerable to me that  al l  these people were kil led in 
Kosovo and we bombed the shit  of them and made 2 
mill ion of them refugees and they st i l l  have no place to 
go.   I t’s  intolerable to me that  -  I t  just  is  -  i t’s  l ike I’m 
not being argum-, one of those left ies kind of crazies,  I  
mean I  just  look around and know deep in my gut that  
there is  no fucking way that  any of this should be  
happening in a world for people who say they believe in 
some higher power.   There’s no way.  There’s no way.13  
 
                                                 
13 Interview with member of Christian NGO.  New York City, June 2000. 
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Unlike the decreed fate of Weber 's  Protestant ethic,  the spiri t  
that  brought the human rights movement into existence has thus far 
survived -  in spite of i ts  embeddedness within the rational,  
bureaucratic organizations and insti tutions that  i t  helped to create.   
Rather than having to choose between secular world cultural  and 
religious principles,  activists  interpret  human rights in terms of 
multiple worldviews.  As sociologists of culture and social  movements 
have pointed out,  individuals can draw from any number of 
transposable “schema” (Edgell  2002; Sewell  1992) or “frames” 
(Johnston and Klandermans 1995) in order to interpret  action,  and this 
certainly holds true for human rights.  
On the one hand, religious organizations engage with 
international insti tutions and make use of rationalist  tools such as 
posit ive law, bureaucratic management or other rationalist  strategies 
that  I  will  describe Chapter Four.   But even then, they may use these 
tools to defend dist inctly religious interests,  such as the right to 
evangelize or to protect  minority religions (Livezey 1989; Voye 1999; 
Lerner 2000).   Both collectivist  and individualist  forms of religious 
freedom are defended through legal-rational argumentation,  the 
presentation of scientif ic evidence and public appeals to world 
cultural  principles such as universalism and individualism. 
At the same time, individuals within human rights organizations 
may interpret  human rights,  as well  as certain world cultural  
principles,  as rooted in their  rel igious tradit ions.   Religious activists  
engage in various combinations of worship,  scriptural  study, 
evangelism and  human rights activism as a form of religious practice.   
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That is ,  rel igious activists  do not see participation in human rights as 
peripheral  to,  or as “watering down,” their  faith.   Rather,  human rights 
activism is an expression of their  faith,  a way of “doing religion” in 
global civil  society.  
This is  not to argue,  however,  that  secularization has not 
occurred in any way in the human rights f ield.   The fact  remains that  
the ideological  framework that  now defines the field as a whole,  
unlike the Christ ian framework that  defined i ts  origins,  fully manifests 
the world cultural  principles elaborated by Boli  and Thomas, and has a 
dist inctly secular tone.   Although this shift  in discourse has not 
prevented growth in the population of religious human rights 
organizations,  the disjuncture between the religious principles 
operating at  the organizational level of analysis and the almost 
exclusively secular principles consistently described within global 
civil  society research needs to be addressed.    
I t  is  my contention that  claims about hegemonic world cultural  
forms, though they accurately describe official  discourses such as 
those elaborated in Human Rights declarations and conventions,  may 
or may not serve as the ideological  compass for the culturally diverse 
actors operating within organizations fields.   To adequately 
comprehend the complexity and conflict  inherent in the construction of 
world culture,  we need to look beyond these official  discourses and 
consider the heterogeneity of cultural  forms that  mingle and compete 
within and across organizational f ields.   As Hefner (2001, p.  499),  in a 
discussion of civil  Islam, reminds us:  
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Viewed from the ground of everyday practice rather than the 
dizzying heights of official  cannons … in all  societies there 
are values and practices that  hover closer to the ground than 
official  discourse and carry latent possibil i t ies,  some of 
which may have egali tarian or democratic dimensions.   
These low-lying precedents may not be heard i t  high-flying 
cultural  canons.   Nonetheless … these messages are in some 
sense ‘available’ to those seeking guidance on what to 
become when the world takes a new turn.  
 
At the same time, lending support  to Steve Bruce’s argument 
that  diversity i tself  creates the conditions for certain forms of 
secularism (Bruce 1999),  the pluralism that  we find in the centralized 
contexts of international insti tutions creates the conditions for 
homogenization (e.g.  secularization) of discourse.   For instance,  to 
avoid ideological  controversy,  negotiations among states within the 
UN have typically been characterized by avoidance of specific 
references to religion (Lerner 2000, p.  119).   Such avoidance does not 
occur out of any blatant disregard for religious viewpoints,  but out of 
an interest  in avoiding conflict .  When asked if  religious differences 
were discussed openly at  UN meetings,  one individual that  I  spoke 
with during the course of my field research responded that  “religion is  
everywhere” but the issue "is far too explosive.   We'd never get  
through a meeting!"  I t  is  precisely because religious differences carry 
so much meaning in global civil  society that  explicit  references to i t  
are often avoided – not because of any decrease in religion’s relevance 
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to the issues or actors at  hand.  
 In the next chapter,  I  will  turn in detail  to the conflicts that  
emerge as a result  of the cultural  heterogeneity in the human rights 
f ield.   First ,  I  will  examine the opportunit ies and challenges that  
religious NGOs confront through their  engagement with secular actors 
and insti tutions in human rights.   In particular,  I  will  uncover the 
strategies and tactics that  NGO members use to negotiate between 
their  religious commitments and need to maintain legit imacy within a 
f ield that  is ,  at  least  in terms of official  culture,  secular.   Chapter 
Four will  also introduce the issue of inter-religious conflict ,  and begin 
to examine the religious stratif ication among NGOs, a topic that  will  
be covered in even greater detail  in Chapter Five.    
  
 CHAPTER FOUR  
COOPERATION AND CONFLICT IN HUMAN RIGHTS   
 
Chapter  Three established that  foundings of religious human 
rights NGOs increased over the second half  of the 20t h  century,  
suggesting that  the organization of the field around international 
insti tutions opened opportunit ies for rel igious mobilization.   This 
f inding raises questions,  however,  about whether any conflicts  emerge 
as a result  of the need for rel igious NGOs to simultaneously maintain 
legit imacy vis-à-vis the secular field of human rights on the one hand, 
and their  religious membership bases on the other.   Furthermore,  i t  
cannot be assumed that  international insti tutions open opportunit ies 
equally for al l  rel igious groups,  raising a second set  of questions,  
about interorganizat ional competit ion and the potential  for the 
formation of al l iances and cleavages among religious and secular 
groups.    
This chapter will  examine cultural  heterogeneity,  cooperation 
and conflict  in human rights ,  and the strategies and tactics that  
rel igious actors,  including NGOs and states,  use to negotiate the 
pluralist ,  secular terrain of this transnational field.   By “conflict” I  am 
not necessari ly,  or even usually,  referring to outright hosti l i ty among 
actors.   Rather,  I  am usually referring to the fact  that ,  in spite of the 
many objectives that  human rights NGOs share in common, they 
operate in a f ield where resources are finite.   As a result ,  even 
organizations addressing similar issues from compatible perspectives 
compete for funding, members,  contracts,  and recognit ion,  creating a 
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si tuation of interorganizational conflict .   In addit ion,  Human Rights is  
the si te of more explici t  conflicts over diverse and competi t ive 
program objectives and activit ies.   These more overtly contentious 
types of conflict  occur among states as  well  as  NGOs.  Both types of 
conflict  are of concern in this  chapter,  which will  address the 
following questions:  
 
•  
•  
•  
•  
First ,  how do the secular norms and assumptions of Human Rights 
influence the abil i ty of rel igious groups to mobilize in ways that  
are consistent  with their  tradit ions?   
 
Second, how does the influence of Human Rights norms and 
assumptions vary across religious tradit ions?  
 
Third,  how does religious affi l iat ion influence opportunit ies for 
al l iance formation on the one hand, and contribute to inter-group 
conflict  on the other?   
 
Fourth,  what strategies and tactics do religious organizations use to 
establish credibil i ty among the secular actors and insti tutions in 
Human Rights while  maintaining legit imacy among their  rel igious 
membership bases?  
 
To answer these questions,  I  refer to two sources of data.   The 
first  source consists  of interviews that  I  conducted with leaders of 
rel igious human rights NGOs, described in the second methods section 
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of Chapter Three.   The interviews were open-ended and semi-
structured and focused on two sets  of questions relevant to this 
chapter.   The first  set  focused on NGO leaders’ perceptions of the 
advantages and disadvantages of rel igious affi l iat ion in terms of the 
recruitment of activists ,  legit imacy vis-à-vis secular insti tutions and 
general  publics,  fund raising,  and all iance formation with other human 
rights organizations.   The second set  of questions focused on the use 
and acceptabil i ty of explici t ly rel igious language in Human Rights and 
the extent  to which inter-religious differences are discussed openly 
across contexts.   The purpose of the interviews was to get  an idea of 
how both conflicts  and all iance formation play out within the NGO 
universe from the perspective of religious NGO advocates.    
But no discussion of religious relations in human r ights would 
be complete without  taking into account power and poli t ics,  both 
within and among states.  International poli t ical  and economic 
relat ions become part icularly important  to NGO viabil i ty when state 
sovereignty claims coll ide with human rights claims.   For instance,  no 
one denies that  the exclusion of the Dalai  Lama from the Millennium 
Peace Summit was the result  of China’s international economic 
importance.   Likewise,  Sikh activists that  have been denied ECOSOC 
consultative status have consistently claimed that  their  exclusion is  
due to a combination of India’s international  economic importance and 
Sikh minority claims to self determination within that  country.   In 
fact ,  the issue of state sovereignty repeatedly emerges in the fields of 
human rights and humanitarian assistance as southern states raise 
concerns about perceived northern NGO biases.   Southern 
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governments have often accused northern transnational NGOs of being 
Trojan horses that  carry not  only western values,  including 
Christ iani ty,  but program objectives favoring northern states’ 
economic interests  (The Economist ,  2000).   From this perspective,  
support  for NGOs or  national  groups that  challenge governments’ 
policies are viewed as i l legit imate intrusions into internal  affairs  of 
state.   
To understand how religion intersects with confl icts over 
western values and sovereignty claims, the second source of data that  
I  analyze consists  of United Nations documents pertaining to the 
negotiations over the UN Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.  
Debates that  ensued over  the Declaration of Commitment on 
HIV/AIDS bring to the surface important cultural  differences among 
states that  are rooted not  only in religion,  but also in differences in 
the consti tutional relat ionships between religion and state.   As will  
become clear throughout this chapter,  the dominant posit ion within the 
UN acknowledges freedom of sexual orientation as a human right.   
Furthermore,  protect ion of that  r ight is  discursively constructed as 
essential  to the identification and treatment  of HIV/AIDS victims.  
These assert ions conflict  with the values held in many of the Muslim 
countries,  which adhere to an interpretation of Islam that  define 
homosexuali ty as a sin.   Furthermore, since many of these countries 
are theocracies,  homosexuali ty is  not only a sin,  but also a crime 
against  the state.   As a result  the conflicts  over homosexuali ty that  
were hotly debated during the Special  Session providing a window 
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into the intersection between state and religious conflict  in Human 
Rights .  
The documents that  I  used for  this portion of the analysis 
include 13 UN press releases (released between February 1,  2001 and 
June 22,  2001),  transcripts of 27 UN press briefings (delivered 
Between May 2,  2001 and June 27,  2001),  10 independent press 
reports given between July 20 and June 21, and the complete transcript  
from the proceedings of United Nations General  Assembly Special  
Session on HIV/AIDS, which was held June 25-27, 2001.  I  also 
referred to a variety of supporting documents,  including the UN 
Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, the United Nations 
“Reference Document” on civil  society part icipation at  UN 
conferences and special  sessions, the “Action Guide” for the 
implementation of the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, and 
similar types of documents that  were referenced throughout  the special  
session. 
 
Cultural Confl ict  and the Declaration of  Commitment on HIV/AIDS 
The Special  Session on HIV/AIDS was a si te of conflict  over two 
controversial  issues that  will  be discussed in this chapter.   The first  
issue was NGO participation – specifically the participation of an 
NGO called the International  Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission.  During the months prior to the convening of the Special  
Session,  eleven states raised objections to this  NGO’s part icipation in 
the Session,  culminating i ts  removal from the l ist  of part icipants.   
Debates over the NGO’s part icipation status ensued during the 
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negotiations prior  to and on the first  day of the Special  Session.   What 
was interesting about the debate in the General  Assembly was that  
neither rel igion nor homosexuali ty was mentioned by the Islamic 
states that  opposed the NGO’s participat ion.   Rather,  the conflict  
played out  on str ict ly procedural  grounds.    
A second controversy that  emerged was over language used in 
the draft  document  of the Declaration of Commitment  on HIV/AIDS.  
Specifical ly,  the draft  Declaration that  was presented for negotiat ion 
prior to the conference made explicit  references to “men who have sex 
with men, sex workers and their  partners,  and injecting drug users  and 
their  sex partners.”1  By the end of the 3-day session,  the document 
had been revised in subtle ways.   Rather than directly naming these 
vulnerable groups ,  the document referred to behaviors that  increase 
vulnerabil i ty,  including “risky and unsafe sexual  behavior and 
injecting drug use.”2 The phrase “men who have sex with men,” was 
no longer present in the document  and was subsumed under more 
ambiguous phrase “vulnerable groups;” the reference to sex workers 
was rephrased as “all  types of sexual  exploitat ion of women, girls  and 
boys,  including for commercial  purposes.”3   
The changes in wording, though barely perceptible to the casual,  
disinterested observer,  were the culmination of heated debates that  
involved objections raised by certain members of the Organization of 
the Islamic Conference (OIC),  the Vatican,  and the United States 
                                                          
1 Human Rights Watch.  June 20, 2001.  “UN: AIDS Conference Whitewash: US, Vatican, Egypt 
Undermining Frank Language in Conference.  Article extracted from Global Policy Forum, 
http://www.igc.org/globalpolicy. 
2 United Nations.  Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS, United Nations General Assembly Special 
Session on HIV/AIDS, June 25-17, 2001.  Pg. 26, paragraph 62. 
3 Ibid.  Pg. 27, paragraph 63.   
  
 
96 
(under the leadership of the Bush Administration).4  Arguments both 
for  and against  the inclusion of the more explicit  language were made 
during the General  Assembly Special Session,  as well  as  during the 
informal  negotiations over  the document .   
Through a close reading of the press releases,  briefings and 
Session transcripts pertaining to these two conflicts ,  I  will  show two 
things.   First ,  I  will  show how the Special  Session part icipants and 
observers  (e.g.  the press) make dist inctions about discourse that  
define i t  as ei ther “value-laden” and “cultural” on the one hand, or 
“factual” and “based in reali ty” on the other.   In part icular,  claims 
made by religious organizations are vulnerable to being discredited as 
culturally determined,  and therefore uninformed, while secular claims 
are more readily awarded the status of objectivity.   I  wil l  show that ,  
when speakers’ claims are evaluated as fal l ing into one of these two 
categories,  the evaluations are based less on the actual  content of 
speakers’ claims, and more on the status of the party making them.   
Second, I  wil l  argue that  the use of rat ionalist  modes of 
argumentation to achieve religiously motivated ends,  as I  will  show to 
be the case with the procedural  debate over the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission,  is  no accident.   Rather,  i t  is  a  
common strategy that  rel igious actors use to negotiate a secular 
organizational f ield,  part icular ly when religious viewpoints that  run 
contrary to the objectives of the secularist  mainstream are discredited 
on the basis of their  being religious.  The need for  this strategy varies,  
                                                          
4 Bosely, Sarah.  June 28, 2001.  “US-Islamic Alliance Hits Aids Hopes.”  Guardian. Article extracted 
from Global Policy Forum.  http://www.globalpolicy.org.  . 
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however,  according to whether rel igious groups espouse viewpoints in 
support  of mainstream agendas or in opposit ion to them.   
When religion emerges as issue of potential  confl ict  in Human 
Rights ,  rel igious groups use this rationalist  strategy by combining two 
tactics that  I  will  introduce in this chapter:  discursive secularization 
and procedural  rationalism.   
 
Discursive secularization .   One way to negotiate across culturally 
diverse venues is  to strategically shift  among secular and religious 
discourses.   For example,  rel igious beliefs or identi t ies that  are 
central  to an organization’s mission or objectives may be emphasized 
in the recruitment  of members,  but de-emphasized in communications 
to the public or in appeals for support  from secular organizations and 
insti tutions.   Related to this,  rel igious persons,  groups or issues may 
be of central  importance in the draft ing of formal statements and 
documents,  even when those statements or documents carry no obvious 
trace of rel igious conviction when presented “on the floor” of 
international insti tutions or in other public forums.   
 
Procedural rationalism .   Two forms of procedural  rat ionalism are 
i l lustrated in this chapter.   First ,  I  will  show how NGO participation 
in international insti tutions is  a multi- t iered,  mutli-stage process that  
provides many points of access and influence.   Human Rights 
negotiations do not  occur in s ingular forums where all  interested 
parties openly and equally come together to hash out their  differences.   
Rather,  even a four-minute statement  presented before the Economic 
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and Social  Council  (ECOSOC) is  often the culmination of multiple 
meetings of preparatory committees and working groups,  not to 
mention the corridor and cafeteria conversations that  precede or 
accompany the meetings where documents are drafted.   As a result ,  
rel igious groups often make arguments and shape statements in the 
earl ier  stages of the claims-making process,  which are less structured,  
more open to debate,  and less public then actual  conference and 
special  sessions.   Second, rel igious groups use procedural  rat ionalism 
by challenging controversial  proposals  and platforms on procedural  
grounds,  or by exploit ing certain procedural  ground rules,  rather than 
by attacking the actual  substance or values underlying the programs 
that  run contrary to their  preferences.   Both types of procedural  
rat ionalism work by creating space for  religious groups to exert  
influence in the grievance process without rel igious motivations or 
identi t ies being held to public scrutiny.    
Implici t  in these strategies is  a type of conflict ,  or  least  a 
diversity of opinion,  that  has not,  unti l  recently,  been confronted 
openly in international insti tutions.   However,  many of the activists  
that  I  spoke with expressed the view that  this is  beginning to change 
and that  rel igious differences are start ing to make their  way to the 
surface of public  debate.   The remainder of this chapter wil l  explore 
rel igious-secular interaction during this period of insti tutional change,  
and the way that  rel igious difference is  negotiated in a secular field 
where rel igion is  st i l l  a  somewhat taboo subject .   
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Culture,  Coalit ions and Cleavages  
Transnational rel igion and international relat ions combine in the field 
of Human Rights  in ways that  bring to l ight  the contested nature of 
human rights norms.  This has especially been the case as a broader 
plurali ty of actors associated with the UN has begun to assert  diverse 
interpretations of various human rights  concepts ,  such as those 
pertaining to social  and cultural  r ights.   In a conversation about 
possible reasons for the increased visibil i ty of rel igion at  the UN and 
the gradual ( though st i l l  marginal)  inclusion of rel igious language in 
UN-related texts since the 1990s,  one NGO advocate suggested: 
 
I  think that  i t  is  just  about  t ime… People are start ing to 
speak up for themselves.   Precisely those people who have 
not been l istened to.   Like in Africa,  l ike in Latin 
America,  l ike in Asia,  where people have a much stronger 
and richer  spiri tual  l ife.   Finally,  they are making their  
voices heard a l i t t le bit  more.   And you have to take into 
considerat ion that  the UN is  the UN of everybody and not 
just  the UN of a few secular states. 5
 
With this increased diversi ty,  of course,  comes the potential  for  
conflict .   And although conflicts  have emerged in Human Rights,  by 
and large they have not been conflicts  between NGOs of differing 
religious t radit ions.   In fact ,  more often than not ,  NGO leaders 
                                                          
5 Interview with minority religious NGO activist, October 6, 2000, Geneva.   
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reported that ,  even among NGOs of radically different  tradit ions,  
rel igion serves as  a  basis for cooperation.6   
Instead,  cleavages occur in more varied and interesting ways.   
For instance,  conflicts  that  are simultaneously transcultural  and intra-
religious have been of tremendous importance in recent years.   These 
conflicts have almost invariably been over issues having to do with 
women, sexuali ty and/or reproductive freedom, with family planning 
and AIDS most frequently in the spotl ight.   Usually breaking down 
across “l iberal” and “conservative” l ines (by current American 
definit ions),  the al l iances formed around these cleavages are 
internally quite diverse,  cutt ing across rel igious and national 
identi t ies,  while  creating cleavages within religions and countries.   In 
other words,  the same issues that  create intra-rel igious conflicts can 
serve as the basis  for powerful inter-religious all iances.   On the 
conservative side,  for example,  i t  is  common to find states  and NGOs 
from the global north and south working hand in hand along with 
conservative American evangelicals,  the Vatican,  and Islamic NGOs 
and states.   The same diversi ty is  found in coali t ions on the left .  At 
least  in the organizational f ield of Human Rights,  transnational 
conflict  looks less  l ike Samuel  Huntington’s Clash of  Civil izations 
and far more l ike James Davidson Hunter’s Culture Wars .    
                                                          
6My contact with each respondent was usually the duration of one interview.  As a result, it cannot be 
assumed that we developed the type of trusting relationship needed for full disclosure regarding 
sensitive issues.  Inter-religious conflict in human rights is one such sensitive topic, especially at the 
UN.  Therefore, it is not clear whether or not the lack of discussion of inter-religious conflict accurately 
reflects NGO leaders perceptions of the state of relations among NGOs, or if reports of inter-religious 
harmony were part of the “face” that religious human rights NGOs strategically present to the public.  
As will become clear in the remainder of this chapter, religious conflict in human rights is not always 
discussed overtly.     
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To elucidate the different  types of coal i t ions and cleavages that  
emerge among religious and secular actors in Human Rights,  the 
remainder  of this  chapter is  organized into two general  sections.   The 
first  section focuses on religious-secular relations,  the second on 
inter-religious relations.   Each type of relation brings with i t  the 
potential  for cooperation and conflict ,  and is  a  source of both 
all iances and cleavages.   I  will  describe the discursive and procedural  
tactics that  rel igious groups use in each type of relation to exert  
influence in a way that  al lows them to simultaneously stay t rue to 
their  rel igious foundations,  while maintaining legit imacy within a 
pluralist  and secular  public  sphere.  
As will  quickly become clear,  the dist inction between religious-
secular and inter-rel igious does not perfectly reflect  the real i ty of 
rel igious NGO relat ions,  as there is  considerable overlap and 
interaction among the categories.  For example,  variation among 
religions that  are not problematic in terms of interfaith al l iance 
building can nonetheless serve as bases for inequali ty in terms of 
religious-secular relations.   The dist inction that  I  make between these 
two types of relations is  meant str ict ly as a heurist ic device for 
helping us understand these complex interactions and the l ines along 
which religious all iances and cleavages are l ikely to be formed.  
 
Religious-Secular Relations 
One set  of questions that  I  posed to religious human rights  advocates 
focused on the opportunit ies and challenges rel igious NGOs confront 
in their  at tempts to build all iances,  express grievances,  and otherwise 
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exert  influence among secular organizations and insti tutions.   In 
reference to these matters,  the advocates that  I  interviewed perceived 
religious affi l iat ion as presenting NGOs with both advantages and 
disadvantages relative to their  secular counterparts.  
 
A.  Cooperation .   The main advantage religious NGO leaders reported 
flows from religious NGOs’ embeddedness in organizational networks 
that  extend broadly across and deeply into local  cultures.   As 
described by the Program Director of a  large interfaith organization,  
“you’ve got a network of infrastructure that  reaches from the smallest  
vil lage up to the national level  and is part  of an international set  of 
tradit ions. . .   They are transnat ional structures but they are also local  
structures.”7   
There are two sets of reasons why religious NGO embeddedness 
in these simultaneously local  and transnational structures creates 
advantages for religious NGOs.  The first  set  has to do with material  
resources needed to build mobilizing structures and deliver programs; 
the second set  has to do with the cultural  resources and resonance with 
local  communities that  al low transnational mobilizing structures and 
programs to be effective.   Both sets of characterist ic are at tractive to 
secular organizations that  lack them, making religious NGOs 
potential ly valuable partners.    
First ,  the sunk costs  of start ing new programs are often less  for  
NGOs with t ies to deep and extensive organizational networks than 
would be the case for NGOs operating independently of such t ies.   For 
                                                          
7 Interview with Director of interfaith NGO, September 2000, New York City.   
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example,  the activist  quoted above described the appeal of rel igious 
communit ies to secular “experts” who design United Nations programs 
addressing issues such as chi ld poverty or HIV/AIDS: 
 
If  they [experts] are mapping specific interventions,  we 
can connect that  with religious communities as a structure 
through which those interventions might  be made.  So you 
build the technical  capacity of the religious community,  
say to be able to care for and deliver certain 
interventions.8
 
He goes on to describe the uniqueness of rel igion’s mobilization 
capacity as follows: 
 
The other thing is ,  part icularly in Africa,  people are 
realizing that  if  you [inaudible] the government,  one of 
the only other structures that  has the capacity to reach 
most  of the population in any area or has the potential  to 
do that  are rel igious insti tutions… and part  of this is  
because of the post-colonial ,  post-missionary legacy.  
They [religious insti tutions] tend to have a significant 
portion of the health and educational st ructures in those 
countries.   So,  you’ve gotta  s tart  to work that  way.9
 
                                                          
8 Ibid. 
9 Ibid. 
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Second, due to the geographical  reach and historical  duration of 
their  t ies with local  communities,  rel igious groups tend to have 
considerable experiential  knowledge of the concrete needs of local  
populations.   As an activist  working for a Catholic women’s NGO 
explained:   
 
As [the NGO], now, we are beginning to find a way that  
we can have our impact in the United Nations.   A lot  is  
because we’re really in touch all  over the world with 
grassroots  women and really involved l ike in Africa with 
health programs, education.   Same in Brazil  – the 
Phil ippines.   All  over.   We know what the si tuation is  and 
we know native women that  know what the si tuation is .   
So we can do a lot  in gett ing women to come to these 
meetings and get a voice and find out  what is  going on to 
impact  the decisions that  the delegates make.10
 
 The transnational infrastructures of world religions provide a 
core incentive for states and secular insti tutions to include them in the 
development and implementation of their  humanitarian and human 
rights programs.  Recognit ion of their  importance is  i l lustrated by the 
fact  that  almost  every delegate speaking during UN Special  Session on 
HIV/AIDS made an explici t  reference to the indispensabil i ty and need 
for  continued involvement of religious communit ies in addressing the 
AIDS crisis .   For instance,  the Catholic  Church alone,  including 
                                                          
10 Interview with member of Catholic women’s NGO,  June 2000, New York City. 
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agencies of the Catholic Church and Catholic NGOs, was providing 
25% of care to HIV/AIDS vict ims global ly at  the t ime of the UN 
Special  Session.11   
Furthermore,  rel igion-based programs have a reputation for 
being successful.   Consider,  for  example,  the United Nations case 
study “AIDS educat ion through Imams: a spiri tual ly motivated 
community effort  in Uganda.”  This program was not only described in 
the UNAIDS study as “remarkably successful ,” but was referred to by 
several  delegations at  the Special  Session as a model for  other 
countries to consider incorporating.   Through i t ,  the Islamic Medical  
Association of Uganda (IMAU) mobilized 850 mosques and trained 
6,800 community volunteers who visi ted 102,000 homes in Uganda 
over a period of f ive years to educate people about HIV and how to 
protect  themselves from it  (UNAIDS 1998, p.  13).   “After  only two 
years,  baseline and follow-up surveys revealed that  community 
members in IMAU project  areas showed increases in correct  
knowledge of HIV transmission and prevention… and a s ignificant 
reduction in self-reported sexual partners and an increase in self-
reported condom use” (IMAU 1998, p.  6).   By the end of this f ive-year 
period,  Uganda Ministry of Health surveys showed a significant  
decline in HIV infection,  with some urban health clinics reporting the 
percentage of mothers test ing HIV-posit ive to have dropped by almost 
half  (IMAU 1998, p.  8).   Mobilization of an effort  as extensive as this  
                                                          
11 Statement by H.E. Archbishop Javier Lozano Barragan, President of the Pontifical Council for 
Pastoral Assistance of Health Care Workers, Head of Holy See Delegation to the XXVI Special Session 
of the General Assembly on HIV/AIDS, New York, June 27, 2001. 
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would be difficult  to achieve in such a short  period of without the pre-
exist ing networks of the religious communities.   
But the success of such programs is not simply due to the 
material  resources.   I t  is  also due to the second set  of advantages that  
rel igion brings to human rights and humanitarian efforts,  advantages 
that  are dist inctly cultural .   Researchers have already compiled 
considerable evidence that  a lack of sensit ivity to local  cultures can 
present major obstacles to the success of development ,  humanitarian 
and human rights  programs (Fox and Brown 1998; Keck and Sikkink 
1998;  Ferguson 1990; Mendelsohn and Glenn 2002).   In l ight of this ,  
NGOs affi l iated with local rel igion benefi t  from a certain form of 
cultural  capital ,  and organizations that  are deficient  in knowledge of 
local  cultures can benefit  from working with them.  NGO advocates 
described multiple ways in which their  unique form of cultural  capital  
is  useful.  
First ,  rel igious affi l iat ion can sometimes actually enhance an 
NGO’s capacity to address human rights violations that  are committed 
in the name of religion.   Contrary to the viewpoint that  rel igions are 
stat ic,  unchangeable insti tutions whose problems are only amenable to 
imported,  secular interventions,  rel igious activists  were more l ikely to 
art iculate a view of religion as dynamic and adaptable.   They 
frequently described how solut ions to rel igion-based human r ights 
conflicts  do exist  within rel igious tradit ions,  and since religion is  not 
going to disappear anytime soon, i t  must  be a component  of any 
program that  realist ically hopes to such violations.   One Muslim 
human rights activist  explains:    
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… we have got an abil i ty to bring a rel igious legit imacy 
and the outlook that  is  needed to analyze the problem 
properly and find solutions to i t .   For example,  let’s  say 
there are certain parts of the world we want to campaign 
against  male chauvenism that  has oppressed women – let’s  
say Afghanistan… I really do not believe you can help the 
women in Afghanistan without an understanding of the 
religious needs and background and using the religion as a 
tool of empowering them against  the oppression they are 
facing.   But having said that ,  I  think that  understanding is  
completely missing within the bulk of the projects that  are 
being set  up.12
 
In other  words,  rel igious affi l iat ion allows human rights norms to 
resonate with grassroots communities in circumstances where 
imported,  secular discourses may fall  f lat .   I t  provides NGOs with a 
tool for translating human rights norms into a viable,  resonant 
language that  can make them sensible from the perspectives of local  
communit ies (Osman 2003).    
Religion can also serve as source of inspiration for involvement  
in activism.  For example,  the Muslim activist  quoted above described 
how a debate ensued among his organizations’ founding members as to 
whether or not a  reference to Islam should be included in the NGO’s 
t i t le.   In spite of certain disadvantages associated with doing so,  this  
                                                          
12 Telephone interview with Chairperson of Islamic human rights NGO, December 2001. 
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activist  fel t  that ,  in the long run,  the explicit  reference to Islam that  
the organization decided to use ended up working to the organization’s 
advantage.    
 
I  don’t  think without that  identi ty many of our  members 
would be motivated to actually do what we are doing, and 
even being involved in what we are involved in.   Also,  
because of the level  of oppression being faced by 
Muslims, we are sort  of a self  help group -  an inst i tution 
FROM the community addressing those things is  actually 
very – i t  has been a very posit ive thing to help people to 
joining in.13
 
Overall ,  rel igious activists  perceived the advantages of religious 
affi l iat ion as stemming from the unique quali t ies of rel igious 
insti tutions,  with both material  and cultural  advantages making them 
attractive all iance partners.   My impression,  however,  was that  
rel igious activists  perceive their  secular counterparts as quick to 
recognize the material  advantages of cooperation with religious 
groups,  but perhaps less at tuned to the cultural  advantages and the 
potential  for rel igion to provide solutions to human rights conflicts .   
In other  words,  while partnerships with religious NGOs make sound 
economic sense,  rel igion’s status as a  legit imate cultural  framework 
for addressing human rights is  st i l l  tenuous,  creating the potential  for 
conflict  in rel igion-secular relat ions.  
                                                          
13 Ibid. 
  
 
109 
 
B.  Conflict .   The main problem for the analyst ,  however,  is  that  much 
of the conflict  involving religion in Human Rights ensues behind the 
scenes of transnational diplomacy, beneath the radar of the casual 
observer.   For example,  a leader of an NGO affi l iated with a minority 
religion described the following scenario surrounding the text  of a  UN 
document:  
 
Activist :   I t  was very interesting to see that ,  when we 
were at  the Millennium Forum in May, there were a 
number of NGOs, including a number of French NGOs for  
that  matter ,  who systematically tr ied to remove all  
rel igiously connotated words … I heard one NGO for 
myself  that  was fighting against  the term “compassion” to 
be included because i t  had a religious connotation.… But 
at  the same time … often t imes now you see the word l ike 
“spiri tual  value” and things l ike that  in text  much more 
than you used to.  
 
Interviewer:  So,  are there actual  debates about whether or  
not the word “spiri tual” would be put in?  Or,  is  this 
something people would have lengthy dialogues about? 
 
Activist :   No.  Lengthy dialogues,  no.   I  have found that  
al l  of a sudden you’ll  f ind the term…. somebody who has 
the text – you know, put i t  – i t ’s  not going to be 
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somebody raising from the floor and very obviously 
saying “please can you add spiri tual .”  But,  you know, 
somebody is going to a negotiation,  when a text  appears i t  
is  going to be in the text  and so on and so forth.   And 
somebody is not  going to be again raising their  f lag and 
saying “remove i t .”   But  al l  of a sudden i t  might disappear 
from the text.   You know?  I  think i t’s  much more subtle 
than people making big debates on i t . 14   
 
Consistent  with her description of this rather evasive method of text  
edit ing,  this activist  went onto describe the negotiations surrounding a 
Pakistani  proposal for a human rights  resolution on the defamation of 
Islam.  She explains:  
 
That really deals with issues that  are typically rel igious.   
And although there is  not much debate in the public,  
everything is  done in the back corridor.   But perhaps i f  
you look at  i t ,  you might  f ind trends in ways l ike the text ,  
the way i t  is  moved… I mean there is  a  whole debate.   So,  
there are lengthy negotiations ensuing.  See the problem is 
that  they are occurr ing in places where you wouldn’t  have 
anything in writ ing.15
 
                                                          
14 Interview with member of minority religious NGO, October 6, 2001, Geneva.  
15 Ibid. 
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The process that  this activist  described was also operating in the 
events leading up to the controversy over the International Gay and 
Lesbian Human Rights Commission’s part icipation in the Special  
Session on HIV/AIDS.   
 
Religion and NGO Selection at  the UN Special  Session on HIV/AIDS .    
The terms for part icipation in the UN Special  Session on HIV/AIDS 
stipulated that  NGOs without consultative status could part icipate on a 
non-objection basis .   This meant that  any member state could require 
that  a non-accredited NGO be removed from the l ist  of part icipants.   
After circulation of the init ial  l ist  of  NGOs on April  19,  2001, the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights  Commission had 
received 11 objections,  and was subsequently str icken from the l ist .16  
When the amended, “final” l ist  (which did not include the NGO in 
question)  was distr ibuted on May 18, 2001, representatives from the 
European Union and Canada raised concerns about  the changes,  and 
more specifically about the anonymity and lack of transparency 
surrounding them.  The representative from Norway, concurring with 
the EU’s concerns,  stated that :  
 
He found i t  very disquieting that  the l ist  had been changed 
from the l ist  that  had been circulated on April  19.   He 
noted,  in part icular,  that  three non-governmental  
organizations had been str icken from the l ist  with no 
                                                          
16 United Nations press Release GA/9857.  06/25/2001.  “General Assembly Approves List of Civil 
Society Participants for June HIV/AIDS Special Session.” 
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explanation given from those that  had a duty to explain.   
Transparency should be at  the heart  of the Assembly’s 
work,  he added.  I t  was unacceptable that  there was not at  
least  an explanatory footnote in the document providing 
information about the changes.   Whether or not the 
changes were legit imate,  the reasoning needed to be 
highlighted for the membership at  large.17
 
On June 22, the issue was again raised,  when in a meeting of the 
General  Assembly,  Canada’s representative proposed that  the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights  Commission be included 
on the l ist  of part icipants for  the Human Rights Round Table.18  Egypt,  
Libya,  Qatar and Pakistan all  made interventions in opposit ion to 
Canada’s proposal.   But  the objections were not made in terms of the 
substantive issues surrounding the NGO’s inclusion or exclusion.   
Rather,  the objections were raised on issues of procedure.19
Although the UN press releases describing the controversy did 
not give details  surrounding the procedural  issues,  procedural  
objections were raised again during the first  day of the Special  
Session on AIDS, for which I  had complete transcripts.   Agenda i tem 
5 of the fi rst  meeting of the Special  Session was enti t led “organization 
of the session” and concerned the l ist  of civil  society actors that  were 
permitted to part icipate in the round tables of the Special  Session.   
                                                          
17 Press Release GA/9865.  05/18/2001.  “Assembly Approves NGOs for Participation in Special 
Assembly Session on HIV/AIDS.”   
18 United Nations Press Release GA/9882.  June 22, 2001.  “Assembly Fine-Tunes Arrangements For 
Special Session on Children, Disagrees Over NGO Participation in AIDS Roundtable.”  
19 Ibid. 
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The transcript  of the debate in the General  Assembly was revealing.20 
The General  Assembly turned i ts  at tention to a document containing 
the l ist  of approved NGOs, along with a separate document  containing 
an amendment.   The amendment proposed “that  the l ist  of  part icipants 
for  Round Table 2 – the round table on human rights – include the 
name of Karyn Kaplan of the International Gay and Lesbian Human 
rights Commission.”21
Egypt  was the first  to raise an objection,  stat ing “I t  is  not  the 
issue of an organization that  will  part icipate or not part icipate in a 
round table.   I t  is  the issue of the right of Member States to use the 
rule of non-objection basis .   I f  we abolish this rule today, those 
countries that  do not move in a group will  be the countries that  suffer  
the most.   That is  why I  am proposing,  on behalf  of the Organization 
of the Islamic Conference (OIC) -   which represents 56 countries – a 
motion of no action on this amendment.” 
The next representat ive that  the President of  the Assembly 
called upon to speak was the representat ive of Canada,  who explained 
the reasoning and purpose behind the amendment.   He stated,  in regard 
to the objections to the International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights 
Commission’s part icipation,  that  “After  lengthy informal discussions 
over the past  few days,  i t  has become apparent that  your Office [the 
Office of the President of the General  Assembly],  is  not at  l iberty to 
divulge the identi t ies of the objecting delegations;  nor is  i t  able to 
                                                          
20 All information and quotes for my discussion of this meeting of the United Nations General 
Assembly, Special Session on HIV/AIDS are extracted from United Nations document A/S-26/PV.1.  
This document is an official record and transcript of the United Nations General Assembly, Twenty-
sixth Special Session, 1st meeting, Monday, 25 June, 2001, 9:00 a.m., New York. 
21 Quoted from “Mr. Hynes,” representative of Canada. 
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enlighten the Assembly as to the nature or basis  of the objections;  nor,  
i t  seems were any of the anonymous and objecting delegat ions able or 
will ing to share any such information with other members of the 
Assembly.”  He went on to say that  excluding this NGO through these 
methods set  a dangerous precedent,  al lowing for a  system of 
“anonymous,  arbitrary blackball ing” that  could have a severe chil l ing 
effect  on all  future NGO participation,  regardless of the values held 
by any particular NGO. 
When the representative of Sudan took the floor  in response,  he 
objected,  but not to any of the points  made by Canada.  Instead,  he 
objected on the basis of a  point  of order.   He directed his comments to 
the President,  stat ing that  the President  “should have been advised 
properly … that  the first  speaker to address this  very important issue 
after you returned to the Chair  was the representative of Egypt,  on 
behalf of al l  the Organization of the Islamic Conference member 
States,  and that  was in process of voting on the issue that  we are 
addressing.   I  think that  giving the floor to the representative of 
Canada was a grave mistake,  because according to the rules of 
procedure,  once a motion has been proposed i t  has to be seconded and 
voted on,  and there should be no debate.”    
Similar  arguments over procedure and points of order ensued, 
taking several  twists and turns.   For example,  after  the Assembly 
voted on the amendment,  the Islamic states retrospectively questioned 
the legit imacy of the vote due to quest ions about  quorum.  First  they 
questioned whether  or not sufficient  numbers of representat ives were 
present for there to be one; later  they raised quest ions about  whether 
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or not representatives who were present  but not voting should be 
counted.   Although most of the procedural  issues raised were 
legit imate,  at  t imes they bordered on ridiculous.   For example,  one 
representative challenged the President’s conclusion that ,  i f  a person 
had voted,  they indeed had been present  for the vote,  the number of 
votes therefore counting as sufficient evidence of a quorum in the 
absence of an actual  count  prior to a vote.    
In the end, Egypt’s request  for no motion was voted down (63 
votes opposed, 46 votes in favor,  19 abstentions) ,  and the amendment 
reinstating the Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission was put 
favorably to vote.   At the end of the session,  Islamic states ,  one by 
one,  refused to vote on the final  l ist  of accredited NGOs, result ing in 
a f inal  vote in favor of the amended l ist  of NGOs.  The Islamic states’  
refusal  to vote was in protest  of the fact  that  the Assembly was putt ing 
to vote,  in public ,  an issue that  was supposed to be resolved 
informally,  with the option of anonymity,  and by consensus (i .e .  the 
non-objection rule).   Overall ,  these procedural  debates went on for  
over two and one-half  hours.   Not  once during the process were the 
issues of rel igion or homosexuali ty raised by any member of the OIC.   
Press accounts of the event ,  however,  painted a different picture 
of the proceedings,  one that  focused exclusively on the religious 
dimension of the objections to the International Gay and Lesbian 
Human Rights Commission’s part icipation in the Summit.   Although 
there was an occasional reference to the objections being raised “on 
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points of order and rules of procedure,”22 there was no discussion of 
what those procedures were,  or the fact  that  the debate over  the non-
objection basis for  part icipation had very newsworthy implications.   
Particular ly,  by over-riding the non-objection rule,  the President of 
the General  Assembly changed the non-accredited NGO approval 
process from one based on consensus to one based on vote,  leaving 
states that  are not  al igned with dominant blocs at  a dist inct  
disadvantage.   The objections raised by the OIC states also spoke very 
directly to another very controversial  issue in UN poli t ics – the issue 
of NGOs being viewed by some southern states as “secular  
missionaries” working on behalf of northern states’ interests.   
Allowing NGOs that  were not  even accredited to part icipate in the 
session in spite of the objections raised by southern states could 
exacerbate concerns that  NGOs are instruments of northern states’ 
foreign policy.   That  this aspect of the debate went unreported is  
noteworthy.  
Instead of addressing the complexity and variety of issues at  
stake,  the debate was characterized as entirely rel igion-based, with 
one reporter claiming that  the OIC states raised “moral objections” to 
the NGO’s inclusion [quotation marks used in press report]. 23  In my 
reading of the transcript ,  however,  not once did I  see the phrase 
“moral  objection” used by any of the Islamic states’  representatives 
during the meeting addressing the part icipation of the International 
Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission.   The representative of 
                                                          
22 United Nations Press Release GA/9882.  June 22, 2001.   “Assembly Fine-Tunes Arrangements for 
Special Session on Children, Disagrees over NGO Participation in AIDS Round Table.”   
23 Riley, Mark.  2001.  “Islamic Nations Block AIDS pact again.  Age.  Article extracted from Global 
Policy Forum: http://www.globalpolicy.org. 
  
 
117 
Pakistan did describe his objection as “a matter  of principle.”  But the 
principle he was referring to was the violation of a procedure (i .e.  
non-objection) that  had been agreed upon and documented in a formal 
resolution.   According to his understanding, the principle of non-
objection meant  that  “The objection raised by any Member State is  not 
a matter  for discussion in the General  Assembly… We believe that  i t  
is  not for the General  Assembly to consider the merits  or demerits  of 
any object ion.   That  is  for the committee on NGOs to do.”24
Explicit  argumentat ion on the basis of values was present,  
however,  in arguments supporting the amendment allowing the 
International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights  Commission to 
part icipate.   The most explicit  value-oriented statement  was made by 
the representative from Norway, who described the issue as “a 
question of what kind of organization the United Nations is ,  and what  
kind of organization we are turning into… That is  what this is  really 
about.   I t  is  a f ight  about the soul of the United Nations:  in which 
direction are we going?”25    
This is  not to say that  rel igious actors never raised the issue of 
religion.   On the contrary,  rel igious differences were an important 
subject  of debate in the informal negotiations leading up to the 
Special  Session,  when “Several  government  delegations,  including 
those of the United States,  Egypt,  Libya,  and the Vatican,  [at tempted] 
to delete from the draft  declaration … any mention of … men having 
sex with men, sex workers and their  cl ients,  and injecting drug users  
                                                          
24 Statement by representative of Pakistan.  A/S-26/PV.1 
25 Statement by representative of Norway A/S-26/PV.1 
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and their  partners.”  26 As will  be discussed in greater detail  below, this 
issue was raised often during the Special  Session in delegates’ 
speeches.   But  the fact  remains that  rel igious conflicts  are 
predominantly “backstage” events.  
The greater explicit  emphasis  on religion in informal and 
preparatory,  in comparison to formal and official ,  venues is  part  of a 
larger pattern that  is  recognizable in the strategies that  rel igious 
NGOs use to influence the claims making process in Human Rights.   
Specifical ly,  rel igious NGO members,  often inadvertently but at  t imes 
quite strategically,  use discursive secularization in a way that  takes 
advantage of the procedural  rationalism inherent  in the diplomatic 
process.   
For instance,  the rules for bringing human rights violations to 
the attention of ECOSOC are very structured in terms of who may 
attend, who may make statements before the council ,  and the duration 
for  and circumstances under which they may speak. In the face of such 
t ightly structured opportunit ies,  statements are carefully crafted 
through multi-stage processes involving formal and informal  working 
groups and preparatory committees.   Several  NGO members described 
how, even though they may not actually make formal statements 
before the council ,  they are nonetheless very involved in the earl ier  
stages of the process,  where issues are hashed out and formal 
statements developed.  As a result ,  rel igious individuals and 
organizations can provide substantial  input into the draft ing of 
                                                          
26 Human Rights Watch.  June, 20, 2001.  “UN:  AIDS Conference Whitewash – US, Vatican, Egypt 
Undermining Frank Language in Confernece.”  Article extracted from Global Policy forum.  
http://www.globalpolicy.com. 
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statements or documents that  are presented by “secular” sources.   But 
activists  were also quick to point  out  that  the “real” dialogue begins 
even prior  to preparatory forums, in informal contexts where activists  
act  on the knowledge that  “… I know you and I  know what your 
interests are,  and I’m preparing a statement ,  maybe you would help me 
draft  i t .”27  
Using a similar strategy, one interfaith NGO leader described a 
two-phase process of interfai th mobil ization around human rights and 
humanitar ian issues.   The firs t  phase involves religious actors from a 
diversity of tradit ions arriving at  a common understanding of 
spiri tually informed values and objectives.   In the second phase,  
activists  t ranslate that  common spiri tual  understanding through a 
process of discursive secularization.   The organization’s objective 
during this second phase is  to translate i ts  platform, or pitch,  into a 
language that  will  resonate with the broader human rights community 
without sacrif icing the integrity of the group’s spiri tual  bases.   Using 
the example of a project  init iat ive focused on children’s r ights,  this 
activist  explains:  
 
We can al l  express out of our  tradit ions that  the child is  
the center  of care in our community.   And we’ve all  got  
scriptural  or other  warrants within our  tradit ions to 
support  that .   Now, the message were going to take as 
rel igious leaders to the public is  not  going to be loaded 
with our individual and part icular internal language or 
                                                          
27 Interview with leader of large Catholic NGO, June 2000, New York City.  
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scriptural  references.   But we’re gonna take this shared 
concern and together find a public language that  st i l l  has 
a religious dimen -   or,  eh,  i t  doesn’t  -  we’re not going to 
sound l ike Amnesty or some other group, but  were going 
to speak in a language where i t  al lows us to collaborate 
with specifically human rights organizations,  so to speak.  
So that  they can understand a connection.   We don’t  
speak, for  example,  as a Christ ian… you know we 
wouldn’t  speak simply in biblical  language which would 
make i t  harder to f ind common cause with secular  human 
rights organizations… So, i t’s  a two step process. 28
 
Although religious organizations do occasionally use explici t ly 
religious language in public forums, including the UN, the extent of 
religious involvement would be underestimated if  we emphasized the 
carefully crafted speeches and official  records of part icipat ion too 
heavily.   Furthermore, conflicts among organizations,  including 
conflicts  over religion,  are more l ikely to occur in preparatory 
sessions,  not in the final  statements that  are presented in the official ,  
public forums of international  inst i tutions.   Therefore,  the fact  that  
rel igion often looks l ike a “non-issue” on the surface cannot be taken 
as an indication of an absence of religious influence or conflict .   
But why is  this the case?  Why does language become 
secularized as NGOs move through the processes of constructing 
statements and presentations?  Did not the Millennium Summit of 
                                                          
28 Interview with Director of Interfaith NGO, June 2000, New York City. 
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Religious and Spiri tual  Leaders usher  in a new era of religious 
cooperation and openness in the international community?  In theory,  
i t  did,  and I  do not question the sinceri ty of ei ther the part icipants or  
the sponsors of events bringing religious groups into closer dialogue 
with international insti tutions.   But widespread cultural  change is  a 
slow process,  not an event.   And close reading of diplomatic speeches 
and press coverage at  the Special  Session on HIV/AIDS reveals that  
rel igion’s legit imacy in international insti tutions is  st i l l  tenuous and 
contested.   Although diplomatic speech is  careful ly crafted to avoid 
giving any impression of host i l i ty or bias,  there are nonetheless subtle 
ways in which representatives,  spokespersons,  and the press discredit  
rel igion and reinforce secular  viewpoints.  
 
Religion,  Reason and the Debate over Language  
Consider for example,  the debates surrounding the explicit  mention of 
“men who have sex with men, sex workers and their  cl ients,  and 
injecting drug users” in the Declaration of Commitment on HIV/AIDS.  
Part ies in favor of as well  as part ies opposed to explicit  references to 
these groups had both moral  and practical  reasons for their  posit ions.   
Part ies in favor of the explicit  language claimed that  to exclude i t  was 
an act  of denial ,  st igmatization and discrimination similar to the more 
pervasive denial  and discrimination that  was not only morally 
unacceptable according to human rights standards,  but  was severely 
impeding efforts  to identify victims, provide treatment and prevent  the 
spread of the epidemic.   Part ies who objected to the explicit  language 
argued that  explicit  mention of these groups implied tacit  approval  of 
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behaviors that  were not only contrary to the beliefs of their  cultures,  
but were the very cause of the epidemic,  and would increase the 
prevalence of the epidemic in their  countries if  permitted.   Though 
there were both moral  and practical arguments on each side of the 
controversy,  the arguments were not consistently treated as such. 
For example,  during the negotiations leading up to the Special  
Session,  UN Deputy Secretary-General  Louise Frechette held a press 
conference at  UN headquarters.   The following question was posed to 
the Deputy Secretary-General:  
 
Question:  Are you concerned that  the final  declaration 
may be watered down so much that  i t  wil l  not  have the 
impact  the United Nations would l ike because of serious 
differences remaining on issues such as homosexuali ty,  
prosti tution and so forth?29   
 
First ,  i t  is  worth noting that  the question is  posed by the press not  in 
terms of a conflict  between two or more subsets of actors within the 
United Nations,  but between “what the United Nations would l ike” and 
what others who have disagreements about “homosexuali ty,  
prosti tution and so forth” would l ike.    
The Deputy Secretary-General  follows suit  in her  response.   She 
begins by pointing out that  the there is  much good faith and a strong 
desire among the delegations “to come to an agreement  so that  the 
                                                          
29 United Nations Press Release DSG/SM/134, June 20, 2001.  “Transcript of press conference by 
Deputy Secretary-General Louise Frechette.” 
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session ends on a full  consensus on a good, strong declaration.”  But 
then she goes on to say,  “I  think that  ways will  be found to find words 
that  take into account the cultural  sensit ivit ies without doing damage 
to the intent of  the declaration  (my emphasis added).30  The dispute 
then,  is  framed as one between an abstract  enti ty called the United 
Nations community that  is  in agreement with “the intent  of the 
declaration,” and a set  of presumably outsiders who oppose i t .    
She then goes on to dist inguish among and subtly character ize 
the types of concerns of each of these part ies:  
 
Clearly,  I  sense that  there is a very strong desire across 
Member States to f ind this compromise,  which will  mean 
that  they will  have to find the right words to deal  with the 
reali ty ,  but  not to offend the sensit ivi t ies of some 
cultures.   I t  is  a real i ty,  and i t  has to be taken into 
account  (my emphasis added).31
 
 
This statement implicit ly creates and reinforces two 
assumptions.   First ,  that  delegations in favor of the inclusion of 
explicit  language are operating from the standpoint of “reali ty” (e.g.  
fact ,  science,  objectivity),  and second, delegates opposing i t  are 
operating from a standpoint of “sensit ivi ty” (e.g.  emotion,  a  absence 
of concern with “reali ty” or “facts”).   And this was not merely an 
                                                          
30 Ibid. 
31 Ibid. 
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aberration wherein one spokesperson ut tered some carelessly worded 
phrases.   Rather,  this  characterization of “some cultures” as ei ther 
ignorant or unconcerned with scientifically established mechanisms of 
HIV/AIDS transmission was also frequently evinced in delegates’ 
speeches during the Special  Session.   In spite of the poli te 
“diplomatese” in which the speeches were writ ten,  opposit ion to 
explicit  language pertaining to homosexuals,  injection drug users  and 
prosti tutes was variously and frequently described as “ancient  
taboos,” “moral squeamishness” and “burying our heads in the sand.” 
 An examination of the actual  statements presented by the 
Islamic representatives during the Special  Session,  however,  reveals 
that  this characterization is  not entirely accurate.   While Islamic 
states made no attempt to hide the fact  that  they approached the issue 
of HIV/AIDS from the perspective of their  rel igion,  they justified this 
approach on the basis of what  they perceived as i ts  proven 
effectiveness in stemming the t ide of AIDS – a perception that  was 
based on the observation that  Islamic countries had,  and continue to 
have,  the lowest prevalence of HIV/AIDS globally.32 They defended 
their  posit ions through reference to the same “facts” as those 
referenced by their  secular counterparts  – the facts that  HIV/AIDS is 
especially prevalent  among men who have sex with men, injecting 
drug users and people with multiple sexual partners.  But they arrived 
at  different programmatic solutions from those of the majority,  based 
on their  cultural  contexts.   The representative of Pakistan gave what 
                                                          
32 According the most recent statistics compiled by UNAIDS, Middle Eastern and Northern African 
countries account for less than 1percent of HIV cases globally.  Within the region, approximately 0.2% 
of the population is infected.   
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was perhaps the most diplomatic recognition of this dist inct ion.   After 
discussing the economic aspects of the epidemic,  he went onto say: 
 
We believe that  every country has to chalk out  i ts  own 
preventative and combative strategy and best  suited to i ts  
circumstances.   International involvement should be 
l imited to resource mobilization,  sharing of benefits  of 
research and technological  advancement and making 
available affordable and sustainable treatment  and 
medicines…  
 
We must not let  controversial  norms overshadow our 
struggle.   But we must remain sensit ive to each other’s 
value systems.  While pursuing our crusade against  the 
pandemic,  let  us continue to show respect to each other’s 
culture,  fai th and values.33
 
 
He then went on to describe Pakistan’s National  AIDS Control  
Program, which has been in place since 1993 even though the country 
had largely “remained protected from AIDS so far .”34 The program 
included strategies for information awareness,  surveil lance,  HIV/AIDS 
testing,  blood bank screening,  counseling,  and bio-social  research.     
                                                          
33 Statement made by Dr. Abdukl Malik Kasi, Minister for Health of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS,  June 25, 2001. 
34 Ibid. 
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 Other Islamic countries,  such as Saudi Arabia,  drew more 
explicit  connections between the religion of Islam and the fight  
against  HIV/AIDS.  But again,  the argument was not one of Islam 
taking precedence over f ighting the disease.   Rather i t  was an 
argument about Islam’s perceived effect iveness in preventing the 
spread of the disease:35     
 
The Kingdom is committed to the international 
recommendations and strategies that  are in conformity 
with the teachings of Islam… The number of patients 
infected with AIDS in the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia is  
small ,  not  exceeding 440 cases since 1985.  The reason 
for this  is  the adherence to the religion of Islam, which 
prohibits  sexual relations outside the confines of 
marriage.   In spite of this,  an awareness campaign was 
established by using the media to all  groups,  especially 
the young, who are the highest  r isk group.  The program 
emphasizes adherence to Islamic teachings and explaining 
the dangers of the disease,  i ts  complications,  the way i t  
spreads,  and ways to avoid i t . 36
       
  Iran’s representative gave what was perhaps the most  strongly 
worded statement on behalf  of Islam.  His statement ,  unlike those of 
                                                          
35 It is not my intent here to evaluate any of the claims to effectiveness made by any of the parties, only 
to establish the nature of such claims.  
36 Statement by H.E. Dr. Yacoub Bin Youssouf Al-Masruwah, Deputy Minister of health for Preventive 
Medicine. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, 
June 27, 2001. 
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Pakistan and Saudi  Arabia,  did make pointedly moral ,  as well  as 
causal ,  claims.  His references to moral i ty were rather lengthy, but 
their  general  point  and spiri t  are captured in the following excerpts:    
 
Let us not  delude ourselves.   The spread of the disease 
cannot be addressed in a vacuum.  The moral  aspect  
involved in and around the why and how of i t  al l  and the 
established fact  that  irresponsible sexual behavior ,  of 
different forms, has been among the key factors in the 
spread of the disease,  cannot,  and in fact ,  should not be 
brushed aside,  under any pretext,  even in the name and 
under the guise of empathy for the hapless infected… The 
question,  however,  for al l  of us is  whether the totali ty of 
the international community can bring i tself  to the point  
of addressing the real  causes of the pandemic and coming 
up with what i t  takes to combat i t ,  effectively and 
meaningfully,  and certainly with empathy and 
compassion… 
 
The issues and concepts under  discussion in the present 
conference involve long-established fundamental  ethical  
principles and values,  they simply cannot be subjected to 
a post-modern “laissez-fair ,  laisser passer” mentali ty and 
approach…  
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Care and treatment  of the already infected is  al l  but 
imperative and should be pursued with vigour as a matter  
of priori ty.   Yet,  i t  is  our considered view that  prevention,  
in the broadest  sense of the word and most certainly based 
on elements of moral  choice,  responsible sexual  behaviour 
and promotion and protection of family,  provides a more 
effective shield against  further spread of the pandemic.37
 
 This statement  is  thoroughly moralist ic  and judgmental  of the 
behaviors that  are associated with HIV/AIDS transmission.   I t  also 
contains,  however,  a cause and effect argument about how the disease 
is  spread -  an argument  based on the same facts as those that  are used 
to defend the inclusion of explici t  language.   But in this case,  the 
tables are turned,  and i t  is  the secularists  who are accused of “burying 
their  heads in the sand” and ignoring “the reali ty” surrounding the 
causes of HIV transmission and effective solutions.    
Both sides are in agreement as to the multiple causes of HIV 
transmission,  including injecting drug use and risky sexual behaviors 
such as non-monogamy and men having sex with men.  However,  they 
propose different  solutions.   The majority group claims, given the 
knowledge about how HIV is transmitted,  that  the best  way to confront 
the epidemic is  to specifically target  for test ing and treatment 
individuals who engage in these behaviors.   The minority group, given 
this same knowledge about how HIV is transmitted,  along with the 
                                                          
37 Statement by Dr. Ali-Akbar Sayyari, Deputy Minister of Health and Medical Education of the Islamic 
republic of Iran. United Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 26, 2001. 
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knowledge of the relat ively low prevalence of HIV/AIDS in their  
countries,  claims that  the best  way to confront the epidemic within 
their  countries is  to continue to l imit  these behaviors at  the outset .   
What then,  are the practical  implications,  from each perspective,  
of the various forms of language proposed to describe vulnerable 
groups?  From the standpoint  of Islamic states’ representat ives,  to 
explici t ly give priori ty to and,  from their  perspective,  tacit ly approve 
of,  “men who have sex with men, sex workers and their  cl ients,  and 
injecting drug users” would be to compromise a cultural  system that  
they view as an effective preventive measure against  HIV/AIDS.  This  
claim is  succinctly captured in the representative of Egypt’s 
statement:   “Moral  and religious values have protected many countries  
and we should not omit these resources when i t  is  now desperately 
needed.”38
From the majority s tandpoint,  use of the more abstract  phrase 
“vulnerable groups” would “weaken the document” by fail ing to 
explici t ly name those groups who are most vulnerable.   I t  is  not  clear,  
however,  why the use of the more general  phrase “vulnerable groups” 
would weaken actual programs targeted toward them.  As the 
executive director of the International Council  of AIDS Service 
Organizations pointed out ,  he would have “preferred explicit  
language,  but the absence of i t  would not slow the Council  down.  
‘The entire world knows who the vulnerable groups are.   Funders and 
                                                          
38 Statement by H.E. Prof. Ismail Sallam, Minister of Health and Population.  United Nations General 
assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 2001. 
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donors in many countries who do not agree with this are st i l l  working 
with those populations.’”39   
 What remains,  however,  are concerns about values and the 
desire of the majority to make a public ,  principled statement  regarding 
openness toward the categories of people in quest ion.   Even more 
important ,  there remain serious moral  questions about how certain 
categories of people and behaviors should be treated within societies.   
Though these moral  questions are certainly no less important than the 
practical  questions regarding HIV/AIDS, they are indeed moral 
questions.    
This brings us back to our original  concern with differential  
treatment of discourse.   What many delegations and commentators 
fai led to come to terms with is  the fact  that  the debate over explici t  
language was one that  cannot  be accurately characterized in the 
simplist ic terms of a debate between rel igion and science,  or between 
culture and “reali ty.”  Rather,  there are two intersecting debates.   The 
first  is  a debate is  about how, objectively,  to prevent and defeat  HIV.  
Proponents on each side of this debate are arguing from the standpoint  
of the perceived effectiveness of their  chosen methods.   The second 
debate is  a moral  debate about human rights and the treatment  of 
certain categories of people.   Proponents on each side of this debate 
are arguing from the standpoint of values.   And there is  nothing wrong 
with arguing from the standpoint  of values.   But,  by fail ing to 
acknowledge how both sides engage in both types of argument,  one 
side’s discourse is  privileged with the status of objectivity,  while the 
                                                          
39 United Nations Press Briefing.  June 27, 2002.  “Press Conference by AIDS Service Organizations.” 
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other is  discredited from the outset as being based in “mere belief .”  
Furthermore,  these determinations are made less according to the 
content of any particular message,  and more according to the identi ty 
of the messenger.   In other  words,  rel igious groups,  by virtue of their  
status as “religious,” have less maneuverabil i ty in terms of being able 
assert  values-based statements and st i l l  maintain legit imacy.  Under 
such circumstances,  arguments about  procedure and points of order 
may indeed be more effective.          
To the extent that  differential  treatment of rel igious and secular 
speech operates in Human Rights,  i t  is  understandable why actors use 
the combined tactics of discursive secularization and procedural  
rat ionalism in their  broader  mobilization efforts .   While opportunit ies 
for al l iance formation with secular groups and part icipation in the 
global public sphere are abundant,  they require certain adaptations on 
the part  of rel igious groups in terms of their  self-presentation.    
However,  the extent to which these strategies are necessary or 
effective cannot be assumed to apply equally to all  rel igious groups.   
The next section wil l  address this variat ion by moving away from the 
uni-dimensional focus on religious-secular relations,  and adding the 
dimension of inter-rel igious competit ion.     
 
Inter-religious Relations 
By and large,  activists  talked about inter-religious relations in terms 
of cooperation and all iances.   Indeed, each NGO representative readily 
described numerous examples of joint  projects with NGOs of fai th 
tradit ions different from their  own.  But  one topic which religious 
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NGO leaders did talk about more in terms of competi t ion was funding.   
In fact ,  they consistently reported that  one of the main challenges that  
rel igious NGOs confront is  secular donors’ hesitat ion to fund religious 
groups.   Two general  reasons were described for this hesitat ion.    
First ,  some secular donors hesitate to fund religious NGOs for 
fear of being perceived by the public,  by governments,  or  by other 
organizations as partial  to one particular  religion.   Such perceptions 
of part ial i ty leave potential  donors vulnerable to accusations of 
“picking sides” in religious conflicts,  or in debates over  religiously 
charged issues such as family planning.40  A second barrier  presents 
i tself  in the form of many northern countries’  legal  restr ict ions 
regarding the separation of rel igion and state,  which effectively bar  
government-supported organizations from contributing to religious 
endeavors.   One common strategy for negotiat ing these barriers is  to 
seek funding not for  an NGO itself ,  but  for  part icular projects that  are 
demonstrably and exclusively secular in terms of their  objectives and 
methods of implementation.41   
However,  even this secularizing strategy is  more effective for 
some religious groups than for others.   Even if rel igious NGOs do not 
themselves discriminate against  one another,  contributing publics,  as 
well  as  some secular NGOs, foundations and governments,  are 
perceived by many activists  as  allowing religious differences to 
influence their  will ingness to provide support .   This preferential  
treatment occurs in several  forms.    
                                                          
40 Interview with Treasurer of Jewish human rights organization, September 2000, Washington, D.C.. 
41 These interviews were conducted in 2000 and 2001, prior to the Bush administration’s unveiling of 
“Faith-based initiatives.”  
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First ,  when competing for  funding at  the national  level ,  NGOs 
affi l iated with religious tradit ions that  are familiar  or mainstream 
enjoy certain advantages over organizations affi l iated with rel igious 
tradit ions that  appear foreign to that context.   But  the advantages are 
not necessari ly due to any attachment to the favored religion on the 
part  of potential  donors.   Rather,  rel igious affi l iat ion functions more 
l ike a “name brand,” The familiari ty of the name brand affords 
advantages in terms of competi t ion among individual organizations as 
well  as competi t ion among religious tradit ions more generally in their  
efforts  to obtain outside support .  
In terms of competit ion among individual NGOs, religious 
organizations that  have been operating in human rights or 
humanitarian sectors for an extended duration benefit  from posit ive 
reputations and relationships of trust  developed with past  and present  
donors.   For example,  donors in the US might  be more will ing to fund 
a particular Christ ian NGO’s program than a Muslim NGO’s program 
simply because they have a record of posit ive experiences (or at  least  
a lack of negative experiences) with the former.   This record lowers 
the economic and public relat ions risks associated with providing 
support .   Islamic organizations,  to the extent that  they have not been 
operating as long as Christ ian organizat ions in the US, lack 
comparable portfolios.   This  dynamic is  reflected in one Catholic 
activist’s  comments when I  asked her about how Catholic affi l iat ion 
influences the way that  her organization is  perceived in UN circles:  
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Activist :  The people at  the UN know that ,  for the most 
part ,  our organizations don’t  have anything to gain from 
this.   There’s not a f inancial  -  they’re not in business,  
they’re not,  for the most  part ,  they are not looking for 
personal  glory.   They really believe in the things that  they 
do.   
 
Interviewer:   Because you’re an NGO?  Or because you’re 
rel igious? 
 
Activist :   Because we’ve buil t  up a reputation.   They 
know your organization.   They know you as a  person.   
 
Interviewer:    Do you think a new religious organization 
would have the same credibil i ty? 
 
Activist :   They’d have to build i t  up – that  confidence.42   
 
In terms of competit ion among organizat ions that  vary I  terms 
of religious affi l iat ion,  organizational age would then translate into an 
advantage that  systematically favors Judeo-Christ ian organizations 
since they tend on average to have had more t ime to develop posit ive 
relationships with northern donors.43
                                                          
42 Interview with member of Catholic NGO, September 2000, New York City. 
43 For example, among the human rights organizations in my dataset, the average age among 
organizations did vary significantly by religious tradition.  For example, on average, Jewish 
organizations were the oldest in the dataset, with an average of 62 years, while the average age for 
Muslim organizations, the youngest in the dataset, was 30 years.  Catholic and non-Catholic Christian 
NGOs averaged 45 and 35 years of age respectively.   
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The activist  quoted above further went on to describe how 
differences in credibil i ty as a result  of  age can create difficulty in 
terms of interfai th al l iance building: 
 
Activist :   I  worked with the United Nations Environment 
Program.  They had what they call  the Environmental  
Sabbath….. We tried and tr ied to get  as  many groups 
together,  but there seemed to be a preponderance of both 
Protestant  and Catholic.   And there were always Jewish 
representatives,  they were always there,  but  we couldn’t  
get  the other groups.   I t  was very hard for  them to send -  I  
don’t  know what  i t  was…  
 
And then they did appear.   And when the Muslims came 
and became active they wanted,  and rightfully so,  they 
said “We cannot use Sabbath as the t i t le.   We do not 
observe a Sabbath.”  So then they began to call  i t  a  
“Religious Partnership.”  I t’s  an example of how the 
people who had been here and had worked on this  thing 
could very well  say… “[INAUDIBLE] this  name!  We 
have established a reputation with this name.  People 
understand who we are.   Now you’re gonna –“ You know?  
I t’s  not simple.   I t’s  not that  s imple.   
 
I  think to everybody’s credit  we went  along with changing 
the t i t le.   But i t  wasn’t  al l  that easy – because of that  fear 
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of losing the credibil i ty they accrued because they had 
already established a relationship.44
 
In addit ion to competit ion among individual organizations,  
competit ion among entire religious tradit ions appears to operate 
according to a similar mechanism.  Specifically,  activists  perceived 
public familiari ty with a rel igion to be posit ively associated with 
donations to i ts  NGO affi l iates.   For instance,  individuals in the US 
might  be more l ikely to donate to Catholic programs than minority 
NGO programs not because of any agreement  with the tenets of 
Catholicism, or even because of the relative objective merits  of each 
organizations’ programs.  Rather,  i t  is  because the cognit ive 
connection between Catholicism and humanitarian work is  a familiar  
one that  “makes sense” in the American context.   The same cannot be 
as easily said for public perceptions of the relationship between 
humanitar ian work and say,  Scientology, or  even a religion such as 
Islam or Sikhism.   
A leader of a  minori ty religious NGO gave the following 
example when I  asked how religious affi l iat ion affects an NGO’s 
abil i ty to acquire public support:  
 
I  think that  i t  depends on the country,  but I  also think i t  
depends on which religion.   I f  you are an organization of 
the main,  recognized religion of that  country …if you are 
the group of I  don’t  know, Lutheran Churches in 
                                                          
44 Ibid. 
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Germany, people are going to take you seriously.   But i f  
you are some obscure religious organization,  they might  
not.   So,  i t’s  normal.   I t’s  not  a cri t icism at  al l .   I  think 
i t’s  very normal.   Because i t’s  something that  people 
know, so they are familiar  with,  so they are familiar  with 
i t  so they know that  where they are going to put their  
money i t’s  going to be used in a proper  way.  But if  you 
are some obscure group, you might  be perhaps excellent,  
but you also might  be some kooks.45
 
I t  appears then that  rel igious organizations are vulnerable to a 
“l iabil i ty of newness” similar to that  which exists  within various 
industries  (Stinchcombe 1965).   Specifically,  newer organizations are 
at  disadvantage compared to organizations that  have been operating in 
the non-profit  sectors for longer periods of t ime and have therefore 
established legit imacy, relationships of trust ,  and favorable 
reputations among potential  supporters .   
Preference for certain religious NGOs over others is  not always 
a mere function of familiari ty,  however.   A small  number of minority 
activists  also reported more overt  biases operating – biases based in 
stereotypes and misconceptions about certain rel igions.   For example,  
Muslim and Sikh activists each gave examples where members of the 
human rights community assumed that ,  based on their  rel igious 
affi l iat ion,  their  organizations represented religious fundamentalists .   
                                                          
45 Interview with representative of minority religious NGO, October 2000, Geneva. 
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And making matters  worse,  fundamental ism itself  is  sometimes 
assumed to be associated with radicalism, violence,  or terrorism.   
The automatic association of certain rel igions with 
fundamentalism or extremism is captured by one activist’s account of 
a discussion he had with a  human rights worker for one of the major 
human rights organizations.   He asked his colleague “Why are you not 
campaigning for  those people who are being imprisoned in Turkey – 
journalists  and so forth,  who normally you campaign quite  vigorously 
for  -  this class of individuals?  Just  because they are Islamic,  why are 
you not doing i t?”  His colleague’s response was that  he had “put a  
couple of those cases up,  but  there was t remendous backlashes from 
campaigners of that  organizat ion,  saying they don’t  want to campaign 
for Muslim fundamentalists .”46  
One very frustrated activist  gave an example of how similar 
assumptions operate in international inst i tutions.   When I  asked her 
how others responded when members of her NGO would make 
comments l ike “Its  part  of our faith to defend the rights of the 
downtrodden,” the activist  responded: 
 
Activist :   Suspect.   People are suspect.   Because [our 
rel igion] has this  st igma of being terrorists .   Yeah, okay, 
terrorists  that  care about human rights .  
 
Interviewer:   Do you think i t  would be different i f  you 
were to say “it’s  part  of our  Christ ian faith?” 
                                                          
46 Telephone interview with Director of Islamic human rights NGO, December 2001.   
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Activist :   Oh yeah.  You get  an RC [Roman Catholic] 
bishop up there saying “we believe that  equali ty and 
world peace blah blah blah is  so important ma ma ma ma,” 
he’s just  absolutely revered.   You get  a [minority 
religious adherent]  up there and they go “Huh?”  See what 
I  mean?  Because they’ve already got a perception in their  
own minds about what [our  religion] is  or isn’t .   And they 
haven’t  delved any deeper.   They haven’t  looked beyond 
the [mode of religious dress]…. They’re basing [their  
opinions] on media reports,  on sensationalism, on 
incidents…”47    
 
 
 An alternative interpretation of the differential  treatment that  
this activist  reported may be that  rel igious biases operate according to 
whether or not their  statements are consistent with dominant 
viewpoints on the issues in question.   By “dominant” I  mean that  the 
viewpoints are ei ther shared by the majori ty or are in the interests  of 
powerful actors within the field.    
 For instance,  compared to statements made by Islamic 
representatives at  the Special  Session on HIV/AIDS, the World 
Council  of Churches (WCC) spoke from a more explicit ly religious 
standpoint .   The WCC’s representative described HIV/AIDS as “an 
i l lness that  violates God’s will  for His creation” and described their  
                                                          
47 Interview with spokesperson for minority NGO.  September 2000, Ottawa. 
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“spiri t  of voluntarism and genuine compassion” as “facil i tated by our 
spiri tual  mandate.”48   
I t  might indeed be the case that the World Council  of Churches 
has greater freedom of religious expression relat ive to the members of 
the OIC because of a straightforward bias that  favors Christ ian 
organizations.   But we also need to take into account the fact  that ,  
unlike the viewpoints expressed by the OIC states,  the WCC expressed 
viewpoints that  were wholly in support  of the viewpoints held by the 
secular majority at  the Special  Session.   For example,  the WCC 
concurred with the majority in the General  Assembly that  “High risk 
and vulnerable groups (e.g.  persons with drug dependencies,  prisoners,  
refugees,  migrant  populations,  internally displaced persons,  people of 
homosexual orientat ion) require part icular at tention and 
accompaniment fully respecting their  essential  human right.”  
Furthermore,  the WCC was keen to “dismiss the widespread myth that  
al l  churches and rel igious organizations are against  the use of 
condoms.”49   
 But the Vatican also used explicit ly religious language to 
defend i ts  posit ion.  Consider these excerpts from the statement given 
at  the Special  Session by the head of the Holy See delegation: 
 
On various occasions,  His Holiness Pope John Paul II  has 
affirmed that  those suffering from HIV/AIDS must be 
provided with full  care and shown full  respect,  given 
                                                          
48 Statement by Dr. Christopher Benn, representing the Commission of the Churches on International 
Affairs of the World Council of Churches.  United Nations General Assembly Special Session on 
HIV/AIDS, June 27, 2001. 
49 Ibid.  
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every possible moral and spiri tual  assistance,  and indeed 
treated in a way worthy of Christ  himself .   According to 
the Pope,  the merciful  love of God needs to be shown 
especially towards the orphaned children of parents who 
have died of AIDS… 
 
In may cases,  HIV/AIDS implies problems also at  the 
level  of existential  values;  i t  is  a true pathology of the 
spiri t  which harms not only the body but the whole 
person, interpersonal relationships and social  l ife ,  and is  
often accompanied by a crisis  of moral  values… 
 
No one can deny that  sexual l icense increases the danger 
of contracting the disease.   I t  is  in this  context that  the 
values of matrimonial  fideli ty and of chasti ty and 
abstinence can be better  understood.  Prevention,  and the 
education which fosters i t ,  are realized in respecting 
human dignity and the person’s transcendent destiny,  and 
in excluding campaigns associated with models of 
behavior  which destroy l i fe and promote the spread of the 
evil  in question.50
 
 
                                                          
50 Statement by H.E. Archbishop Javier Lozano Barragan, representing the Holy See delegation. United 
Nations General Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS, June 2001. 
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But unlike the World Council  of Churches,  the Vatican’s posit ion 
conflicted in very important ways with the viewpoints expressed by 
the majority,  and was therefore cri t icized by major human rights 
organizations as “gett ing their  way” and seeing to i t  that  “the denial  
and discrimination that  have helped spread the disease will  continue 
unabated.”51  I f ,  as the minority activist  above perceived, Catholic and 
Christ ian speech is  privileged relative to other  religious groups simply 
on the basis of i ts  being Catholic or Christ ian,  such cri t icisms against  
the Church might have muted.   
  Having said that ,  the Holy See does appear to have a pattern of 
using the most explici t ly rel igious language relative to that  of the 
other rel igious groups at  the UN.  But the relat ive freedom of 
expression assumed by the Catholic Church may not be a  function of 
the same factors that  determine types of expression for other religious 
groups.   There are two intersecting reasons for  this exception.   First ,  
unlike any other Western religious insti tution,  the Holy See 
technically is  considered a state and has permanent observer status at  
the United Nations.   Therefore,  compared to a rel igious NGO, i t  is  not  
vulnerable to having i t  r ights  of part icipation denied or revoked as a 
result  of discursively “going against  the grain.”52  
Second, unlike the Islamic states,  the Holy See is  nonetheless of 
Western origins.   And although the West is  often denoted as the 
“secular West ,” i t  cannot be assumed that  al l  confluence of interest  
                                                          
51 Human Rights Watch.  June 20, 2001.  “UN: AIDS Conference Whitewash: US, Vatican, Egypt 
Undermining Frank Language in Conference.”  Article extracted from Global Policy Forum.  
http://www.globalpolicy.org. 
52 Some groups, such as Catholics for a Free Choice and the associated See Change Movement, are 
trying to have the Holy See’s observer status removed.  But whether or not they will succeed in this 
endeavor any time soon is highly questionable. 
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and ideology between Christ ian religion and Western states has 
dissolved.  As already mentioned above, one way this relationship 
between Christ ian religion and the West  may play out is  in terms of 
the relat ive legit imacy Christ ian groups are afforded in the north,  
which provides the bulk of f inancial  support  to “global civil  society” 
(Uvin 2000).   But i t  may also be the case that  the depth,  
expansiveness,  and level  of interorganizational coordination within 
the Catholic organizational universes gives i t  certain leverage over 
other rel igious groups,  especially minorit ies.   
At this  point ,  however,  these hypotheses about variation in 
rel igious influence are only conjecture.   Putt ing them to the test  wil l  
be the task of the next chapter.   Specifically,  Chapter Five will  use 
logist ic regression analysis to predict  rel igious NGO access to one 
important form of capital  in global civil  society – the social  capital  
that  accrues through formal t ies with international insti tutions.   I  wil l  
examine the two types of rel igious NGO characterist ics discussed in 
this chapter – resources and resonance – to determine the relat ive 
weight  of each in determining the odds of obtaining consultat ive 
status with international insti tutions.    
 
  
    
CHAPTER FIVE 
WORLD CULTURE AND STRATIFICATION: RELIGIOUS 
NGO SELECTION IN INTERNATIONAL INSTITUTIONS 
 
This chapter examines the role of international insti tutions in 
selecting among rel igious NGOs for cert if ication,  and subsequently 
legit imation,  within the field of human rights.   I  accomplish this task 
by elucidating key characteris t ics that  dist inguish religious human 
rights organizations that  have IGO ties  from those that  do not have 
IGO ties.   As Tarrow points out,  “cert i f ication operates as a powerful  
selective mechanism in contentious poli t ics,  because a cert ifying si te 
always recognizes a  l imited range of identi t ies,  performances and 
claims” (Tarrow, 2004, p.  22).   As a result ,  requirements for 
cert if ication can influence structural  power1 among religious groups,  
by differential ly permitt ing access to the formal arenas where issues 
such as religious freedom or women’s rights (which are often of 
concern to religious groups)  are negotiated.   In the process,  
accreditation standards proscribe the incentives and disincentives 
human rights NGOs are faced with when considering whether to 
maintain,  adopt,  or de-emphasize various aspects  of rel igious 
discourse and practice.   For instance,  normative expectations that  
rel igion be detached from poli t ics,  or observant of the rights of  
                                                          
1 Following Roy, by “structural power” I mean “the ability to determine the context within which 
decisions are made by affecting the consequences of one alternative over another” and influencing the 
rules according to which interactions and exchanges among organizations are organized  (Roy 1997, 
p.13).     
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homosexuals,  will  require greater compromises for some religious 
groups than for others,  potentially having a transformative influence 
on accredi tat ion-seeking NGOs whose ideologies and practices are in 
tension with these ideals.   
My main argument in this chapter is  that  the normative 
standards that  guide NGO selection for consultative status with 
international inst i tutions – standards that  are rooted in world cultural  
principles -  are not neutral  with regard to region or rel igion,  and 
reinforce strat if icat ion among religious groups within transnational 
organizational f ields.2  For instance,  as Figures 5.1 and 5.2 reveal,  
NGO ties to IGOs are disproportionately distr ibuted along religious 
l ines.   The figures i l lustrate the results  of a cross-tabulation of IGO 
consultative status with expected values given the proportion of the 
world’s  population represented within each of the world’s major 
religious t radit ions.   As the figure reveals,  Christ ian,  Jewish,  and 
especially Catholic human rights NGOs are significantly favored over 
Muslims and “others ,” a category that  includes diverse groups such as 
Buddhists ,  Jains,  Hindus and religions commonly describes as “new 
religious movements.”  As I  will  demonstrate later  in this chapter,  this  
disproportion by religion parallels  a similar pattern in favor of NGOs 
from the global north.   
Using binomial logist ic regression,  I  wil l  explain patterns of 
consultative status through an examination of NGO conformity to two 
types of organizational characterist ics.   The first  set  of characterist ics  
                                                          
2 Following Pyle and Davidson (2003), I define religious stratification as “a relatively stable ranking of 
religious groups in terms of their access to power, privilege, and prestige.   
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Figure 5.1 Proportion of Global Populat ion within Major Religions,   
Excluding Nonrelgious.   
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Figure 5.2 Frequency of IGO Consultative Status by 
Religion,  Excluding Nonreligious  
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indicates conformity to standards rooted in the prevail ing world 
cultural  norms operating in the field of human rights;  the second set  
indicates different components of organizational  structure that  serve 
as proxies for organizational resource capacity.   I  will  show that ,  in 
order to understand ideological  selection as i t  applies to religion,  we 
need to take into account the interaction between the cultural  
templates that  inform modes of organizing in global civil  society and 
the resource capacit ies of NGOs affi l iated with different global 
regions and religions.   Drawing upon this evidence,  I  will  argue that ,  
though world culture has secularized,  i ts  relationship with Christ ian 
religion remains important.   Specifical ly,  the relationship is  expressed 
in the organizational advantages afforded northern and Catholic 
NGOs, thereby contr ibuting to stratif ication in the human rights f ield.3
 By demonstrating the relationship between world cultural  
principles and strat ification,  this  chapter will  expose an important 
contradiction; i t  wil l  highlight an inconsistency between the 
egali tarian discourse of Human Rights on the one hand, and patterns 
of inequali ty within the same field on the other .   But my point  is  not 
simply to argue that  a decoupling between discourse and practice 
exists .   Rather,  i t  will  be to show that ,  in spite of these 
                                                          
3 The analysis that follows focuses only on the current balance of power among religious NGOs in the 
human rights field.  It is not designed to support claims about institutional change over time.  I will 
argue, however, that historical relationships between religious and secular power are imprinted in the 
patterns of stratification that currently exist among religious groups in the world system.  The analysis 
is intended to raise, not answer, historical questions about the construction of the human rights field, 
and the diverse interests and assumptions at play in the creation of the standards that guide NGO 
certification in international politics.  These questions speak very strongly to debates about the extent to 
which international institutions are truly autonomous, or merely extensions of international relations, 
through which international inequalities are institutionalized and reproduced. 
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inconsistencies,  indeed because of them, discourses and practices in 
the world poli ty operate as a mutually supporting,  coherent system.  
Specifically,  I  will  show how egali tarian world cultural  discourse 
actually enables strat ification within organizational fields.    
  
Hypotheses 
To begin,  after  empirically demonstrating that  Northern and Christ ian 
NGOs are indeed disproportionately over-represented in IGOs, I  will  
test  the fi rst  two hypotheses:   
 
Hypothesis 1: Religious NGOs that are in conformity with world 
cultural principles wil l  have greater odds of  obtaining IGO 
consultative status than religious NGOs that are not in conformity 
with world cultural  principles.    
 
Hypothesis 2: When controll ing for conformity to world cultural 
principles,  regional  and religious dif ferences will  no longer be 
predictive of  IGO consultative status.  
 
If  hypotheses 1 and 2 prove valid,  we will  have identified a l ink 
between world cultural  discourse and NGO strat if ication by region and 
religion.   The next s tep is  to identify the mechanisms through which 
this l ink operates.   Identification of  these mechanisms requires us to 
take into considerat ion two features of organizations that  are of 
part icular interest  to historical  insti tutionalists:  access to resources,  
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and the role of states and other standard sett ing insti tutions in 
structuring organizational f ields (Wuthnow 1987, p.  15).  
 As I  discussed earl ier ,  international  inst i tutions form all iances 
with NGOs because they are in part  dependent upon them for the 
technical  expertise,  material  resources,  or local  knowledge that  NGOs 
can provide for the implementation of international insti tutions’ 
programs (Wapner 1995;Lipshutz 1999).   In l ight of this preference 
for  NGOs that  can be “useful” to international organizations,  we 
should find that  “insider” and “outsider” (i .e.  accredited vs.  
unaccredited) statuses are predicted by various measures of 
organizational capacity (e.g.  large membership,  globally extensive 
infrastructures).   
 
Hypothesis 3: Resources of  NGOs will  predict  IGOs t ies.  
 
If  hypothesis 3 is  accurate,  i t  should also explain why northern 
organizations and organizations affi l iated with Western religions,  
especially Catholicism, would have an advantage in acquiring 
consultative status.   First ,  rel igious organizations with northern 
secretariats,  by definit ion,  have t ies with northern states.   By 
extension,  they are more l ikely to have access to the financial  
resources that  such t ies imply (Fox and Brown 1998;  O’Brien 2000; 
Uvin 2000, Mendelsohn and Glenn 2002).    
Second, the historical  relationship of Christ ian religion to 
Western development has left  Christ ian rel igion,  especially 
Catholicism, with certain advantages over non-Christ ian religious 
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organizations,  as was discussed in Chapter Two.  I f ,  as a  result  of 
these differences in historical  relations with western states,  resources 
and the ways that  they are organized vary by both regional  and 
religious affi l iat ion,  i t  follows that the structural  characterist ics of 
organizations should not  only predict  IGO ties,  but should also 
explain regional and religious differences in IGO t ies.  
 
Hypothesis 4: When controll ing for structural characterist ics of  
NGOs, regional and religious dif ferences will  no longer predict  
consultative status.    
   
 The task at  hand, however,  is  to show how world culture 
mediates this relationship between resources and IGO ties.   The point  
is  to show that  standards based in world cultural  principles are not 
equally achievable across NGO contenders.   Instead,  NGOs with the 
greatest  resources will  have the greatest  capacity for,  and perhaps 
even a greater interest ,  in enacting world cultural  principles through 
their  operations and structures.   Therefore,  in spi te of the fact  that  
world cultural  principles are egali tarian,  they legit imate cert ification 
standards that  favor the more powerful NGOs in the human rights 
field.   As a result ,  they are inegali tarian in their  effects.  
 
Hypothesis 5: Structural characterist ics of  NGOs will  account for the 
relationship between conformity to world cultural principles and IGO 
ties.  
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The analysis that  I  present below delineates the characterist ics,  
both cultural  and structural ,  that  dist inguish religious groups that  have 
t ies with international insti tutions from those that  do not.   In the 
process,  I  will  demonstrate both the usefulness and l imits  of 
normative frameworks for understanding the organizing principles of 
NGOs in global civil  society.   I  will  show that ,  a l though world 
cultural  principles do predict  the types of organizations that  gain 
access to the core insti tutions of the world poli ty,  their  influence 
works through their  interaction with variables more l ikely to be 
emphasized by historical  inst i tutionalists .   While world culture 
informs the organizational standards that  guide the cert if ication 
process,  these standards,  by and large,  favor NGOs that  already have 
the greatest  access to transnational resources and historically 
strongest  t ies to the northern states ( i .e .  the standards favor northern 
and Christ ian organizations).   As a resul t ,  world culture is  implicated 
in the reproduction of patterns of inequali ty among religious 
organizations in the field of human rights,  where the egali tarian 
principles described by world poli ty scholars inhere.   
   
Data 
My primary source of data is  the Human Rights Directory  managed by 
Human Rights Internet  (HRI).4 Where possible,  I  supplemented or 
verif ied information on each organization found in the HRI database 
with entries from the 2000/2001 edit ion of the Yearbook of  
International Organizations (YBIO) and information from 
                                                          
4 For a more detailed description of Human Rights Internet, see Chapter Three. 
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organizations’ web si tes.   Fol lowing the cri teria for  inclusion as a 
“religious NGO” that  I  detailed in Chapter Three,  I  identified 546 
religious human rights organizations worldwide.   However,  after  
omitt ing defunct organizations,  only 539 of them were used in the 
following analysis.   I  omitted defunct organizations because in the 
HRI Directory ,  information on defunct  organizations is  extremely 
incomplete.   The fact  that ,  of the 546 religious human rights 
organizations that  I  identif ied,  only 7 were reported by HRI or by the 
YBIO as being defunct at tests  to this incompleteness.    
 Another weakness of the HRI Directory  is  that  i t  does not 
contain longitudinal  records.   Each record does contain information on 
the organization’s founding date.   However,  as  the entry for a 
part icular organization is  updated,  i ts  previous entry is  discarded.  As 
a result ,  the Directory cannot be used to systematically track changes 
in organizations over t ime.  Nonetheless,  the logist ic regressions that  I  
present below do provide a valuable account of the way the human 
rights f ield is  currently strati f ied,  and the types of organizations that  
i t  favors,  as of the year 2000.  Detailed questions about the historical  
events and processes that  lead to this state of affairs are a topic for  
further study.  
 
 
Dependent Variable 
For the dependent variable,  presence or absence of consultative status,  
I  consulted HRI and the UN’s l ist  of  NGOs with ECOSOC Consultative 
Status (July 2002) to determine whether each organization had 
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consultative status with any of the following international  
organizations:  the Organization of American States (OAS),  the 
Council  of Europe (CE),  European Commission (EC),  Organization of 
African Unity (OAU), World Health Organization (WHO), the 
International Labor Organization (ILO), or the Economic and Social  
Council  of the United Nations (ECOSOC).  I  coded presence or 
absence of consultative status as of the year 2000 as a binary variable.   
Overall ,  25% (n=135) of the organizations used in the analysis 
(N=539) have IGO consultat ive status with at  least  one of these 
organizations.   
 
Independent Variables 
For each organization,  I  collected information on the location of 
secretariat ,  rel igious affi l iat ion,  framing of organizational mission,  
geographic focus,  age of organization,  size of membership,  and 
geographic expansiveness.   The first  two variables that  I  include in 
the model ,  location of secretariat  (SECR) and rel igious tradit ion 
(RELTRAD), al low us to confirm the existence of the patterns that  
this analysis seeks to explain – patterns of regional and religious 
variation among NGOs in terms of IGO ties.    
For location of secretariat ,  after  running preliminary analyses,  I  
arrived at  seven categories:  1.USA/Europe,  which includes the United 
States and Northern,  Eastern,  and Western Europe (excluding 
Switzerland and Belgium), 2.  Canada,  3.  Swiss/Belg,  which includes 
Switzerland and Belgium (each home to major international 
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insti tutions),  4.   Africa,  5.  Latin America,  6.   Middle East ,  and 7.  East  
Asia.  5
Table 5.1 i l lustrates the breakdown of rel igious NGOs by 
location of Secretariat .   Combining the USA, Canada,  Swiss/Belg,  and 
Europe,  49% of religious human rights  NGOs have secretariats in 
northern countries (n=264).   Of the remaining 51%, Latin American 
NGOs account for  14.8% (n=80) of the dataset ,  13.5% (n=73) of the 
NGOs have African secretariats ,  NGOs based in Asia account for 21% 
(n=113),  while only 1.7% (n=9) of the NGOs in the dataset  are based 
in the Middle East .   Speaking in terms of a  simple North/South 
dichotomy, roughly half  of rel igious human rights NGOs are based in 
the global  North,  and half in the global South.  
For religious tradit ion,  I  dist inguished among the following 
groups:  1.  Roman Catholic,  2.  Non-Catholic Christ ian,  including 
ecumenical  organizations,  3.  Jewish,  4.  Muslim,  5.   Interfaith,  and 6.  
Others.   The last  group, “Others,” includes Hindus,  Sikhs,  Buddhists 
and NGOs represent ing New Religious Movements such as  
                                                          
5 When extracting information from the HRI entries, I recorded the country where each organization’s 
principal secretariat was located.  I first coded the secretariats into 11 categories: USA, Canada, 
Western Europe, Northern Europe, Eastern/Central Europe, Switzerland, Belgium, Middle East, Africa, 
Latin America, and Asia.  After regressing IGO consultative status on this categorical variable, I 
collapsed the northern country categories into three categories that reflected their similarities in relation 
to the dependent variable.  The USA, northern Europe, central/eastern Europe, and Western Europe 
were collapsed into the category “USA/Europe.”  Switzerland and Belgium were collapsed into the 
category “Swiss/Belg,” since NGOs with secretariats in Switzerland and Belgium had significantly 
greater odds of IGO consultative status than did NGOs from any of the other Northern states.  This 
should come as no surprise given their proximity to the UN and EU- based international institutions.  
Many of the larger organizations that have consultative status with major IGOs maintain their principle 
secretariats in Switzerland or Belgium precisely in order to be in close proximity to these institutions.  
Therefore, to keep Swiss and Belgian organizations in the same category as other northern 
organizations would be misleading, as it would entail partially sampling on the dependent variable, and 
artificially weighting the analysis in favor of a “northern bias.”  Therefore, I classified Swiss and 
Belgian NGOs into their own separate category.  Canada remained in its own category, as Canadian 
NGOs showed decreased odds of obtaining consultative status when compared to all of the other 
northern states.   
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Table 5.1   Frequencies:   Religious Human  
         Rights NGOs by Secretariat  as of 2000. 
 
 
 
Location of 
Secretariat 
Frequency Percent 
 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
USA 
 
Canada 
 
Swiss/Belg 
 
Europe 
 
Latin America 
 
Africa 
 
Middle East 
 
East Asia 
 
Total 
113 
 
32 
 
30 
 
89 
 
80 
 
73 
 
9 
 
113 
 
539 
21.0 
 
5.9 
 
5.6 
 
16.5 
 
14.8 
 
13.5 
 
1.7 
 
21.0 
 
100.0 
21.0 
 
5.9 
 
5.6 
 
16.5 
 
14.8 
 
13.5 
 
1.7 
 
21.0 
 
100.0 
21.0 
 
26.9 
 
32.5 
 
49.0 
 
63.8 
 
77.4 
 
79.0 
 
100.0 
Sources:   Human Rights Internet and Yearbook of International 
Organizations 
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Scientology, al l  of  which had extremely small  numbers of human 
rights NGOs listed in the Directory .   The coefficients for this last  
category should be interpreted with this diversity in mind.   
Table 5.2 i l lustrates the breakdown of Religious NGOs by 
religious t radit ion.   As the table i l lustrates,  human rights NGOs are 
unequally distr ibuted across religious tradit ions.   If  we break the 
population down in terms of a simple Judeo-Christ ian vs.  non-Judeo-
Christ ian dichotomy, Jewish and Christ ian organizations account for  
84.5% of the organizations in the dataset .   Christ ians alone,  including 
Catholics ,  comprise 78.3%.  Non-Judeo-Christ ian organizations,  
combined with the Interfaith organizations of which minori ty groups 
are often members,  account  for only 15% of religious human rights  
NGOs.  This is  in spite of the fact  that  non-Judeo-Christ ians 
(excluding atheists)  comprise roughly 63 % of the world’s population.6  
Table 5.3 presents a  cross-tabulation of proportions of human rights  
NGOs by religious t radit ion against  the expected proportions given 
world’s  population represented within each of the world’s major 
religious t radit ions.   As the table reveals,  Catholic,  non-Catholic 
Christ ian and Jewish organizations are over-represented in Human 
Rights ,  indicating that  rel igious human rights mobilization is  not  
proportional to global membership across the world’s religious 
tradit ions.   I  wil l  return to this point  about proportional mobilization 
later  in this art icle,  since i t  is  important  for interpreting patterns of 
consultative status.  
 
                                                          
6 Data extracted form Adherents.com 
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Table 5.2  Frequencies:   Religious Human Rights NGOs  
                by Religious Affil iat ion as of 2000.  
 
 
Religious 
Affiliation 
Frequency Percent 
 
Valid 
Percent 
Cumulative 
Percent 
Catholic 
 
NonCatholic 
Christian 
 
Jewish 
 
Muslim 
 
Interfaith 
 
Other 
 
Total 
 
Missing 
 
Total 
137 
 
 
26.3 
 
32 
 
22 
 
30 
 
27 
 
511 
 
28 
 
539 
25.4 
 
 
48.8 
 
5.9 
 
4.1 
 
5.6 
 
5.0 
 
94.8 
 
5.2 
 
100.0 
26.8 
 
 
51.5 
 
6.3 
 
4.3 
 
5.9 
 
5.3 
 
100.0 
26.8 
 
 
78.3 
 
84.5 
 
88.8 
 
94.7 
 
100.0 
 
Sources:   Human Rights Internet and Yearbook of International 
Organizations 
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Table 5.3 Chi-Square:   Religious NGO Counts  
   by Religious Tradit ion X Expected Counts  
     Given Proportion of Global Populat ion  
                  within Each Religion 
 
 
Religious 
Tradition 
Observed 
N 
Expected 
N 
Residual 
 
Catholic 
 
NonCatholic 
Christian 
 
Muslim 
 
Jewish 
 
Other/Interfaith 
 
Total 
 
 
137 
 
 
263 
 
22 
 
32 
 
57 
 
511 
 
 
97.1 
 
 
97.1 
 
132.9 
 
5.1 
 
178.9 
 
39.9 
 
 
165.9 
 
-110.9 
 
26.5 
 
-121.9 
p. < .001 
 
Sources:   Human Rights Internet,  the Yearbook  
Of International Organizations,  and  
Adherents .com (2002) 
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Explanatory Variables  
To examine the relationship between cert ification and strat ification in 
Human Rights,  I  created variables indicating two types of 
organizational characterist ics.   The first  type measures conformity to 
world cultural  principles including secularism, individualism, 
universalism and poli t ical  neutrali ty.   The second type measure 
structural  characterist ics of organizations,  including age,  membership 
size,  and expansiveness of operations.   
 
Secularism  and Individualism .   As stated in Chapter Two, classical  
theories of modernization assert  a posit ive relationship between the 
rat ionalization of societies’  insti tutions and religious decline.   This 
same assert ion is  made in the insti tutionalist  l i terature claiming that  
the rat ionalism of world culture poses challenges for religious forms 
of organizing (Boli  and Thomas 1999,  p.  43) .   Taken at  face value,  
this argument  suggests that  rel igious NGOs promoting secular human 
rights missions,  by either “toning down” or abandoning any 
evangelist ic objectives,  would have greater odds of obtaining IGO 
consultat ive status than would NGOs assert ing explici t ly rel igious 
objectives,  since international insti tutions are overwhelming secular 
and rational.   
However,  a central ,  underlying premise of this dissertation is  
that  the choice between “religious” and “secular” is ,  in many respects,  
a false choice,  and that  the mutual  dist inctiveness and incompatibil i ty 
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of their  logics have been overstated.   In Chapter Three,  we found that  
rel igious mobilization in human rights  actually increased during a 
period of pronounced rationalization in the field.   Chapter  Four 
demonstrated that  religious groups exert  non-negligible influence in 
international insti tutions,  even when scant evidence of their  influence 
exists  in the public documents that  explicate the posit ions of 
international insti tutions on cri t ical  issues.   The findings of these 
chapters suggested that  secular insti tutions actual ly open opportunit ies 
for  religious mobilization,  just  as they do for secular mobilization.  
We cannot assume, however,  that  inst i tutions embodying 
western principles would open opportunit ies equally for al l  rel igious 
groups,  especially when we take into consideration the role of human 
rights insti tutions in arbitrat ing between individualist  and collectivist  
claims pertaining to religious freedom.  Western legal interpretations 
of rel igious freedom assume a pluralist  rel igious market and frame 
religious freedom largely in individualist  terms,  emphasizing the 
rights of individuals  to freely promote or change their  rel igions.   This 
interpretation stands in contrast  to the collectivist  interpretation,  
which emphasize issues of cultural  survival  and the protect ion of 
rel igious groups from proselytism.  I f ,  as historic  insti tutionalists  
argue,  international insti tutions structure organizational fields and 
markets in favor of their  more powerful actors,  we can expect to f ind a 
bias in favor of the model of religious freedom that  permits  the most  
powerful rel igious groups to successfully expand into new terri tories – 
or,  to use the terms of religious economies scholars,  to achieve greater 
market  share.   
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To the extent that  northern and Christ ian groups are more 
organizationally and economically equipped than others to compete 
internationally for converts ,  i t  is  in their  interest  to promote the 
individual ist  rel igious rights  framework.  The converse is  true for 
minority,  and non-proselytizing religions (such as Judaism),  whose 
interests l ie more in cultural  survival  or,  to use the language of 
economics,  the protection of exist ing market share.   Therefore,  i f  a 
posit ive association exists  between individualist  rel igious frames and 
IGO consultative status,  i t  should also account  for variation in 
consultative status by religion.  
To examine how both secularism  and individualism  might be 
associated with IGO ties,  I  col lected information on religious NGOs’ 
mission statements and program descriptions.   I  init ial ly dist inguished 
among five types of organizat ional missions that  differ from one 
another in terms of their  consistency with the principles of secularism 
and individualism.  Appendix B: What is  a Religious NGO? provides a 
detailed description of the typology that  I  created from this analysis.   
In the present chapter,  however,  I  dist inguish between three types of 
organizational frames that  describe NGO missions:  secular ,  
individualist  and collectivist .   
Secular human rights .   Religious NGOs coded as secular  are no 
different from secular NGOs in terms of how they publicly frame their  
approaches to human rights .   Their  mission statements give no 
indication that  they are involved in evangelism, and they make no 
dist inctions regarding the religious preferences of ei ther vict ims of 
human rights violations or  the activists  that  their  organizations 
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mobilize.   If  they focus on rel igious freedom, i t  is  framed universally,  
without discrimination against  or preference for any particular 
rel igion.   According to the secularization thesis ,  we would expect 
these organizations to have significantly more favorable odds of 
obtaining consultative status than would organizat ions whose missions 
and activit ies are more explicit ly framed as religious.    
Pax Christ i  International is  an example of an NGO that  was 
coded as  Secular Human Rights .   Their  mission statement  reads in part  
as follows: 
 
Pax Christ i  International is  a  non-profit ,  non-
governmental  Catholic peace movement that  began in 
France at  the end of World War II .   Today, i t  is  comprised 
of autonomous national sections,  local  groups,  and 
affi l iated organisations spread over  30 countries and 5 
continents ,  with over 60,000 members worldwide.  The 
movement works in all  areas of peace but has a specific 
focus on demili tarisation,  security and arms trade,  
development and human rights,  and ecology. 
                       
Pax Christ  International’s work is  based in spiri tuali ty.   I t  
is  a Catholic organisation but welcomes all  rel igious 
groups and str ives for dialogue and co-operation with 
non-governmental  organisations and movements working 
in the same field – Christ ian,  Jewish,  Muslim and non-
religious.   
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Individualism in Human Rights.   Organizations coded as Individualist  
explici t ly indicate in their  public documents that  they engage in the 
promotion or expansion of  a particular religious tradit ion ,  in addit ion 
to,  or as a  component of,  their  human rights mission.   In many cases,  
these organizations include evangelism among their  core missions.   On 
the one hand, an Individualist  frame is  at  odds with the secularism of 
world culture,  in that  i t  implies the promotion of rel igion as 
framework for defining the moral order.   I t  is  consistent ,  however,  
with the individualist  interpretation of religious freedom as a human 
right,  which emphases the rights of individuals to convert  or seek 
converts .   Hence,  my choice of the label  Individualist .   An example of 
an NGO coded as Individualis t  is  Catholics Against  Capital  
Punishment,  whose mission statement  reads,  in part :                
                   
Catholics Against  Capital  Punishment was founded in 
         1992 to promote greater awareness of Catholic Church 
         teachings that  character ize capital  punishment as 
unnecessary,  inappropriate and unacceptable in today's  
world.  I t  does this in three ways: 
 
                  * By disseminating news of Catholic-oriented 
anti-death penalty efforts  through i ts  newsletter ,  
CACP News Notes,  and this  web site.  
 
                  * By communicating the Church's  teachings on the 
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issue to federal  and state lawmakers,  especially 
those who are Catholic,  urging them to resist  
proposed legislat ion imposing or extending the use 
of the death penalty,  and to work for repeal  of such 
laws currently on the books.  
 
                  * By encouraging members of the Catholic hierarchy, 
                  clergy and religious groups to speak out more 
                  forcefully against  capital  punishment .               
 
A second example is  the Baptist  World Alliance,  whose “Who 
Are We?” web page reads:   
 
The Baptist  World Alliance unites Baptists  worldwide,  
leads in evangelism, responds to people in need and 
defends human rights.   
 
                                                  
 Collectivism and Human Rights .   In contrast  to Individualism ,  the 
category Collectivism  includes organizations that  explicit ly work to 
protect  their  own religious group.7 In important ways,  collectivist  
NGO frames are at  odds with world cultural  discourse,  since they 
emphasize group survival ,  including the right to protect  a rel igious 
group from challenges posed by outsiders,  as opposed to framing their  
                                                          
7 An NGO was not coded as collectivist if its goal was only cultural preservation in the form of 
historical societies, libraries or museums.  
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rights concerns in terms of individual freedoms.  Action for  Post-
Soviet  Jewry is  an example of an NGO coded  Collectivist .   Their  
mission statement  reads,  in part ,  as follows: 
 
Action for  Post-Soviet  Jewry, Inc.  (APSJ) is  a private,  
non-profit ,  human rights organization dedicated to helping 
Jews in the former Soviet  Union (FSU) as well  as 
part icipating in general  human rights work and 
humanitar ian aid projects.   APSJ was founded in 1975 in 
response to the struggle of Jews in the Soviet  Union to 
emigrate and to l ive freely as Jews.   
 
I t  is  possible for a  human rights organization to 
simultaneously promote individualist  and collectivist  frames.   
For example,  Christ ian missionary organizations targeting 
human rights insti tutions to protect  the r ights of the “persecuted 
church” overseas can use an individualist /evangelist  model in 
seeking protection,  while simultaneously framing the need for 
protection specifically in terms of their  own group.  This  would 
stand in contrast ,  for example,  to a  Jewish organization that  is  
concerned with anti-Semitism, but  has no interest  in evangelism 
or any other at tempts to proliferate Judaism.  Since the 
possibil i ty exists  for organizations to combine individualist  and 
collectivist  frames,  each Mission was treated separately and 
coded as a  binary variable.   That is ,  an organization may be 
coded as “yes” for  both Collectivist  and Individualist   missions.   
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An organization was only coded “yes” for  Secular mission,  
however,  in cases where i t  was coded as “no” for both 
Individualist  and Collectivist  rel igious missions.  
 
Universalism and Polit ical  Neutrali ty .   I t  is  well  known in Human 
Rights that  international insti tutions prefer NGOs that  have broad 
geographical  foci ,  s ince a broad geographical  focus is  assumed to 
indicate broad and diverse representation.8  From the world poli ty 
perspective,  the preference for  organizat ions that  frame their  
grievances in universal ,  rather than local  or part icular,  terms can be 
interpreted as evidence of conformity to the world cultural  principle 
of universalism .   
An alternative,  though equally normative,  interpretation of this 
preference is  that  a  broad human rights focus is  valued because i t  
signals polit ical  neutrali ty ,  which is  actually derived from the norm of 
state sovereignty.   In spite of academic claims that  Human Rights pose 
a serious challenge to the norm of state  sovereignty,  NGOs seeking 
consultative status with major human rights insti tutions,  including the 
UN and the EC, are required to frame their  human rights grievances in 
general  terms, without making statements that  ei ther support  or oppose 
individual  governments or poli t ical  part ies.   For example,  an NGO that 
targets slavery in the Sudan runs a  higher r isk of being labeled 
“poli t ical” than does an NGO targeting slavery in the Sudan and 
several  other countr ies or,  bet ter  yet ,  slavery “around the world,” 
                                                          
8 Beginning 1994, the United Nations made a verbal commitment to grant consultative status to national 
NGOs (see Willets 2000).  However, the extent to which the United Nations has succeeded in honoring 
this commitment is debatable, and remains a point of contention among NGOs. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   
    
168
since the lat ter  can frame their  grievances in terms of the practice  of 
slavery in general,  as opposed to the policies of a part icular 
government.  
Consistent with the requirement of poli t ical  neutrali ty toward 
states,  NGOs with UN consultative status are discouraged from 
voicing pronounced opposit ion to the UN, and must show evidence 
that  they actively and publicly support  the UN’s objectives (Willets  
1996, p.4) .   NGOs which fail  to provide such support ,  or are overtly 
cri t ical  of international insti tutions or powerful  member states r isk 
being labeled “poli t ical ,” as opposed to “neutral” or purely 
“technical” and,  as a result ,  are threatened with the loss of their  
consultat ive status or financial  support  from key insti tutions (Pei-
Heng 1981; Willets  1996, p 33).   
The power of states to use the standard of poli t ical  neutrali ty to 
marginalize,  or at  least  neutralize,  NGOs seeking access to 
international insti tutions presents a challenge to optimistic claims 
about NGO capacity to exert  normative authority independently of 
states (Wapner 1995; Boli  and Thomas 1999; Lipshutz 1999).   While i t  
may be true that  INGOs can legally operate without state approval or 
backing,  the norm of poli t ical  neutrali ty suggests that  the amount of 
influence they wield in insti tutional poli t ics is  considerably weakened 
should they choose to exercise their  cultural  authority by directly 
challenging states.9   Because of i ts  theoretical  importance,  my 
analysis seeks to measure each organization’s geographic focus  in a 
                                                          
9 The “Anti-NGO Movement” can be understood in this context as the most recent organized attempt 
assert control over NGOs and INGOs that stray from politically neutral positions.  It is not clear, 
however, whether NGOs have become more political, or whether the definition of what constitutes a 
“political” claim has expanded to include a greater diversity of NGO claims and activities. 
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way that  dist inguishes between conformity to the principle of 
universalism and conformity to the principle of poli t ical  neutrali ty.  
The variable Geographic Focus  (Geo Focus)  measures whether 
an organization focuses on human rights violations nationally (in one 
country,  but not necessari ly the country out of which they operate),  
regionally,  internationally or universally.   A strict ly national 
geographic focus indicates nonconformity with the cri terion of 
polit ical  neutrali ty .   At the other end of the spectrum, a universal  
focus indicates conformity to the principle of universalism .   I f  
poli t ical  neutrali ty is  the operative principle predicting IGO 
consultative status,  nationally-focused organizations should have 
significantly lower odds of obtaining IGO ties when compared to 
organizations that  focus on human rights violations internationally,  
regionally,  and universally.   But,  i f  universalism is  the operative 
principle,  then only a universal  focus will  increase odds of obtaining 
consultative status relative to a national  focus.  
But we also need to consider the possibil i ty that  principles such 
as universalism and poli t ical  neutral i ty primarily function to 
legit imate the distr ibution of structural  power in favor of the larger 
and more established NGOs in the human rights  f ield.   To investigate 
this possibil i ty,  I  created a set  of variables that  measure structural  
characterist ics of organizations that  serve as proxies for resource 
capacity and establishment within a transnational field:  level  of 
operations,  membership,  and age.  
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Level of  Operations.   The variable Operations  measures whether an 
organization has offices or act ive membership nationally,  regionally,  
or internationally.   International organizations are those organizations 
whose membership spans beyond any particular region; they are more 
l ikely than regional  organizat ions to be intercontinental .   International 
organizations tend, on average to be larger than regional 
organizations,  but this is  not necessari ly the case.10  
 
Membership.   While Operations  is  an indicator of geographic 
expansiveness,  Membership  measures the number of countries 
represented among an organization’s members.   Membership  is  a 
continuous variable.   
 
Age . 11 The oldest  NGO in my dataset  is the Holy Trinity Fathers.   The 
organization was founded in 1198, and even by today’s standards,  had 
a human r ights mission,  which was to ransom Christ ians and Muslims 
pressed into slavery during the Crusades.   Today, the Holy Trinity 
Fathers remain a community of Catholic priests actively working to 
gain the release of rel igious prisoners.   However,  for  most of the 
                                                          
10 For example, the mean and median membership for regional NGOs is 29 and 16 countries 
respectively, and the largest “regional” organization in the dataset has 101 countries represented among 
its members.  The mean and median membership for international NGOs is 75 and 74 countries 
respectively, and the largest international NGO in the dataset has 170 countries represented among its 
members.  However, the smallest regional organization in the dataset represents 10 countries, while the 
smallest international organization only represents 5. 
11 I initially collected information on both the age of each organization and the age of each 
organization’s human rights program.  However, the HRI Directory does not always distinguish 
between organizational foundings and human rights program foundings.  In cases where an 
organization’ directory entries and web pages made no mention of such a distinction, I coded the case 
as if the human rights program was founded in the same year as the organization.  As a result, my 
measure of the age of each organization’s human rights program was highly unreliable.  Also, it was not 
significantly associated with the dependent variable when included in the regression models.  For these 
reasons, I chose to use only the organizational age in the analyses that follow. 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   
    
171
centuries-old organizations in the dataset ,  a human rights  mission at  
the t ime of founding cannot be assumed, given that  “human r ights” as  
the concept is  understood today did not  then exist .   The coefficients  
for  age should be interpreted with this  caveat in mind.  That is ,  age  
measure how long an organization has existed,  not necessari ly how 
long i t  has been engaging in human rights activism.  
If  Hypotheses 1 and 2 are correct ,  variables measuring world 
cultural  principles will  not only be associated with consultat ive status;  
they will  also explain regional and rel igious dispari t ies in terms of 
IGO ties,  thus implicating world culture in the reproduction of a  
strat if ied human rights f ield.   If Hypotheses 3 and 4 are correct ,  the 
structural  characterist ics of organizations will  not only predict  
consultat ive status,  but will  also account for  relationships between 
consultative status and religion and region.  I f  Hypothesis 5 is  correct ,  
and world cultural  principles serve the function of strat ifying 
organizations fields to the advantage of more powerful  actors,  the 
structural  variables will  also account  for the relat ionship between 
world cultural  principles and IGO ties.   
 
Results 
Examining national diversi ty first ,  consistent with the concerns of 
many globalization scholars about northern biases operating among 
NGOs, we do find disproportionate northern NGO representation in 
international  inst i tutions [Table 5.4,  Model 1].   NGOs with 
secretariats in the US and Western Europe have greater odds of 
achieving consultative status than do NGOs from Canada, Latin 
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America,  Africa and Asia.   Organizations from Switzerland and 
Belgium have greater odds of achieving consultat ive status that  do 
those from the US and the rest  or Europe.   As discussed in the 
methods section,  this f inding comes as no surprise given that  Belgium 
and Switzerland host  the UN and EU-based international insti tutions.   
Religious NGOs based in the Middle East  also have greater  odds of 
achieving consultative status than do organizations from the North.   
This is  difficult  to interpret  prior to examining more complex models.   
But,  referring back to Table 5.1,  i t  is  noteworthy that  only nine 
organizations in the dataset  have secretariats in the Middle East .   This 
low frequency of human rights mobilization might suggest  a selection 
bias,  wherein those Middle Eastern organizations that  do mobilize 
around human rights in the fi rst  place are more l ikely to “buy into” 
the field’s  underlying world cultural  premises,  and are therefore more 
l ikely to seek and obtain consultat ive status.   Conversely,  i t  may be 
the case that ,  in the Middle East ,  “world cultural” premises lack 
sufficient resonance to result  in widespread mobil ization around 
human rights as i t  is  constructed in the core insti tutions of the field.    
Before adding religion to the model,  i t  is  helpful  to look back to 
Figure 5.1,  which compares the frequency of consultative status by 
religion to the proportion of the global population represented within 
each religious tradit ion.   As the cross tabulation in Table 5.3 
confirms, Catholic ,  non-Catholic Christ ian and Jewish organization
     
Table 5.4  Binomial Logist ic Regression:  IGO Consultat ive  Status as of 2000. 
 
 
Independent 
Variables 
   (1)  
N=539 
  (2) 
N=511 
  (3) 
N=432 
  (4) 
N=432 
  (5) 
N=392 
  (6) 
N=328 
  (7) 
N=215 
  (8) 
N=223 
B-term Constant  -.815***   
(.153) 
.062 
(.240) 
.219 
(.260) 
-.180 
(.284) 
-1.236 
(.431) 
-1.004** 
(.482) 
-.932 
(.680) 
-.474 
(.834) 
Secretariata 
Canada 
 
Swiss/Belg 
 
Latin America 
 
Africa 
 
Middle East 
 
East Asia 
 
 
-1.131** 
(.556)   
1.826*** 
(.440) 
-.736** 
(.331) 
-.715** 
(.342) 
1.508** 
(.723) 
-1.142*** 
(.153)   
 
 
-1.13798** 
(.574) 
1.683*** 
(.465) 
-1.057*** 
(.61) 
-.554 
(.365) 
1.727** 
(.775) 
-1.384*** 
(.346) 
 
 
-1.232** 
(.585) 
1.758*** 
(.515) 
-1.046*** 
(.389) 
-.838** 
(.417) 
1.967** 
(.908) 
-1.340*** 
(.373) 
 
-1.332** 
(.603) 
1.825*** 
(.542) 
-1.191*** 
(.394) 
-.972** 
(.431) 
1.571 
(.918) 
-1.624*** 
(.392) 
 
-1.167 
(.636) 
1.629*** 
(.571) 
-.274 
(.491) 
-.018 
(.491) 
1.914** 
(.983) 
-1.022** 
(.482) 
 
-.811 
(.678) 
1.320** 
(.628) 
-.341 
(.568) 
-.285 
(.578) 
2.362 
(1.364) 
-.932 
(.528) 
 
-.501 
(.871) 
1.366 
(1.269) 
-.288 
(.718) 
.230 
(.748) 
12.744 
(53.353) 
-.650 
(.713) 
 
-1.245 
(1.065) 
-3.214 
(2.320) 
-1.546 
(.931) 
-.831 
(.995) 
4.359 
(113.558) 
-1.836 
(.969) 
Religionb 
NonCath Xtian 
 
Jewish 
 
Muslim 
 
Interfaith 
 
Other 
  
-1.252*** 
(.264) 
-1.001** 
(.471) 
-1.270** 
(.597) 
-.764 
(.492) 
.077 
(.490) 
 
-1.081*** 
(.281) 
-.946 
(.516) 
-1.206 
(.644) 
-.461 
(.507) 
.525 
(.598) 
 
 
-1.112*** 
(.292) 
-.188 
(.572) 
-1.022 
(.704) 
-.289 
(.515) 
.668 
(.638) 
 
 
-1.015*** 
(.315) 
-.095 
(.651) 
-1.016 
(.754) 
-.581 
(.605) 
1.107 
(.795) 
 
-1.338*** 
(.367) 
-.192 
(.715) 
-1.630** 
(.824) 
-.969 
(.689) 
 .630 
(.871) 
 
-2.411*** 
(.556) 
-1.364 
(1.145) 
-8.367 
(30.449) 
-3.018*** 
(1.155) 
-1.050 
(1.192) 
 
 
-2.683*** 
(.643) 
-1.078 
(1.366) 
-9.627 
(90.740) 
-12.566** 
(6.221) 
-1.849 
(2.425) 
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Table 5.4 (continued) 
 
Secular 
Mission 
 
Individualist 
Mission 
 
Collectivist 
Mission 
 
 -.502
(.276) 
------ 
 
 
1.189*** 
(.263) 
 
-1.011** 
(.411) 
------- 
 
 
1.287*** 
(.288) 
 
-.864 
(.454) 
------- 
 
 
1.212*** 
(.871) 
 
-.953** 
(.488) 
 
 
 
1.301*** 
(.501) 
 
-1.181 
(.805) 
-------- 
 
 
1.740*** 
(.617) 
 
-1.723 
(.976) 
Geo Focusc
Regional 
 
International 
 
Universal    
   
      
      
       
      
    
 
.421 
(792) 
.244 
(.395) 
1.348*** 
(.403) 
 
-.235 
(.856) 
-.209 
(.515) 
.747 
(.461) 
-.007 
(1.552) 
-.667 
(.859) 
-.433 
(.821) 
Operationsd
Regional 
 
International 
 
1.028*** 
(.384) 
1.408** 
(.631) 
 
1.824** 
(.875) 
1.740** 
(.821) 
 
-.555 
(1.379) 
-.433 
(1.748) 
 
 
Membership 
.046** 
(.020) 
 
.606*** 
(.231) 
 
Age  
 
 
.012 
(.009) 
 
 
.013 
(.011) 
Nagelkerke 
R Square 
R2 = .156 R2  = .221 R2=.252          R2=.323 R2=.344 R2 =.401 R2=.661 R2 =.734 
a. Reference category is “USA/Europe”                                         ** p < .05; ***p < .001 
b. Reference category is “Catholic” 
c. Reference Category is “National” 
d .  Reference Category is “National” 
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are disproportionately represented in international insti tutions.   
However,  we also know, from Table 5.2,  that  mobilization in human 
rights is  disproportionate across these same categories.   In effect ,  
some of the disproportion in consultat ive status may be attr ibutable to 
a lack of mobilization,  not due to an insti tutional bias operating 
among organizations that  have succeeded in mobilizing.  
Nonetheless,  i f  we compare consultat ive status to the proportion 
of exist ing human rights NGOs [Table 5.4,  Model 2],  we st i l l  f ind 
inequali ty in terms of insti tut ional access.   However,  the patterns do 
not break down neat ly across western/nonwestern religious l ines.   The 
comparison category is  “Catholic,” and the analysis reveals that  
Catholicism is significantly associated with increased odds of 
obtaining consultative status relative to Jews, Muslims and non-
Catholic  Christ ians,  but  not relative to interfaith organizations or  
“Others.”  Since consultat ive status and religious t radit ion are not 
associated in a way that  breaks down neatly across West/non-West 
l ines,  something more than a straightforward “western” bias must be 
at  work,  and the key to understanding i t  l ies in the difference between 
Catholic  and non-Catholic NGOs. 
After adding religious affi l iat ion to the model,  the differences 
between “Africa” and “USA/Europe” are no longer significant,  
perhaps suggesting that  a disproportionate number of non-Catholic  
NGOs have secretariats in Africa.  
  The first  variables added to the model  to explain variation by 
region and religion were the Mission  variables,  which indicate whether 
or not organizations frame their  missions in ways that  were consistent  
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with world cultural  principles.   Model 3 examines the influence of 
secular organizational frames on consultative status.   Model 4 
examines the influences of adopting either individualist  or collectivist  
models of rel igious freedom.  As Table 5.4 i l lustrates,  a secularist  
frame does not introduce any advantages or disadvantages in terms of 
consultative status.   In other words,  we can reject  the hypothesis that  
secularism is  posit ively associated with organizational legi t imacy 
within the world poli ty.   Both the individualist  and collectivist  
rel igious frames,  however,  are predictive.    
The individualist  frame is  posit ively associated with IGO 
consultative status.   Religious NGOs that  explicit ly describe the 
expansion of their  rel igious beliefs or t radit ions as amongst their  
goals (e .g.  through evangelism or religious education) have greater 
odds of obtaining consultat ive status than organizations that  do not.   
This f inding suggests that  rel igious part icipation in international 
insti tutions does not dilute the evangelist ic content of organizational 
missions.   In contrast ,  NGOs that  express a more defensive posture,  
and seek to protect  the rights  of their  own religious groups (i .e.  use 
the collectivist  frame) have significantly decreased odds of obtaining 
consultative status.   
In terms of their  implications for NGO stratification in the 
human rights f ield,  the results  when we include the Mission  variables 
suggest  that  the cultural  r ights  of collect ives are subordinate to the 
rights of individuals  to freely convert or  seek converts.   Furthermore,  
the Mission  variables do account for some of the inequali ty by 
religion,  specifically the proportionally lower odds of both Jewish and 
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Muslim NGOs having consultative status relative to Catholics.   This 
makes sense when we consider  the competing interpretations of 
rel igious freedom in l ight of the interests of both groups.   For Jews, 
the combination of not seeking converts and batt l ing a history of anti-
Semitism explains why their  human rights programs would more often 
give priori ty to the protection of their  own group;  they have l i t t le 
interest  in framing their  human rights init iat ives in ways that  protect  
the freedom to evangelize.   Although Muslims do seek converts,  many 
of their  r ights groups assume a defensive posture when i t  comes to 
religious freedom, emphasizing protection from outside (usually 
western)  cultural  intrusions,  or form other forms of “Islamaphobia” 
and discrimination.   The finding that  collectivist  groups are 
significantly less prevalent in international insti tutions than groups 
that  have evangelizing missions raises questions about the types of 
religious groups that  f ind their  interests  served by international 
insti tutions,  especially when we think in terms of the capacity of 
insti tutions to structure markets in favor of more powerful  actors.  
The other variable measuring the influence of world cultural  
principles is  Geographic Focus,  which measures NGO consistency 
with the norms of universalism  and poli t ical  neutrali ty .   Model 5 
reveals that  only organizations with universal  focuses have greater 
odds of achieving consultat ive status than do nationally focused 
organizations.   The fact  that  there are no stat ist ically significant 
differences between nationally,  regionally and international ly focused 
organizations suggests that  consultative status is  predicted more by 
the advantages of universalism than by the disadvantages of str ict ly 
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national orientations (or rejection of the principle of poli t ical  
neutrali ty) .    
Of greater  analytic importance,  however,  Geographic Focus 
explains some of the variation in IGO consultative status by region.  
Canadian,  Latin American,  and African organizations are no longer  at  
a disadvantage relative to American and European NGOs after adding 
taking into to account the geographic foci  of each NGO.  Not 
surprisingly,  Model 5 also reveals a relationship between geographic 
focus and a collectivist  mission,  suggesting that  NGOs that  focus on 
rights for part icular groups tend to have narrower regional foci .    
 This brings us to the next question – that  of the extent to which 
the framing variables are important in and of themselves versus their  
importance due to their  interactions with variables indicating 
organizational resource capaci ty.   For instance,  the correlation matrix 
in Table 5.5 i l lustrates that  Geographic Focus  is  significantly 
correlated with structural  variables that  measure NGO membership 
size,  expansiveness of operations,  and age.   These correlations raise 
questions about whether organizations with universal  foci  are favored 
because of their  principles or  because of their  size and the 
embeddedness within the organizational  f ield that  presumably comes 
with age,  as described in Chapter Four.  
To explore this question about the relat ionship between 
principles and measures of organizational structure,  Models 6 through 
8 examine the influence of the structural  variables on IGO 
consultative status.   Model 6 reveals that  Operations  is  not only 
significant,  but also accounts for  the association between Geographic  
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Table 5.5  Pearson Correlation: Geographic Focus X 
Level of Operations X Membership Size X Age of NGO. 
 
 
 
 Geographic 
Focus 
Level of 
Operations 
Member- 
ship Size 
Age of 
NGO 
Geographic 
Focus 
 
Level of 
Operations 
 
Member- 
ship Size 
 
Age of 
NGO 
 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
.482** 
 
 
.477** 
 
 
.221** 
 
-- 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
.552** 
 
 
.120* 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
1.000 
 
 
.369** 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
-- 
 
 
1.000 
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed). 
* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed). 
 
Sources:   Human Rights Internet  and the Yearbook of 
International Organizations.  
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Focus  and IGO ties .   Furthermore,  i f  we drop Geographic Focus  from 
the model ,  and add the structural  variables Membership  and Age  
(Model 7) ,12 the Nagelkerke R square increases from .401 to .661.  
Examining the coefficients ,  the age of an organization does not 
significantly increase or decrease the odds of obtaining consultative 
status,  but  the membership size does.     
Equally important,  al l  of the variation by region is  accounted 
for with the addit ion of the structural  variables.   Whereas variat ion in 
consultative status by religion is  influenced by the consistency of 
organizational missions with world cultural  principles,  north/south 
inequali ty is  more a function resources,  if  we allow that  
organizational size and expansiveness are suitable proxies for  resource 
capacity.   However,  i t  is  also the case that  the two types of variables 
(cultural  and structural)  are related,  as is  evident from the 
relationships among organizat ions’ geographic foci ,  expansiveness of 
operations and collectivist  frames.  
Interestingly,  the decreased odds of interfaith organizations 
having consultat ive status become significant once we control  for 
organizational size,  expansiveness and age.   This  f inding suggests that  
the large membership and geographical  expansiveness of interfaith 
organizations are the characterist ics that  al low them to “keep up” with 
Catholics in terms of representation in international insti tutions.   In 
12 In Model 7, due to missing data on the variables added to the model, the number of NGOs with 
Middle Eastern secretariats drops to 4, and the number of Muslim organizations drops to 9.  In Model 8, 
the numbers of Middle Eastern and Muslim NGOs drop to 2 and 7 respectively.  These low numbers 
probably account for the high standard errors for these categories, and should be taken into account 
when interpreting the coefficients. 
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the absence of such characterist ics,  interfaith organizations are at  a 
disadvantage.    
Model 8 reintroduces the variable geographic focus .   Although 
this variable does not show a significant relationship with consultat ive 
status,  i t  does improve the fi t  of the model,  increasing the Nagelkerke 
R Square from  .661 to .734.  The fact  that  of the variables 
Geographic Focus,  Level  of  Operations ,  Membership ,  and Age ,  only 
one of them is  significant  when all  are included in the model is  
probably a function of the high correlation among them (Table 5.6) .    
In terms of a final  model,  the variables Individualist  Mission ,  
Level of  Operations  and Membership  account for  most  of  the variation 
by region and religion.   Only the advantage of Catholics over non-
Catholic Christ ians and Interfaith Organizations remains to be 
explained.  Indeed, there is  something about Catholicism that  gives i t  
an advantage in terms of international insti tutional representation -  
something that  is  not accounted for in terms of organizational size or 
mission.    
Many authors have already writ ten about the unique structure of 
Catholicism and the relative advantages that  structure affords Catholic 
actors in their  transnational operations (Meyer 1991; Casanova 1994;  
Voye 1999; Della  Cava 2001; Warner and Wenner 2002).   Chapters 
Two and Four of this dissertation also discussed these advantages.   
Through centuries of missionary activity supported by northern states,  
the Vatican developed organizational networks that  more densely span 
a larger transnational terri tory than do those of other rel igious 
tradit ions,  and,  equally important,  are centralized and hierarchical .   
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These characterist ics al low for more efficient coordination and 
resource-sharing among Catholic NGOs (Della Cava 2001;  Warner and 
Wenner 2002),  as well  as internationally recognized and legit imated 
representation vis-à-vis states and international insti tutions (Voye 
1999;  Della Cava 2001).   In Human Rights,  i t  may be the case that  
individual  Catholic organizations lacking the large,  expansive 
structures that  facil i tate consultative status nonetheless benefit  from 
their  t ies to the Church and subsequently the resources and legit imacy 
that  such t ies confer.  
In contrast ,  non-Catholic rel igious NGOs, lacking t ies to 
comparably dense,  coordinated,  and poli t ically entrenched 
international networks must build larger organizations and resource 
capacity on an organization by organization basis .   This would 
explain,  for one,  the variat ion in insti tutional access between Catholic 
and non-Catholic Christ ian human rights organizations,  insofar  as the 
lat ter  are organized l ike a market rather than a hierarchy.  At the same 
t ime, this argument sheds l ight on the relat ive lack of human rights 
mobilization within non-Judeo-Christ ian rel igious tradit ions (Table 
5.2).   In the absence of t ies to powerful  northern states on the one 
hand, and centrally coordinated resource networks on the other,  they 
may simply lack the power needed to mobilize in conformity with the 
organizational forms legit imated by international inst i tutions.   As 
Model 2 revealed,  “Others” are not at  a disadvantage compared to 
Catholics  when they do manage to form NGOs, but  their  numbers of 
NGOs are so small  as to leave them significantly under-represented in 
international insti tutions all  the same (Figures 5.1 and 5.2).   Given 
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this  chapter’s findings,  further analysis of rel igious insti tutional 
representation might  productively begin with a focus on how the inter-
organizational t ies within rel igious networks variably influence 
structural  power for individual  NGOs within organizational f ields.  
   
Conclusion 
Just  as legit imacy is required for the successful  construction of 
nation-states,  legit imacy is  required in the construction of 
international insti tutions.   Combined with the bargaining power of 
religious groups with resource-rich global networks,  this  need for 
legit imacy is  creating new spaces and opportunit ies for rel igious 
influence.   But some religious groups are better  posit ioned to take 
advantage of these opening opportunit ies than are others .   
Specifical ly,  rel igious groups that  have been historically t ied to the 
most  powerful  states have considerably greater involvement  with 
international insti tutions than groups that  have been historically 
associated with the global periphery.   In other  words,  the cultural  
terrain of the transnational  human rights sector is  not only 
heterogeneous;  i t  is  strat if ied according to both region and religion.  
We cannot rush to the conclusion,  however,  that  under-
representation of Southern and non-Western religious groups is  due to 
rejection of minority groups’ applications for consultative status.   I t  is  
very l ikely that  under-representation is  also due to self-selection on 
the parts of the some NGOs, ei ther due to lack of information,  
insufficient  resource capacity to mobilize or benefit  from consultat ive 
status,  or concerns about a  loss of legit imacy in the eyes of 
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consti tuents that  view northern dominated insti tutions with suspicion.   
But even these scenarios raise the issue of power.   Part icularly,  they 
raise questions about how the costs and benefits  of conformity to 
insti tutional rules,  and to world culture more generally,  might vary by 
region and religious tradit ion.    
For example,  in this study, we found that  overtly religious 
organizational frames do not hinder,  but actually assist ,  some types of 
rel igious activists  seeking influence in human rights.   Specifically,  
organizations that  explici t ly state an intention to spread the teachings 
of their  rel igions have greater  odds of obtaining consultat ive status 
than those NGOs that  do not.   In contrast ,  organizations that  explicit ly 
endorse the protection of their  cultures from perceived threats to the 
group as a  whole have disproportionately lower odds of obtaining 
consultative status.   This  order of preference is  rooted in a 
predominantly western model of religious freedom that  gives priori ty 
to the rights of individuals to freely profess their  beliefs in public.   In 
spite of the many virtues of this individualist  framework, at  i ts  core,  i t  
is  an endorsement of the “free market” model of rel igious 
transformation.   Catholics,  given their  resources and entrenchment 
around the globe have l i t t le to fear from competi t ion in a free 
religious market .   In fact ,  endorsement  of an individualist  model of 
rel igious freedom is l ikely to work to the Church’s,  and many 
Christ ian organizations,’  advantage,  insofar as i t  just ifies the opening 
of previously closed religious markets .   
In contrast ,  non-Christ ians not  only lack the resource capaci ty 
and level of coordination needed to compete as equals in open 
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rel igious markets,  their  abil i ty to protect  their  “market share” is  
inhibited by an inst i tutionally embedded cert i f ication process.   First ,  
groups vary by religion in terms of their  capacity to enact  the 
egali tarian standard of universalism.  Second, the endorsement of an 
individual ist  model of rel igious freedom can work against  their  
interests.   A striking contradiction l ies in the fact  that  the 
organizational standards valued as indicators of world cit izenship and 
equali ty within individual NGOs produce an organization field that ,  
when considered as a whole,  is  marked by substantial  inequali ty and 
northern dominance in terms of insti tutional access.   
Ironically,  egali tarian principles and inegali tarian interorganizational 
relations not only co-exist  within the same field,  they work to 
mutually reinforce one another .    
 In “Conceptions of Christendom: Notes on the Distinctiveness 
of the West,” John Meyer (1991) elaborated how Christ ian religion 
provided the structural  foundation for the emergence of world culture.   
The point  of this chapter has been to i l lustrate how the enduring 
organizational compatibil i ty of Christ ian (especially Catholic)  
rel igion with the structure of the international  system sti l l  matters in 
terms of stratif ication among religious groups.   I  i l lustrated this for 
one field of transnational action – human rights .   The final  chapter of 
this dissertation will  discuss,  among other things,  the implications of 
these findings,  and a discussion about the future of rel igion in global 
poli t ics,  and of poli t ics in global rel igion.  
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                                       
   
CHAPTER SIX 
CONCLUSION 
 
This chapter will  summarize the research reported in the preceding 
chapters,  elaborate upon i ts  theoretical  contribut ions,  and suggest  
avenues for future research on religion in transnational poli t ics.   I  wil l  
argue two general  points.   First ,  in order to accurately assess the role 
that  rel igion plays in transnational poli t ics,  we will  need to reconsider 
the relationship between sacred and secular in the context  of 
modernity.   In terms of movements for social  change, this 
reassessment will  require that  we more carefully consider how 
modernization actually provides opportunit ies for rel igious 
mobilization.   In terms of inst i tutional poli t ics,  we need to search for  
mechanisms through which religious and secular  authority continue to 
support  one another ,  in spite of insti tut ional differentiat ion.   Second, I  
will  argue that  insti tutionalist  accounts of world culture will  benefit  
from more explici t  at tention to the role that  action plays,  not only in 
social  change, but also in inst i tutional reproduction.   Although 
scholars usually study social  movements in order to understand social  
change, by turning our attention to action and strategy, the study of 
social  movements can also bring to l ight the more dynamic processes 
through which social  structure is  maintained.   
I  will  also examine some of the l imitations of this dissertat ion,  
especially the inadequacy of the evidence for making longitudinal 
causal  claims,  and some ambiguity that  remains regarding the role of 
agency in producing stratif ication in Human Rights.   Although both of 
these weaknesses are important,  I  view them as neither detracting 
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from the findings that  do emerge from this project ,  nor as indicative 
of “dead ends” in terms of research on the questions that  i t  raises.   
Rather,  they indicate a need, and opportunity,  for  further research on 
religion in global poli t ics -  research that  takes into consideration 
addit ional  dimensions of movement fields,  insti tutions,  and the part ies 
that  interact  within them. 
  
Public Religion and Secular Insti tutions    
Chapters Two and Three speak most directly to questions about 
secularization,  and the relationship between rationalism and public 
religion in Human Rights .   They do so by examining religious NGOs 
foundings over the past  century,  and the strategies rel igious human 
rights NGOs use to assert  claims across culturally diverse contexts.   
Before interpreting the findings from these chapters,  however,  I  will  
clarify some l imitations of the quanti tat ive data that  were used as 
evidence.  
The most serious l imitation of the data is  that  they are not 
sufficient to support  causal  claims about organizational change over 
t ime.  Chapter Two does show an impressive coincidence of IGO 
formation and religious NGO foundings.   However,  this relationship,  
in and of i tself,  is  not  sufficient evidence that  rel igious NGO 
foundings are caused by,  or  occur in response to,  the construction of 
international insti tutions;  nor does i t  tel l  us that  insti tution building 
occurs in response to NGO mobilization.   I t  is  also possible that  the 
increases in foundings were caused by different factors for each 
group, or  that  organizational foundings were enabled by some 
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additional  underlying variable that  had a posit ive relationship with 
both IGOs and religious NGOs.   
One such variable,  and the one that  world poli ty insti tutionalists  
would stress,  is  the t ransnational proliferation of rationalist  modes of 
organizing.   From this perspective,  both IGO and NGO construction 
can be interpreted as the isomorphic enactment  and embedding of 
world cultural  principles.   This interpretation is  rooted in assumptions 
that  sociology inherited from the classical  account of modernization,  
which constructs rat ionalism as l inear,  progressive,  and destined to 
exert  an organizing influence over greater terri tory and over more 
sectors of social  l i fe with the passing of t ime.  Given the 
rationalization of the Human Rights sector (as described in the 
Introduction),  this modernist  account of societal  transformation would 
seem to be an appropriate framework for understanding the sector’s 
evolution and the types of actors that  comprise i t .   
There are,  however,  some problems with the insti tutionalist-
modernist  account of societal  transformation.   First ,  rat ionalism, from 
this perspective,  is  also assumed to be a secularizing process,  meaning 
that  i t  should be associated with a decline in public religion.   In 
addit ion,  i t  takes for  granted a considerable degree of homogeneity 
across organizations and across levels of analysis .  As we found in 
Chapter  Two, neither secularism nor homogeneity can be assumed in 
Human Rights,  since all  of the foundings that  we observe in this study 
are,  in fact ,  foundings of religious organizations.   Furthermore,  they 
are rel igious organizations that  are explici t ly and openly oriented 
toward influencing the public sphere of the world poli ty.   This pattern 
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is inconsistent  with the classical  modernization narrative,  for which 
religious decline is  of central  importance.  Rather than revealing an 
adverse impact  of modernization on religion,  the dramatic increase in 
religious NGO foundings since mid-century suggests that  the 
rationalization of Human Rights,  along with espousal  and enactment 
of enlightenment principles within the field,  is  at  least  posit ively 
associated with public rel igion; i t  may have even opened opportunit ies 
for rel igious NGO formation.   
Several  implications follow from these findings.   First ,  they 
require that  we abandon certain assumptions about the homogenizing 
force of modernity.   My research lends strong support  to claims that  
modernity actually creates the condit ions for the emergence of 
movements based on ascriptive identi t ies  -  identi t ies that  challenge 
processes such as secularization,  Westernization or globalization1 
However,  whereas previous challenges to modernization theory have 
focused on identi ty formation,  I  have focused on actual  mechanisms 
through which actors with religious identi t ies strategically use 
rationalism to their  advantage.   The NGO tactics that  I  describe in 
Chapter  Three -  procedural  rat ionalism and discursive secularization – 
are two such mechanisms.  By focusing on how NGOs strategically 
frame grievances and inter-organizational communications across 
religious and secular contexts ,  I  have identified two relat ional  
mechanisms2 through which the sacred and the secular meet ,  and 
subsequently come to mutually consti tute one another.   These tactics 
                                                          
1 See, for example Polanyi 1957, and more recently,Hardt and Negri, 2000; Adelkhah 2000; Barber 
1995; Castells 2004; Appaduri 1990. 
2 For a discussion of relational mechanisms, see McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly, 201., p. 26.   
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il lustrate the malleabil i ty of instrumental  rat ionalism, as a tool  that  
can be used to support  any number of ends,  religious or  secular.    
If  we cannot assume a posit ive relationship between means and 
ends rationalism, neither can we assume that  rel igious groups’ 
incorporat ion of secular discourses and concepts  indicates religious 
decline.   Religious NGO mission statements certainly uti l ize the 
language and philosophical  framework of Human Rights .   Although 
this incorporation may consti tute an internal  rel igious transformation,  
just  as secular human rights  has transformed through t ime, i t  does not 
necessari ly indicate secularization.   As Swatos and Christ iano point 
out,  “change [is] inherent  in religion,  just  as change is  in other 
insti tutional spheres and cultural  dimensions,  precisely because 
religion is  a sociocultural  inst i tution” (Swatos and Christ iano 2000, p.  
16).  Religion,  l ike any insti tut ion,  is  most usefully conceptualized as 
continually evolving throughout history,  and any decline in religious 
authority as a result  of that  evolutionary process should not be 
assumed, but left  open for  investigation (Edgell  2002, p.29; Hefner 
2001, p.493; Kurtz 1986).  
Since religion and rationalism cannot be assumed to be opposing 
logics,  conceptual and methodological dist inctions between religious 
and secular practice may actually obscure,  rather than i l luminate,  the 
relationship between religion and the public sphere.   A second 
implication of this research,  then,  is  that  we need to broaden our 
definit ion of rel igious practice.   Information about individuals’  church 
attendance and privatized spiri tuali ty tel ls  us much about certain 
dimensions of rel igiosity.   But i t  is  insufficient i f  we want  to obtain a  
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more complete picture of religious l i fe .   Once we take into account  
individuals '  subjective interpretations of social  action,  we find that  
the boundaries between religious and secular practices are not as self-
evident as  implied by standard aggregate measures of rel igiosity (e.g.  
frequency of prayer ,  worship service attendance, contributions to 
religious organizations).   By extension,  if  we relax a priori  
assumptions of separate spheres for religious and public l i fe ,  we can 
uncover forms of rel igious practice that  are often overlooked in 
quanti tat ive studies of rel igious transformation.   Even domains of 
action l ike Human Rights ,  which presents as an ideal-typical  
embodiment of secular enlightenment values,  can actually be the si tes  
of religious engagement  – fields through which religious actors play 
out the tenets of their  fai ths.  
A third and related implication is  that ,  in order  to understand 
religious part icipation in the public sphere,  we must dist inguish 
among different  levels of discursive engagement within civil  society,  
especially when that  civil  society is  transnational or global.   The 
pluralist  IGOs that  human rights advocates target  indeed produce and 
enact secular definit ions of reali ty.   And, the consistent elaboration of 
homogenous human rights principles within official  transnational 
documents and speeches gives the impression of universal  agreement.   
If  we assume that  this discourse is representative of the field in i ts  
entirety,  we certainly find evidence of a homogenizing cul tural  force 
that  erases part iculari t ies along religious and ethnic l ines.   
But the secular principles expressed through international 
insti tutions are not necessari ly isomorphic with the core principles 
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that inform or inspire organizational and individual advocacy.  The 
religious-to-secular  translation process described by the interfaith 
NGO director (Chapter Three) serves as one i l lustrat ion of this 
variat ion across contexts.   I t  i l luminates a disjuncture between the 
religious identi t ies that  provide the basis for the NGO’s inter-group 
all iance and the secular frames that  the NGO uses in i ts  outward 
communications.  By analytically at tending to such dist inctions across 
arenas of discourse,  we identify points of resistance to,  or at  least  
differentiation from, official  public discourses.   We even find 
evidence that  challenges us to rethink how hegemonic a particular 
discourse really is .   In fact ,  the heterogeneity of cultural  forms that  
we observe when we move to the organizational and individual levels 
of analysis suggests that  the “world culture” enacted in international 
insti tutions may actually be an eli te sub-culture – one that  may or may 
not be internalized by the actors who organize around i t .    
But the heterogeneity that  I  have described cannot be fully 
ascertained in models of organizational  and insti tutional behavior that  
view agents as merely enactors  of  pre-established world cul tural  
principles.   The durabil i ty of the homogenous world culture that  
researchers observe is  actually maintained through the strategic action  
of  culturally heterogeneous agents that  vary considerably in terms of 
their  level  of agreement  with the values endorsed by IGOs.  The 
tactical  shifts  in language that  we observe as groups move away from 
intraorganizational communication and toward more pluralist  forums 
of interorganizational engagement  are better  understood with the 
incorporat ion of conceptions of culture as more of a “tool kit ,” and 
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organizational framing as more a process of “bricolage” or 
“theorizat ion” (Swidler 1986;  Tarrow 1994: 130; Strang 1993).  Rather 
than merely enacting complete and coherent sets of principles and 
norms consistently and in their  entirety,  NGOs strategically select  and 
weave together diverse symbols and cultural  references from multiple 
sources,  rel igious and secular .    
I  refer to tactical  shifts  toward secular  discourse as discursive 
secularization .   Discursive secularization is  an instance of Snow and 
Benford call  “frame bridging,” which is  the process through which 
social  movement activists  create l inks,  or bridges,  among diverse 
groups,  by translating platforms into discursive frames that  will  
resonate across contexts (Snow et  al .  1997: 238-239).   Consistent  with 
developments in secularization theory that  have lead to dist inctions 
among multiple forms of secularization,  I  view discursive 
secularization as a potential ly autonomous process whose relationship 
to other forms of secularization cannot be assumed, and must be 
treated as an empirical  question.   That is ,  discursive secularization is  
not necessari ly coterminous with privatization or a decline in rel igious 
beliefs  and practices,  nor  does i t  imply religion’s retreat  from the 
public sphere.   Rather,  i t  is  a deliberate tactic used by religious actors 
used to exert  greater  influence in the public sphere.   Therefore,  when 
religious organizations transform their  frames in order to build 
bridges with secular  groups,  i t  is  more l ikely to be an indicator of 
rel igious assert ion rather than decline.  
However,  in the process of assert ing themselves,  rel igious 
actors do nonetheless discursively strengthen the secular norms and 
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assumptions embodied in the insti tutions and organizational  fields 
where they interact .   Insti tutional durabil i ty,  then,  is  as much the 
outcome of conflict  and challenge as i t  is  an outcome of legi t imacy 
and conformity.   This brings us to the importance of social  movements 
for the sociological  study of insti tutions.   A sharper focus on the 
tactics and strategies used by insti tutional challengers forces us to 
specify of the role that  action plays not only in insti tutional change,  
but in inst i tutional reproduction as well .   By examining rel igious 
NGO’s discursive strategies,  I  have shown that  religious actors relate  
to world culture through action ,  as opposed to enaction ,  through 
challenge ,  rather than conformity .   This shift  in the conceptualization 
of agency moves world poli ty inst i tut ionalism in a direction where i t  
can account for and incorporate heterogeneity and conflict  in studies 
of organizational environments that  are otherwise characterized by 
isomorphism and homogeneity.   
Looking beyond the findings of this project ,  I  would predict  
that ,  i f  we were to examine the use of discursive secularization over 
t ime, we would find that  i t  increases or decreases along with 
transformations in poli t ical  opportunity structures,  both domestic and 
international.   For example,  the Religious Right in American poli t ics 
currently has scant need of discursive secularization,  since i t  has 
strong supporters in al l  branches of U.S. government.   Given that  
support ,  I  would predict  that  rel igious activists’  discourse will  
increasingly sacralize for as long as  those all iances remain in place 
and in power.   Should all iances or el i te configurations shift  in such as 
way as to close opportunit ies for the Religious Right,  the lat ter  may 
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retrench, but only on the surface,  or  in terms of the face of their  
movement .   That is ,  through discursive secularization,  movements can 
maintain their  rel igious bases while engaging in the frame 
transformation necessary to create an aura of legit imacy in more 
secular contexts.  
Having moved cultural  heterogeneity and action to the forefront 
of insti tut ional analysis,  we arrive at  questions about competing world 
cultural  principles,  and the mechanisms through which some remain 
subordinate to others.  The next section will  address these questions,  
along with the important contributions that  Chapter Four makes to 
answering them. It  is  at  this  point  that  structure,  as opposed to 
agency, becomes more important to my analysis.  
 
Accreditat ion,  Inequality,  and World Culture .       
Chapter Four systematically investigated the characterist ics that  
dist inguish between accredited and non-accredited NGOs, revealing 
several  ways that  NGO structure is  related to IGO ties.   My findings 
pertaining to this  association are important for two reasons.   First ,  
they confirm the existence of insti tutional inequali ty in global civil  
society.   Second, they i l lustrate that  the sources of that  inequali ty are 
both material  and cultural .   Before elaborating upon the implications 
of these findings,  however,  i t  wil l  be instructive to discuss important  
l imitat ions of the data used for that  chapter.     
The most serious problem with the data used in Chapter Four is  
that  they are cross-sectional.   Therefore,  they are inadequate to the 
task of showing that  access to international insti tutions,  or the desire 
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for  access,  causes  NGOs to innovate or adopt part icular types of 
structures or missions.   This ,  ideally,  is  what I  would l ike to have 
shown.  To demonstrate such a causal  relationship,  however,  would 
require information on organizational frames over  t ime, and the 
demonstration of frame variation within organizations,  ei ther 
preceding or shortly after  obtaining IGO consultat ive status.  The 
creation of an aggregated data set  that  contained such information on 
each individual organization would be a daunting,  perhaps even 
impossible,  task.    
A promising alternative,  however,  would be to conduct 
organizational l i fe histories focused on frame and mission 
transformations in a small  number of religious organizations across 
t ime.3  Such organizational l i fe  histories could provide valuable 
information about whether or not the desire for or acquisi t ion of 
consultative status,  or the mere presence of an accredit ing body within 
an organizational f ield,  provides an impetus for frame transformation 
within NGOs.  Such historical  case studies,  in combination with the 
quanti tat ive research I  conducted for Chapter Four,  would provide a 
more complete picture of the opportunit ies and incentives religious 
NGOs take into account when deciding to adopt,  discard,  or transform 
elements of their  organizational missions and operations.    
A second problem with the data is  that  i t  does not tel l  us 
whether exclusion from international insti tutions is  the result  of 
disenfranchisement or strategic choice on the part  of NGOs without 
IGO ties.   My fieldwork did al low for some speculation regarding this 
                                                          
3 See, for example, Meyer Zald’s (1970) study of the YMCA.  
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question,  since two of the NGOs whose leaders that  I  interviewed did 
not have IGO consultative status.   In both of those cases,  the 
advocates with whom I spoke clearly expressed the perception of 
disenfranchisement,  and intent ional exclusion at  the behest  of 
powerful players in the human rights  f ield,  including governments.   
Yet,  i t  cannot be assumed that  this was the case for al l  of the religious 
NGOs in my dataset  that  did not have consultat ive status.   I t  is  also 
possible that  many of them are simply not interested in IGO 
accreditation.    
To ascertain the reasons for NGO non-participation in IGOs, one 
potentially useful extension of this research would be to actually 
observe the accreditat ion process.  Such an observation would reveal 
how and when overt  exertions of state  power influence decisions about 
consultative status.   For example,  members of a  Sikh organization 
concerned with human rights in India reported that ,  each t ime they 
have applied for UN consultative status,  a representative of India has 
blocked their  accreditat ion.   Observance of the accreditat ion process 
would reveal just  how widespread such occurrences are.   
Observation of the accreditation process would also allow for 
greater insight into the more subtle influences that  procedures and 
standards exert  on NGO accreditation,  including the standards that  I  
at tempt to measure in Chapter Four.   Are these standards explici t ly 
evoked, or are they implicit  in other  cr i teria?  How consistently are 
they applied?  How much agreement  or conflict  exists  regarding their  
appropriateness as  cri teria?   
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As useful as they might be,  the insights  gleaned from observing 
the accreditat ion process would only apply to NGOs that  apply for 
consultative status and are denied.   They would not tel l  us much about 
those religious human rights  NGOs that  never apply for consultative 
status in the first  place.   In order to understand the variables 
underlying self-selection,  a  combination of surveys and in-depth 
interviews focused specifically on NGOs without consultat ive status 
would be valuable.   
I  would not predict ,  however,  that  the findings of such a study 
would seriously chal lenge my claim that  NGO accreditat ion is  a 
discriminatory process.   Even if  we found that  a large portion of the 
variation in accreditation was due to self-selection,  given the 
importance of IGOs to Human Rights advocacy (see Introduction),  I  
would predict  that  the reasons for opting out  of consultative status 
would st i l l  point  us in the direction of a systematic insti tutional bias.    
For instance,  we know from Chapter  Four that  IGO certi fication 
is ,  in part ,  a  function of organizational s ize.   Even if  this  variat ion 
were not due to IGO decisions and preferences,  we would st i l l  need to 
ask: Why is there a  tendency for smaller  NGOs to not seek 
consultative status?  I  would predict  that  one common answer to this 
question would be that  smaller organizations forgo consultative status 
because they lack the resources needed to benefit  from it .   These 
resources might  include facil i ty with dominant languages,  money for  
international  travel ,  or  the extra t ime and material  and human 
resources needed to publicly promote the UN, an activity that  is  
required of accredited NGOs.  Likewise,  the expectation that  
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accredited NGOs advance universal  r ights claims might mean that  
already scarce NGO resources would have to be diverted from 
programs addressing pressing problems in NGO’s own countries.   For  
these types of reasons,  IGO consultative status may be perceived by 
smaller organizations as a  luxury that  is  useful  primarily to 
organizations with large budgets and relatively secure human rights  
environments at  home. 
An addit ional reason why a religious NGO might  strategically 
opt out of consultative status would be to avoid tensions that  emerge 
as a result  of the need to maintain legit imacy with multiple,  opposing 
audiences.   This issue is  pert inent to religious minority groups,  
part icularly those that  are targeted for repression by governments.   
Under such circumstances,  f inancial  support  from outside,  especially 
government,  sources can damage a human rights NGO’s credibil i ty in 
the eyes of i ts  grassroots consti tuencies.   As a result ,  NGOs leaders 
representing oppressed groups must make a choice between accepting 
support  that  might al low for  outside influence (real  or perceived),  
thereby threatening their  legit imacy, or  maintaining their  autonomy, 
but surviving solely on resources of their  membership.4  To a certain 
extent,  al l  human rights NGOs are faced with the choice between 
resources and operat ional independence.   But,  the stakes are arguably 
higher for organizat ions that  represent groups that  perceive their  
interests,  or their  very culture,  to be threatened by governments or 
northern-based agents of globalization such as corporations,  INGOs 
and IGOs. 
                                                          
4 Interview with spokesperson for minority a religious NGO. September 2000.  
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Although these are examples of si tuations in which NGOs might 
freely and rationally choose to forgo IGO consultat ive status,  they 
nonetheless reveal how power and inequali ty influence those choices.   
They force us to ask questions about whose interests are best  served 
by international insti tutions,  and whether the compromises that  
insti tutional affi l iat ion requires are distr ibuted equally across 
culturally diverse groups with uneven resource capacit ies.   These 
questions in turn provoke other questions about just  how far below the 
surface cultural  principles such as universalism and world ci t izenship 
do or  do not extend, bringing us to the issue of principles,  power and 
the insti tutionalization of NGO inequali ty.   
Although the evidence presented in Chapter Four cannot be used 
to make causal  claims about  IGO-NGO transformation,  i t  does 
i l lustrate the current balance of insti tutional power among religious 
NGOs in Human Rights.   I t  shows that  differences in power are 
systematically associated with both region and religion,  with northern 
and Christ ian (especially Catholic) groups enjoying a dist inct  
advantage when i t  comes to obtaining IGO consultative status.   This  
pattern of NGO stratification is  consistent with patterns of 
strat ification among states in the international  system, with those from 
the north and historically western cultures holding posit ions of 
economic and poli t ical  power over those located in the global south.   
My findings pertaining to variation in consultative status by 
region wil l  be of considerable importance to globally focused 
advocates and scholars committed to social  just ice.   Although the 
existence of north-south inequali ty,  in and of i tself,  wil l  certainly not 
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come as a surprise,  the identif ication of a potential ly generalizable 
mechanism explaining the persistence of this inequali ty is  noteworthy.   
I t  shows that  power in international insti tutions does not operate 
exclusively through the purposive actions of northern actors seeking 
to dominate the south.   Rather,  power also works in more subtle ways,  
f lowing through the ostensibly neutral  standards that  structure NGO 
participation,  even when those standards are intended to produce the 
egali tarian outcomes to which many advocates are committed.   
I t  is  important to recognize that  the standards favoring large,  
northern NGOs are neither straightforward nor explicit .   Rather,  they 
work through cultural  legit imations.   Official  discourses do not  
describe large NGOs as preferable because of their  size per se ,  but 
because of what  size is  assumed to represent – a broad, universal  
focus and a technical  capacity that  is consistent  with the myth of the 
United Nations,  and other IGOs, as apoli t ical  insti tutions.   
Accreditat ion,  then,  creates a context where world cultural  principles 
and power mutually reinforce one another,  thereby reproducing 
strat ification among dist inct  categories of actors.   Paradoxically,  the 
insti tutionalization of principles that  are intended to guarantee 
equali ty of representation within individual human rights 
organizations produces inequali ty at  the field level  of analysis.  
This mechanism operates in a similar  way for rel igion as i t  does 
for region.   In spite of the fact  that  international insti tutions assume 
secularism in their  Human Rights instruments,  and in spite of the fact  
that  they do not explici t ly value any one religion over another,  their  
insti tutional rules are based on cultural  assumptions that  by and large 
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favor Christ ian religion over other religious tradit ions.   Key 
advantages l ie in the discursive and philosophical  similari t ies between 
Christ ian religion and world culture,  especially the priori ty that  each 
give to an individualist ,  “market” model of spiri tuali ty that  
emphasizes the rights to evangelism and conversion.   
But equally important are the size and expansiveness of 
Christ ian organizations.   Organizational size interacts with the 
cultural  principles measured in Chapter  Four in two ways.   First ,  
globally expansive religious organizations stand to benefit  more from 
individual ist  interpretations of religious freedom than do smaller 
rel igious organizations,  since the former will  have an advantage over 
the lat ter  when i t  comes to competing for adherents in an open 
religious market .   Second, expansive infrastructures and operations 
allow religious organizations to legit imately claim broad 
representation and universal  human rights agendas.   The two types of 
advantages – cultural  and structural  – mutually condit ion one another.   
The relationship of both culture and structure to stratif icat ion 
speaks to how important i t  wil l  be for scholars of world cul ture to 
incorporate elements of both the “old” and the “new” insti tutionalism 
into their  theoretical  framework if  they wish to understand the 
relationship between world culture and inequali ty.   Consistent with 
the old insti tutionalism, the impact of cert ification on regional and 
religious strat ification suggests that state insti tutions (in this case 
international insti tutions) do indeed structure organizational  fields to 
the advantage of their  more powerful actors.   At the same time, in 
keeping with the new insti tutionalist  emphasis on culture,  i t  shows 
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that  material  resources are not the only components of organizational  
structure that  are predictive of insti tutional power.   In addit ion,  
conformity to an organization’s cultural  environment,  as  expressed 
through the framing of organizational missions and activit ies,  is  also 
associated with access to international insti tutions.  
The need for  incorporation of elements of the “old” 
insti tut ionalism becomes even more apparent when we consider the 
implications of this study for how we think about the historical  
relationship between religious and secular authority in transnational 
space.   As stated above,  the patterns of rel igious NGO strat if ication 
identified in Chapter Four are consistent  with patterns of strat ification 
among states.   I t  is  my contention that  this coincidence is  due to the 
long-term historical  co-development of Christ ian religion and the 
northern-dominated world system (see,  for  example,  Meyer 1991).   In 
spite of centuries of insti tutional differentiat ion,  the similari t ies in 
culture and structure as a result  of these historical  relat ions are 
imprinted in the patterns of strat ification that  currently exist  among 
religious groups in Human Rights.    
My research has empirically established one mechanism – 
cert ification -  through which this historical  relationship between 
western religious and secular authority is  maintained.   What is  st i l l  
needed, however,  is  an insti tutional analysis focused on the historical  
processes through which that  relationship and i ts  associated 
advantages came to be embedded in the structures of international 
insti tutions,  and in the field of human rights more generally.   What 
exactly were the configurations of competing actors,  interests,  and 
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assumptions throughout the past  century that  have influenced the 
current patterns of,  and rules defining,  nongovernmental  access to and 
exclusion from international inst i tutions?  Were there competing 
models for civil  society part icipation,  and why did the one that  we 
observe today prevai l?   Are the biases in favor of certain types of 
NGOs the outcome of strategic design,  or would they more accurately 
be described as unintended consequences of a  contested inst i tution-
building process?  The findings of such a study would speak to 
questions about the potential  for insti tut ions to function as si tes of 
social  change,  as opposed to forms of bureaucratic machinery through 
which transnational  inequali t ies are inst i tutionalized and reproduced.  
 My claim that  historical  relations between religion and the state 
remain relevant in transnational relat ions also has important  
implications for secularization theory – part icularly for how we think 
about the influence of insti tut ional differentiat ion on religion-state 
relations.   Standard accounts  of modernization assume that  rel igion-
state separation is  associated with religious decline.   I  am suggesting,  
instead,  that  rel igion and state be conceptualized as continually 
evolving,  l inked insti tutions.5  Just  as rel igious systems can internally 
evolve and transform while retaining coherent and dist inctly religious 
identi t ies,  so too can the relat ionship between religion and state 
evolve,  and take on myriad forms, with the two insti tutions 
nonetheless remaining l inked.  That is ,  rel igious establishment  is  only 
one form of inter-insti tutional relat ionship that  permits advantages to 
                                                          
5 For a discussion and model of linked, co-evolving institutions, see Edgell’s work on religion and 
family (Edgell 2002). 
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flow between religious and secular forms of authority.   Just  as 
religion-state l inkages were important during colonialist  expansion, 
such l inkages remain important,  in spite of disestablishment,  in the 
current cycle of global expansion,  and as governance shifts  toward the 
international arena.  However,  we need to look to different inst i tutions 
and processes in order to understand how those l inks operate in the 
current context of global transformation.   
 
Avenues for Future Research 
If  the claims I  have stated above are correct ,  the l inks between 
western rel igion and secular states will  come into sharper rel ief as 
research on religion in civil  society moves toward the global level  of 
analysis.   Likewise,  empirical  examinations of the relationship 
between religious and secular authority will  increasingly require that  
we look beyond the nation-state,  perhaps even beginning with the 
global arena,  working our way down to the national level  of analysis.   
Rather than studying religious part icipation in global civil  society as 
an extension of previously state-centered part icipation in poli t ics,  we 
need to pay more attention to how domestic rel igion-state relations 
are,  and always have been, condit ioned by the advantages that  f low 
between religious and secular  authority in transnational space.    
 Consider,  for  example,  the relationship between the 
proliferation of Evangelical  rel igion in Latin America and the poli t ical  
power accrued by Evangelical  Christ ians  in the United States in 
recent decades.   One way to examine this relat ionship would be to 
begin with the rise of the Christ ian Coali t ion in American poli t ics 
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during the Carter  and Reagan years,  and then show how poli t ical  
opportunit ies for the Christ ian Right during these years yielded 
resources for  widespread expansion into Latin America.   An 
alternative approach, however,  would be to begin with the mutual 
interests that  existed between the Reagan administration and 
Evangelicals in Latin America (i .e.  in transnational space),  and from 
there explore how those mutual interests may have created the 
opportunit ies and resources necessary for religious conservat ives to 
form their  formidable domestic lobby in the US.  That is ,  I  would 
seriously consider the possibil i ty that  the Christ ian Coali t ion might 
be,  in part ,  a  consequence of the Religious Right’s  usefulness in U.S. 
foreign policy.   Such examinations of religion-state l inkages in global 
space could add a new level of complexity to our understanding of the 
power currently wielded by religious groups in domestic pol i t ics.  
  Likewise,  in contrast  to my research,  which has focused on the 
more subtle ways that  power is  exerted and contested in the NGO 
universe,  a considerable amount of research remains to be done on the 
explici t  ways that  international poli t ics influence rel igious voice and 
social  capital  among NGOs. For instance,  the cognit ive association of 
Islamic organizations with “fundamental ism” or “terrorism” cannot be 
fully comprehended without considering Middle East  poli t ics and,  
more recently,  the US led “War on Terror.”  In this historical  moment,  
not only do the prerogatives of powerful  states leave Islamic human 
rights organizations themselves vulnerable,  but non-Islamic 
organizations that  affi l iate with or f inancially support  them run the 
risk of being investigated as possible supporters of “terror” as well .   
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The impact this has on Islamic coali t ion and network building surely 
must  be damaging and is  worthy of scholars’  at tention.   
In-depth studies of individual  cases where NGOs have been 
denied accreditation could also provide insight into the ways in which 
states’  interests  condit ion the terms of NGO participation.   Research 
in this direction would not only address questions about  NGO 
autonomy, but also about poli t ical  factors determining which types of 
human rights issues and campaigns are given priori ty within the NGO 
universe.  
Consider,  for  example,  the case of Christ ian Solidari ty 
International (CSI),  an NGO that  has focused extensively on slavery in 
the Sudan.  At the t ime of my interviews with members of CSI (2000),  
i ts  leaders had recently seen their  UN consultative status revoked.  
The reasons for the NGO’s loss of accreditat ion were undoubtedly 
complex,  but were in large part  due to i ts  decision to allow a 
representative from a separatist  group, the Sudanese People’s 
Liberation Army ,  to speak at  the United Nations about widespread 
enslavement of Christ ians by Muslims in the Sudan.  CSI’s  actions not 
only embarrassed the Sudanese government,  but violated the norm of 
“poli t ical  neutrali ty.” Subsequently,  at  the request  the Sudanese 
government,  the NGO’s consultative status was revoked, ostensibly on 
procedural  grounds.  
But i t  is  not  only the poli t ics surrounding CSI’s loss of 
accreditat ion that  could be i l luminated through a scholarly 
investigat ion of this  case.  I t  would also shed l ight  on the relatively 
low profile that  slavery in the Sudan, unti l  recently,  had held in the 
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international community.   As of the year 2000, CSI had already been 
reporting on slavery in Sudan for  several  years.   Yet,  i t  was not unti l  
2004, four  years after  the marginalization of CS I,  that  the atrocit ies 
within the Sudan came to the forefront of the international public’s 
at tention,  and became a central  focus of the mainstream human rights 
community’s agenda.  How can we explain the international 
community’s marginalization of this issue?  And why is  i t  that  now, in 
the midst  of so many other  cr ises,  at tention has finally turned toward 
the Sudan?  This controversial  organization,  CSI,  and transformations 
in i ts  relat ionship with the United Nations and the international human 
rights community,  could provide a lens through which to examine 
these questions,  and would bring into sharper rel ief the types of power 
that  states  and other  actors exercise over NGOs and priori ty’s in 
global civil  society.  
 Equally important,  however,  is  the need to for more culturally 
sensit ive studies of international insti tutions that  would complement 
the aforementioned emphasis  on states’  interests and exertions of 
power.   By “culturally sensit ive” I  mean that  studies of international  
insti tutions could benefit  from attention to the ri tual  functions of 
IGOs.  The relevance of r i tual  and symbol became very clear to me 
while analyzing the transcripts from the Special  Session on 
HIV/AIDS.  At  stake in the debates that  ensued over homosexuali ty 
during this session were not so much the technical  aspects of the UN’s 
programmatic objectives,  but the values and ideological  commitments 
that  were being affi rmed through the largely identical  and repeti t ive 
speeches given by each diplomat.   The posit ion taken by the 
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Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) was not controversial  
because i t  posed any real  threat  to HIV/AIDS programs, but because 
the OIC’s (and the Vatican’s)  speeches consti tuted a rupture,  a 
symbolic discontinuity,  in the ri tual affi rmation that  was the Special  
Session.   Perhaps the representative from Norway i l lustrated this best  
when she proclaimed that  what was at  stake in the debates over 
homosexuali ty was nothing less than “the soul of the United Nations.”   
  This is  not to say that  the conflicts  that  ensue in the symbolic 
realm are “merely” symbolic in their  consequences.   As Risse,  Ropp 
and Sikkink (1999) have aptly demonstrated,  normative human rights 
commitments,  even when not legally binding, do provide standards 
against  which actors are subsequently held accountable for their  
actions.   There is  no reason to assume that  Risse et  al .’s  model would 
not equally apply to concessions made in favor of religious groups 
(including states),  even when those claims go against  the grain of 
hard-won achievements in Human Rights.    
The fact  that  organizational strat ification and insti tutional  
power are in part  contested in the realm of culture is  important 
because of what  i t  might  tel l  us about how social  change (for  better  or 
for worse) happens within and through insti tutions.   I  would st i l l  
maintain that  IGOs, by and large,  support  the interests  of their  more 
powerful members,  and will  continue to function in this manner.   
However,  the fact  that  insti tutional power is  maintained in part  
through conformity to norms, and is  legit imated through ideology, 
lends a certain plastici ty to insti tutions in terms of their  openness to 
challengers.   Insofar as conflicts  are played out on the terrain of 
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culture,  challengers can innovate and assert  claims to an extent that  
would not  be possible if  structure and power were purely matters of 
material  resources.   The transformation of and contest  over  “cultural  
r ights” provides one i l lustration of how minority groups can 
reinterpret  hegemonic discourses to their  advantage,  thereby altering 
the playing field where cultural  minorit ies and majori t ies compete for 
recognit ion of their  claims and for influence.   Although this plastici ty 
may not  fundamentally change the nature of the game (i .e.  i t  
ul t imately remains a game whose rules favor those in power),  i t  does 
nonetheless add an element  of unpredictabil i ty with regard to the 
identi t ies of dominant and subordinate groups.   
On a final  note,  this research i l lustrates the need for a reflexive 
approach to sociology that  takes into account the hegemonic status 
that  secular,  rat ionalist  ideologies hold among western intel lectuals.   
As Peter Berger recently pointed out ,  “A purely secular view of reali ty 
has i ts  principal  social  location in an eli te culture,” which Berger 
describes as global and comprised of people with Western-type higher 
education (Berger 1999, p.10-11).   He goes on to say that ,  “This 
subculture is  the principle ‘carrier’  of progressive,  enlightened beliefs 
and values.   While i ts  members are relatively thin on the ground, they 
are very influential ,  as they control  the insti tutions that  provide the 
‘official’  definit ions of reali ty” (Berger 1999, p.10).  
The problematic relationship of the researcher to rationalism 
does not mean that  social  scientists  should abandon the scientif ic 
method as a tool  for  understanding the social  world.   I t  should,  
however,  serves as a reminder that ,  when studying a social  
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phenomenon such as “world culture,” we are,  in effect ,  s tudying 
ourselves.   The very methods we use, and even the presupposit ion that  
we can “know” this phenomenon through the application of scientif ic  
principles,  makes us the ult imate enactor of those very principles 
toward which we are committed to taking an objective approach.  This 
closeness to the subject  of our research can make i t  al l  to easy to lose 
sight of the fact  that  both religious and secular ideological  systems, 
despite their  differences,  are both,  nonetheless,  ideological  systems 
and should be approached and evaluated according to the equivalent  
standards.   There is  no obvious reason why scientists  should permit  
rat ionalism to claim for i tself  an inherent affini ty with such values as 
universalism, equali ty,  or “truth,” any more so than we permit  rel igion 
to assert  such claims without cri t ically examining the evidence.   
Paradoxically,  reflexive attention to the cultural  features of social  
science will  not only move i t  in a more cri t ical  direction,  but will  
al low for the greater objectivi ty that  is  required for empirical  
research.   
  
 
 
Appendix A 
Interview Letter  
.  
August 23,  2000 
 
World Federation of Methodist   
and Uniting Church Women 
777 United Nations Plaza 
New York, NY 10017 
USA 
 
Dear Ms. Apeadu: 
 
I  am a doctoral  candidate in the Sociology Department  at  Cornell  
University,  completing a dissertat ion on religion and international 
human rights activism.  As you may know, much of the scholarship on 
international activism lacks attention to,  or ignores al l  together,  the 
significant role that  rel igion and spiri tuali ty play as sources of 
inspiration and resources for part icipation in social  justice 
movements,  including movements on behalf  of rel igious rights.   This  
summer,  I  will  be conducting interviews with human rights activists  to 
better  understand how religion and spiri tuali ty fi t  into what is  
increasingly referred to as  an emerging "global civil  society."  I  would 
greatly appreciate the opportunity to meet with you or  representatives 
from the World Federation of Methodist  and Uniting Church Women 
to discuss these issues.   
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I est imate that  the interview will  take approximately one hour and will  
focus primarily on the concerns and challenges faced by activists  and 
professionals whose work is ,  a t  least  in part ,  inspired and supported 
by religious or spiri tual  beliefs and organizations.   I  am especially 
interested in discussing organizations '  relationships with international 
inst i tut ions,  and the importance of rel igion and belief to issues such as 
insti tutional access,  resource capacity and intercultural  dialogue.   
 
My intention is  for this project  to be useful to human rights  supporters  
in their  efforts  to build bridges across rel igious and secular tradit ions 
and to assist  in efforts  to create more culturally diverse and inclusive 
insti tutions.   A summary of this study, once completed,  will  be 
provided to al l  part icipants.   If  you are will ing to part icipate,  please 
indicate below and return this let ter  in the enclosed envelope,  or 
respond by e-mail  to the following address:  elb10@cornell .edu.   Your 
part icipation will  be extremely helpful  and much appreciated.    
 
 
Kindest  Regards,  
 
 
Evelyn L. Bush 
Doctoral  Candidate 
Cornell  University 
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_____  Yes,  a representative from our organization  will  part icipate in 
an interview.  We have representatives in or near the following 
locations:  
 
Name of representat ive to contact   
__________________________________________________________ 
 
  
APPENDIX B 
WHAT IS A RELIGIOUS NGO? 
 
To examine how secularism  and individualism  might be 
associated with IGO ties,  I  init ial ly dist inguished among five types of 
organizational missions that  differ from one another in terms of their  
consistency with the principles of secularism and individual ism.  
 
1.   I  labeled the firs t  mission secular human rights .   These religious 
NGOs are no different from secular NGOs in terms of how they 
publicly frame their  approach to human rights.   Their  mission 
statements give no indication that  they are involved in evangelism, 
and they make no dist inctions regarding the religious preferences of 
ei ther vict ims of human rights violations or the activists  that  their  
organizations mobil ize.   I f  they focus on religious freedom, i t  is  
framed universally,  without discrimination against  or preference for 
any particular rel igion.  Pax Christ i  International is  an example of an 
NGO that  was coded as  Secular Human Rights .   Their  mission 
statement  reads in part  as follows: 
 
Pax Christ i  International is  a  non-profit ,  non-
governmental  Catholic peace movement that  began in 
France at  the end of World War II .  Today, i t  is  comprised 
of autonomous national sections,  local  groups,  and 
affi l iated organisations spread over  30 countries and 5 
continents ,  with over 60,000 members worldwide.  The 
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movement  works in all  areas of peace but has a specific 
focus on demili tarisation,  security and arms trade,  
development and human rights,  and ecology. 
                       
Pax Christ  International’s work is  based in spiri tuali ty.  I t  
is  a Catholic organisation but welcomes all  rel igious 
groups and str ives for dialogue and co-operation with 
non-governmental  organisations and movements working 
in the same field – Christ ian,  Jewish,  Muslim and non-
religious.   
 
 
2 .  The category Faith-Based Activism  includes NGOs whose stated 
goal is  to inform or mobilize persons or  groups of a part icular faith 
tradit ion into human rights activism.  An example of an NGO coded as 
Faith-Based Activism  is  The Buddhist  Peace Fellowship.   Their  
mission statement  reads,  in part :  
 
Buddhist  Peace Fellowship's  open-hearted engagement  
with the world is  expressed through expanding programs 
in the United States and Asia.  Through BPF, Buddhists  of 
many different tradi t ions are developing individual and 
group responses to socially condit ioned suffering…. 
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Through our worldwide network of members,  we str ive to 
bring peace where there is  conflict ,  to promote 
communication and cooperation among Buddhist  sanghas,  
and to alleviate suffering wherever possible….. The 
mission of the Buddhist  Peace Fellowship (BPF),  founded 
in 1978, is  to serve as a catalyst  and agent for socially 
engaged Buddhism. Our aim is to help beings l iberate 
themselves from the suffering that  manifests  in 
individuals,  relationships,  inst i tutions,  and social  systems. 
BPF's   programs, publications,  and practice groups l ink 
Buddhist  teachings of wisdom and compassion with 
progressive social  change.  
 
 
3.   I  labeled the third category Collective Rights .   This category 
includes organizations that  explici t ly work to protect  the rights of 
their  own religious group.  They are dist inct  from NGOs that  promote 
religious freedom in general ,  which were coded as Secular Human 
Rights .   To the extent that  they deviate from the individualist  rel igious 
rights frame, ( i .e.  their  focus on a single but entire group implies a 
more collectivist  or ientation toward human rights) ,  they are at  odds 
with world cultural  discourse.   Action for Post-Soviet  Jewry is  an 
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example of an NGO coded  Collective Rights .   Their  mission statement  
reads,  in part ,  as  follows: 
 
Action for  Post-Soviet  Jewry, Inc.  (APSJ) is  a private,  
non-profit ,  human rights organization dedicated to helping 
Jews in the former Soviet  Union (FSU) as well  as 
part icipating in general  human rights work and 
humanitar ian aid projects.  APSJ was founded in 1975 in 
response to the struggle of Jews in the Soviet  Union to 
emigrate and to l ive freely as Jews.   
 
 
4.   The category Religious Reform includes NGOs that  emphasize the 
protection of  the rights of  vulnerable groups within religious 
communities .   These NGOs typically focus on improving human rights 
practices,  often for women, within part icular rel igious insti tutions,  
communit ies or cultures.   Religious Reform is  very compatible with 
individual ist  norms pertaining to rel igious freedom, in that  i t  
privileges the r ights of the individual over those of the group.  An 
example of an organization coded as Religious Reform is  the Quixote 
Center,  whose mission statement reads,  in part :  
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The Quixote Center  is  a faith-based,  social  justice center 
working with people who have few resources for their  
struggles.   We strive to make our world,  our nation and 
our church more just ,  peaceful  and equitable in their  
policies and practices.    
 
Catholics  Speak Out [a  program of the Quixote Center]  
works for reform in the Catholic Church, and adult  
responsibil i ty for faith.  In part icular,  the project  works 
towards equali ty and justice within the Church and 
dialogue between the lai ty and hierarchy on issues of 
sexuali ty,  sexual orientation and reproduction.  
 
5.   The category labeled Individual Rights  includes NGOs whose 
mission includes the promotion or expansion of  a particular religious 
tradit ion .   These organizations explici t ly state that  evangelism, 
rel igious education,  or similar at tempts to spread their  rel igious 
tradit ion,  are amongst their  goals.1  On the one hand, Individual Rights 
is  at  odds with the secularism of world culture,  in that  i t  implies the 
promotion of rel igion as framework for defining the moral order.   I t  is  
implici t ly consistent ,  however,  with the individualist  interpretat ion of 
human rights,  which emphases the rights  of individuals to convert  or 
1 An NGO was not coded as MISSION4 if its goal was only cultural preservation in the form of 
historical societies, libraries or museums.  
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seek converts.   An example of an NGO coded as Individual Rights is  
Catholics Against  Capital  Punishment,  whose mission statement  reads,  
in part :                
                   
Catholics Against  Capital  Punishment was founded in 
              1992 to promote greater awareness of Catholic Church 
               teachings that  characterize capital  punishment as 
               unnecessary,  inappropriate and unacceptable in today's  world.   
               I t  does this in three ways:  
 
                  
 
    * By disseminating news of Catholic-oriented 
                   anti-death penal ty efforts through i ts  newsletter ,  CACP 
                   News Notes,  and this web si te.  
 
                  * By communicating the Church's  teachings on the 
                  issue to federal  and state lawmakers,  especially those 
                  who are Catholic ,  urging them to resist  proposed 
                  legislat ion imposing or extending the use of the death 
                  penalty,  and to work for repeal of such laws currently 
                  on the books.  
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                  * By encouraging members of the Catholic hierarchy, 
                  clergy and religious groups to speak out more 
                  forcefully against  capital  punishment .                                                        
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